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ABSTRACT

My dissertation is a speculative analysis of the historical contexts of a social
protest, based on the notion of ―articulation‖ advanced in the field of cultural studies.
Focusing on the 2008 candlelight protest against U.S. beef in South Korea, my goal is to
explore the historical contexts of the protest, which formulate the identity of the protest.
Since the U.S. beef deal was approved by the Korean government as a precondition for
the Free Trade Agreement between Korea and the United States, the protest has been
considered (notably by leftists in Korea) as a resistance against post-colonial overtones
and fascist eco-political principle in the era of neoliberal globalization. Instead of
understanding the protest from such an essentialist perspective, my research makes a
commitment to exploring the exterior factors that drove the possibility of the protest. The
notion of articulation, a mode of explanation that moves beyond any linear sort of
causality, provides a framework to view the protest not as a unity, but as a linkage of
multi-dimensional (political, economic, social, and cultural) elements of historical
contexts. Based on my journal entries written during my participation in the protest, and
the journal articles about the 2008 protest written by the scholars in Korea, I explored the
main characteristics of the protest in comparison with the conventional social movements
in Korea, and discovered that the 2008 candlelight protest had featured the ―food safety
issue,‖ ―participants with heterogeneous desires,‖ ―carnivalesque modality,‖ and an
―ambiguous goal.‖ From these main features, I inferred four salient axes of historical
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vectors (and their forces) including ―political democratization and depoliticization,‖
―food industrialization and wellbeing fever,‖ ―market liberalization and job insecurity,‖
and ―advanced communication technology and carnivalesque culture.‖ My research
findings present that the 2008 candlelight protest is not a definite insurgent element
calling for any deep change in the dominant political and economic paradigm, but exists
as a paradoxical event at the cusp between subordination to and resistance against
neoliberal globalization. The main contribution of my research project entails (1) pushing
the boundaries of communication studies on social resistance by including the notion of
articulation which situates the 2008 candlelight protest within its historical contexts, (2)
developing speculative analysis as a critical and cultural studies method for exploring
structural forces operating in deep layers of our experiences, (3) delineating the new
modalities of contemporary social movements by examining the concrete textures and
hues of the 2008 candlelight protest, and (4) offering new ways of (re)thinking the
principles of efficiency and economic growth by interrogating a case of food
industrialization and global exchange.
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CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION

It is nighttime, and a deep indigo sky looms overhead. I am walking amid a crowd
of thousands of people; our shoulders bump together and my voice becomes intertwined
and entangled with the murmurs, exclamations, and hushed dialogue surrounding me.
These people are protesters, just as I am. We slowly make our way toward the Blue
House, the sprawling residence of the Korean president, Lee Myung-bak, although none
of us truly believes we will be allowed to speak to him. Each of us cups a flickering
candle in our hands as a symbol of the peaceful intent of our march, creating a glittering
river of protesters that floods the streets and sidewalks from Seoul Square to Sejong
Avenue. Traffic has come to a complete standstill.
As we draw nearer to the Blue House, our voices rise, and we chant our slogans
more fervently. Our quiet shuffle shifts into a rapid staccato of footsteps as we rush
toward the entrance to Samcheong-dong, the location of the Blue House. And there,
grimly waiting to meet us, are hundreds of riot police, their buses barricading our
destination.
For a moment, the sea of protesters pauses, and silence rolls in like a sudden,
thick fog. Then a single voice pierces the air and urges us all to pass through Kyungbok
Palace so we can access another road to the Blue House. We surge toward the palace wall
and deftly build rough inclines against the wall using stones. Once over the wall, we run
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toward the front gate. A massive, heavy crossbar lies forbiddingly across it. But this will
not stop us. Together we reach out and, with our united strength, lift the immense
crossbar and push open the gates.
But yet again, row upon row of riot police and buses are there to greet us. Nearly
ten thousand protesters are present, but not a single one of us can take another step
forward.
Later, some protesters, attempting to get a better idea of how many riot police we
are facing, try to climb over the buses. This is a mistake. The riot police respond with
water cannons. Protesters fall beneath the high-pressure stream of water, which hits them
on their torsos, eyes, ears, and mouths. Without real provocation, the protestors are
subjected to intense violence, which they take with little resistance. I watch the scene,
frozen with horror and disbelief. Beside me stand protesters with tears in their eyes.
This quelling of the protest by the police occurred in downtown Seoul at midnight
on May 31, 2008, approximately one month after the South Korean government agreed to
resume beef imports from the United States (on April 18, 2008). South Korea (Korea
hereafter), the third largest market for American beef, worth $800 million a year (by
1999), suspended its imports in 2003 after an outbreak of Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy (BSE), known commonly as mad cow disease. As it was known that
eating meat contaminated with BSE is linked to the variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in
humans (a degenerative brain disease), 65 nations including Korea adopted full or partial
restrictions on importing American beef products by 2006 (―The Life and Death of
BSE‖).
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In 2007, when the United States was recognized by the World Organization for
Animal Health (OIE) as a ―BSE controlled risk country,‖ nations began to resume
opening their markets to U.S. beef. Korea‘s resumption of U.S. beef imports, however,
was problematic in that its government‘s agreement was carried out with only a few
restrictions on meat shipments.1 For example, whereas Taiwan and Japan restricted
imports of American beef from cattle older than 20 months, Korea permitted U.S. beef
imports from cattle over 30 months of age despite the belief that such beef was at
particular risk of carrying mad cow disease, having been raised before the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) completely banned feeding the remains of other cattle in the
form of meat and bone meal (MBM), which is known to generate the agent of the disease.
In addition, Korea allowed the import of certain cow parts, such as brains, eyes, skulls,
spinal cords that were known to contain higher risk of carrying the disease.
Despite the known risks, the Korean government justified its decision by claiming
that the U.S. beef market resumption was the country‘s best path to economic growth.
Korea‘s approval of beef imports was, indeed, given for the purpose of expanded trade
agreements with the United States. Korea‘s desire for the Republic of Korea and the
United States Free Trade Agreement (the KorUS FTA hereafter) was accompanied by
U.S. insistence on resuming the beef imports. U.S. congressional leaders had warned that
they would never ratify the pact for expansive deals unless Korea fully reopened its
markets to American beef (and automobiles). Simply put, the resumption of American
beef imports was a precondition for the United States‘ approval of the wide-ranging trade
agreement. Through the KorUS FTA, the Korean government claimed, Korean
1

Manyin 2.

On the sanitary rules of the U.S. beef deal approved by Korea in 2008, I referred to Jerenas and
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conglomerates would achieve more opportunities to export automobiles, cellular phones,
and other goods to the United States. According to the government, these measures were
ultimately necessary for Korea to escape its economic stagnation.
However, with mounting fear of mad cow disease among the Korean public, tens
of thousands of people spilled into central Seoul, outraged and concerned about Lee‘s
decision. Undoubtedly, the government made a misjudgment. Some protesters questioned
how the government could attempt to rescue the (capitalist) ―system‖ at the cost of
putting its ―humans‖ at risk: wasn‘t the (capitalist) ―system‖ supposed to raise the quality
of ―human‖ life? Tension mounted between the protesters‘ value on safety and the
government‘s value on economic growth. Marching in the middle of driveways, the
protesters blocked traffic completely. As Michel de Certeau states that all bodily
articulation, whether spoken or moved, has the capacity to enunciate (5–7); protesters‘
bodies, jostling, clamoring, and disrupting traffic rules, were making the rhetorical claim,
―We do not want the beef! We cannot allow the foreign virus to threaten our health,
brains and lives.‖
The steadily increasing number of the participants, however, faced the
government‘s response of physical violence. The government directed the police to
heavily repress the protest. More than ten thousand riot police were released, building
barricades with their buses around Seoul Square and Sejong Avenue for the purpose of
blocking protesters from marching to the Blue House. They exercised a series of illegal
and drastic measures, using water cannons and tear gas in the course of cracking down on
the demonstrations. These unjustifiable measures were defended by the government‘s
claim that the protest was an illegal act in the sense that nighttime open-air assembly is
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prohibited by Korean law. The police measures led to the injury of hundreds of protesters
and to the detainment of approximately two hundred.
The violent police measures, however, still could not impede the marches of the
candlelight protesters; the 2008 protest reached beyond the fences of farms, factories, and
ivory towers to general citizens from across the political and economic spectrum. The
number of protest participants reached 50,000 on June 5, 200,000 on June 6, 150,000 on
June 7, and the rally held on June 10 was climaxed with one million people. Lee‘s
government was paralyzed by protesters‘ outpourings of anti-regime sentiment and sent a
delegation to the United States for additional negotiations regarding beef imports.
Finally a revision of U.S. beef import conditions was made in June of the year.2
American beef import rom cattle 30 months and older was barred from Korea, and an age
certification for all meat shipped to Korea was promised. Imports of cattle parts like
brains, eyes, skulls, and spinal cords, which are possibly more dangerous, were also
forbidden. In addition, Korea won the right in the accord to inspect a sampling of
American slaughterhouses—beef that had been in frozen storage in Korea for months
could be inspected before heading to stores. Having continued for the three months of
summer (from mid-May to mid-August), the 2008 candlelight protest ended, having
made its mark as possibly the country‘s largest social movement in 20 years.
Research Statement
Surprised at the large scale and continuity of the 2008 candlelight protest, Korean
commentators have dubbed it an ―unpredicted dramatic twist‖ in Korean politics (Chae
130; Cho and Park 4; H. Han 12). The Korean public had shown their political inclination
2

On the revised sanitary rules of the U.S. beef imports through the additional negotiation, I
referred to Jerenas and Manyin 8–9; Reuters, ―South Korea to restart‖; the public issue discussion website
in Korea Aagendanet.co.kr.
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toward conservatism both through the presidential and general elections. Lee Myung-bak,
who officially promised broad-based relaxation of regulations of the financial sector, won
the presidency on February 25, 2008, just two months before the protest. The newly
elected president had accorded priority to rebuilding Korea‘s political and economic
alliance with the United States and attempted to remove the ―biggest barrier‖ of the
KorUS FTA (resuming beef imports) to mend ties with the United States (Cho, ―South
Korea will Lift‖). This reveals that Korean conservatism has not been tradition-oriented
or nationalist, but rather, pursued globalization as a mutation of modernization (Chae
132–3). In the wake of Lee‘s achievement of presidency, his Grand National Party also
had gained a majority of parliamentary seats in the general election. These election
results could be read as the Korean public‘s belief of the necessity to step into the swirl of
economic globalization in order to revitalize the national economy.
How, then, could so many people, who seemingly had demonstrated a high degree
of support for free-market ideology, come to articulate their discontent against economic
globalization that took shape in the KorUS FTA? What drove those who had voted for
conservatives to invest their time and energy in the protest against market-driven
policies?3 How could middle and high school students, who were already exhausted from
the burdens of grade competition and the hectic school schedule, come to jumpstart the
protest? How could mothers, who had been the group of citizens working primarily at
home as nurturers and caregivers, come to march against a diplomatic policy in the
middle of driveways? How much weight did the issue of potential mad cow disease from

3

In a TV interview, some protesters related that they were politically conservative, but still came
to participate in the protest.
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American beef carry in the protest? Was the issue weighty enough to lead Korean
political history to such dramatic twist?
The government conservatives were shocked facing such sustained opposition to
their decision. It became evident that they had not anticipated such a resistance by the
question they used for interrogating the arrested protesters from overnight rallies: ―Who
is pulling the strings behind you?‖ This question exposes the conservatives‘ disbelief that
the vast majority of people would have voluntarily left their suburban homes to enter the
bustling and sometimes violent protest venues for the purpose of standing against the
government‘s decision.
The mainstream conservative newspapers hurriedly attempted to answer the
question, explaining that the protest was driven by individuals misguided by antiAmerican forces. In its editorial section, Dong-A Ilbo stated on April 28, 2008 that ―some
anti-American civil organizations . . . are inflaming public sentiments. … In every respect,
it is just an anti-American instigation‖ (my translation). Similarly, Chosun Ilbo reported
on May 2 that ―the opposition forces to KorUS FTA are reinforcing the danger of mad
cow disease in order to block American beef imports and to incite anti-Americanism.‖ On
May 5, it reported that ―anti-American forces united to work together, so even middle and
high school students, lacking in judgment, are bounding out onto streets with candles‖
(my translations). Essentially, the conservative newspapers regarded the protesters as
puppets whose strings were being pulled by leftist instigators.
However, it does not sound preposterous to define the protest as anti-American
movement merely because it was against American beef. It is an old trick for
conservatives to exploit the specific history of the Korean peninsula, which had suffered
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from ideological antagonism in the contexts of the Cold War. Since the Korean War
(1950–3)—a proxy war between South Korea sponsored by the United Nations,
particularly the United States, and North Korea supported by the People‘s Republic of
China with military material aid from the Soviet Union—South Korean conservatives had
emphasized extreme hatred toward communism like American McCarthyism, and also
drawn an odd equation between ―leftist,‖ ―pro-communist,‖ ―pro-North Korean,‖ and
―anti-American‖ forces. By using this equation as their rhetorical strategy, the
conservatives had attempted to erode the bedrock of their opponents by fostering an
atmosphere of terror, ultimately in order to maintain their status quo (Chae 134). In
Korean political history, once a person or group was labeled ―anti-American,‖ the person
or group could easily be considered a rebellious element that would bring detrimental
chaos and tragedy to the society.4 The major newspapers‘ stigmatization of the protest as
an anti-American movement is in the same vein.
How, then, could the Korean public come to dramatically twist their political
standpoints and articulate their discontent against economic globalization? My
dissertation project aims to address this question and more on the identity of the 2008
candlelight protest. More than simply summarizing the protest as a pro-health response to
global food exchange or detailing what the protest achieved, my research project aims to
present the culturescapes that created the possibility of the protest. In other words, rather
than defining the protest based on its interior characteristic features, I pay more attention
to how the 2008 protest was able to win large and diverse public support, as a path to

4

The student-led, pro-democratic movements against the military dictatorship in the 1980s were
too often the victims of such labeling. The emotion of fear about communism and North Korea, doubtlessly,
has been the key tool for manipulating public opinion and enforcing the conservatives‘ major decisions in
Korea.
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reach the identity of the 2008 protest. Stuart Hall‘s idea about the ―political possibilities
of the masses‖ captures the intention of my research question: ―For something to become
popular entails a struggle; it is never a simple process. It doesn‘t just happen‖
(―Gramsci‘s Relevance‖ 5). In its simplest form, my main inquiry in this research is about:
who/what was pulling the strings behind the 2008 candlelight protest?
However, I am not in search of any singular element of the protest‘s historical
context, because there is no single structure or dimension of human life that stitches
everything into place such that its patterns are indelibly sewn into the fabric of history. In
this sense, Lawrence Grossberg‘s concept of ―articulation,‖ quite similar to what Hall
underlines, is pivotal to my project.5 The notion of articulation leads us to conceive of an
event not as an object but as a process––―its practice, its problematic and its specificity
[of an event] can only be understood in response to particular historical contexts‖ (45).
Under the rubrics of ―articulation,‖ an event or practice is placed within a matrix of
complex-tangled historical contexts. Articulation is a mode of explanation that moves
beyond any linear sort of causality. Accordingly, my research project explores the
political, social, economic, and cultural factors during certain historical periods of time
that produce the possibility of the 2008 protest, all of which are too complex and
contradictory to be conceived in terms of a simple relationship. I attempt to explore these
complex factors to formulate the identity of the 2008 candlelight protest. The findings of
this research project, I hope, help those who have passions toward democratic designs
better envisage the locations and directions of contemporary social movements to map
out their plans.
5

Indeed, I am indebted to Grossberg in this research project. My hope is to further develop his
notion by applying it to the 2008 candlelight protest.
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In the remaining part of the introduction, I discuss the significance of this research
and provide an overview of this project. The concept of ―articulation‖ is discussed in
Chapter 2.
Significance of Research
Theoretically, my research project extends the boundaries of communication
studies on collective resistance by introducing the notion of articulation (advanced in
cultural studies) as theoretical and methodological frameworks for understanding the
historical context of an event or a practice. Extant communication studies, particularly
those in Korea (to be discussed in detail in Chapter 2), have mainly focused on
communication modalities and technologies used in social movements. As ―cultural
studies‖ provides a contextualist perspective, the concept of articulation presents a theory
of context (Grossberg 45). Gaining a sense of how historical forces play out to influence
a practice enables us to more clearly see where struggles are possible and also
demonstrates the multi-faceted nature of struggles.
The second theoretical merit of my research project is in the fact that it
experimentally places speculative analysis (to be discussed in detail in Chapter 3) as a
research method in social science. Empirical and positivist studies are unquestionably
dominant approaches to both research and theory construction in social science;
―speculation‖ mostly tends to be frowned upon. I attempt to develop speculative analysis
as a critical and cultural studies method for exploring structural forces that operate within
deep layers of our daily experiences. Although social structure is real and part of our lives,
we cannot understand it through sensory experience or through logical and mathematical
treatment of the data obtained from the sensory experience. My argument about the
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methodology thus foregrounds the idea that any research cannot be isolated from the
researcher‘s speculation, based on his or her insights, political stances, and morals.
My research project has four more practical significances. It first calls on readers
to rethink the principles of democracy. Korean conservative pundits have been very vocal
in the criticism of social protests including the 2008 candlelight protest with their
emphasis on ―representative/parliamentary democracy‖ system as an ideal and possible
model of democracy in reality.6 By examining the standpoints of the 2008 protesters, my
research project attempts to locate social protest as a method to reinforce representative
democratic system, and as a justifiable ―civil right of disobedience and resistance‖ (Nam
261).
Second, my research project delineates the new modalities of contemporary social
movements through its focus on the textures and hues of the 2008 candlelight protest,
which shares the characteristics of recent social protests in the world such as Arab Spring
in 2010, Occupy Wall Street in 2011, etc. First, like the other social protests, the 2008
candlelight protest refused to accept the legitimacy of the existing legal and political
order. Second, the 2008 protest was not sharply focused or fiercely committed to a single
issue. Rather, it covered various ranges of issues from food safety, social economic
inequality, health care, education, journalism to some other neoliberal agenda. This
appears to be featured by its participants across political and economic spectrums,
deploying heterogeneous desires. Fourth, the 2008 protest, led by information
technology-savvy youth, effectively utilized communication technologies (such as the
Internet, electronic messaging, blogs, videos, and other sources) to build solidarity, to

6

The pundits such as Lee Han-gu, Kim Sang-bae, Kim Il-Young, Huh Woo-young, Shin Jung-sub,
etc. have taken the position. The details of their opinions will be discussed in Chapter 3.
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raise awareness of its issues, and to encourage people to join. Fifty, the 2008 protest
utilized new ways of political engagement mixed with cultural imagination (such as irony,
satire, and parody) and developed anti-hierarchical and anti-authoritarian consensusbased politics, all of which became main approaches to protest and activism. Readers of
my dissertation project will understand the different angles, qualities, and nuances
typified in current social movements from the conventional movements.
Third, my research project draws attention to the postcolonial overtones of
globalization with the discussion on the unequal relationship between Korea and the
United States in the establishment of the KorUS FTA. Globalization, as a political,
cultural, technological, and economic phenomenon, has manifested through neoliberal
policies across the world. Globalization fosters growth and technological advancement,
creates new forms of network societies and knowledge, and facilitates human interactions,
giving people more options through an easier exchange of ideas made possible by the
Internet and telecommunications. On the flip side, however, globalization exacerbates the
existing power and resource differentials between the global north and south and
increases global power disparities and inequitable trade/economic relations. In particular,
―free trade‖7 is in the range of neoliberal tools that the major powers in the world (such as
the United States, the European Union, financial institutions, transnational corporations,
and multinational organizations) have used to drive other countries to conform to their
game plan of political and economic domination (Sang-gu Kang 50). Focusing on the
protest in Korea against American beef imports, which began in May 2008, my research
7

―Free trade‖ is a market model in which trade in goods and services between or within countries
flows unhindered by government-imposed restrictions including taxes and other legislation such as tariff
and non-tariff trade barriers. In the phrase of ―free trade,‖ ―free‖ might imply that the global market
guarantees democratic equality of opportunities between or among countries without any regulation from
any power-groups or power-countries.

13
project calls attention to one of the consistently problematic aspects of economic
globalization—inequality.
Fourth, my research project highlights issues of food safety and sovereignty,
caused by food industrialization and global food exchanges. The United States, markedly,
has industrialized its food system into large-scale monoculture farms to maximize
productivity, and acts as a hegemonic vector in food distribution, leading to critical food
safety and sovereignty issues. By focusing on the rallies that voice fears about the
possible health risks of U.S. beef (such as mad cow disease), my research interrogates the
canonical economic logic of ―Homo Economicus‖ (Herman Daly famously
problematized) that currently guides food industrialization and globalization, and calls for
a rethinking of ethical meanings made in connection with food industrialization and
globalization.
Overview of Dissertation
The rest of this research project is organized into six chapters. In Chapter 2, I
examine the existing discussions about the 2008 candlelight protest with my critical
perspective and explore the notion of ―articulation‖ as a theoretical framework for
understanding how the 2008 protest was able to win large and diverse public support.
Articulation, which implies ―a variation on a history or a political event happens at a
juncture of different and distinctive cultural practices‖ (Grossberg 54), leads me to
hypothesize that the articulation of discontent against economic globalization is not
simply a discursive unity but a contingent linkage of different vectors and forces of social
structures.
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In Chapter 3, I explain the methodology of this project. I elaborate on
―speculative analysis‖ as a method to analyze the historical vectors that orchestrated the
protest. I define ―speculative analysis‖ as an analysis strategy to infer configuration of
likely reality from a number of verifiable elements. I use this speculative analysis strategy
to infer the historical vectors and forces of the 2008 candlelight protest (configuration of
likely reality), presented in Chapter 5, from its main features (the verifiable elements that
I comprehend through my observation of the protest and the extant relevant literatures),
presented in Chapter 4.
Chapter 4 describes the characteristic features of the 2008 candlelight protest.
Understanding the characteristics of the protest is important in examining the historical
context of how the wide range of protest participants came to present their human agency
in the form of resistance. This chapter is divided into four sections, each of which
respectively examines the different nuances of the protest including: ―Issue: Food Safety,
Health and Life,‖ ―Participants: Heterogeneous Desires,‖ ―Modality: Serious State and
Humorous Protesters,‖ and ―Goal: Leaving Myung-bak Castle.‖ From these
characteristics of the protest, the historical context of the protest is inferred and further
discussed in chapter 5.
Chapter 5 portrays the national and international landscapes of South Korea as a
canvas for the 2008 candlelight protest. I have categorized this historical context into four
subcontexts: ―Political Democratization and Depoliticization,‖ ―Global Food Exchanges
and Well-being Yol-pung,‖ ―Market Liberalization and Job Insecurity,‖ and
―Development of Communication Technology and the Carnivalesque.‖ These factors are
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the elements that will help me lay out the mold and identity of the protest as well as the
meanings made and shared around this historical event.
Chapter 6 summarizes and concludes this research project. Based on the matrix of
complex-tangled historical vectors and forces that produced the possibility of the 2008
candlelight protest, my research project presents the paradoxical quality of the 2008
candlelight protest: although it is true that the 2008 candlelight protest was shifting the
frame and tempo of capitalist globalization, the protesters were not a definite insurgent
element calling for any deep change in the dominant political and economic paradigm.
The 2008 candlelight protest exists at the cusp between subordination to and resistance
against neoliberal globalization, providing large support for Grossberg‘s insight about
historical struggles as ―neither pure resistance nor pure domination but rather, as caught
between containment and possibility‖ (22).
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CHAPTER 2:
LITERATURE REVIEW

The 2008 candlelight protest against U.S. beef imports in Korea embodies the
meaning of the counter-hegemonic struggle against the doctrine of economic growth. The
doctrine of economic growth indicates an ideology or attitude that sets economic agendas
and increasing efficiency as the overarching goals across the spectrums of society,
politics, and culture (Chae 137–40). Achieving social hegemony8, this principle has often
justified deferring or canceling various social values such as democracy, human rights,
safety, and pluralism in Korean history. As Antonio Gramsci astutely states, society, by
nature, is not a static, closed system of ruling groups; rather, it is in constant flux, where
subjects or agents dynamically deploy struggles to (de/re)construct common sense to
achieve hegemony or counter-hegemonies (12). The 2008 candlelight protest
symbolically arose from a refusal to accept the Korean government‘s apologetics in its
decision to achieve economic growth.
Indeed, the issue of protest has been a topic of research in the field of
communication studies in that counter-hegemonic discourse formation, social resistance
and solidarity all revolve around communication processes and strategies. Through their
8

I use the concept ―hegemony‖ as the ensemble of interests, beliefs, and practices exerted by the
dominant fundamental group, based on Gramsci‘s work. Gramsci conceptualizes ―hegemony‖ as ―the
‗spontaneous‘ consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on
social life by the dominant fundamental group. Accordingly, in my work, ―hegemony‖ refers to ―power‖
with its legitimacy—power that has the capacity to protect common and shared values (Gramsci 12).
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research and praxis, Korean communication scholars9 have explored different
characteristics of the 2008 candlelight protest—solidarity it garnered, the modality of its
development, and the outcomes/impacts of the protest on the Korean public‘s ordinary
lives. Of particular note is their finding that ordinary citizens formed their point of view
through Internet forums and discussions, and orchestrated the protest through superefficient communication technologies (such as the Internet, wireless Internet-access
devices, personal digital assistants, cellular phones, etc.); the protest, saturated with new
communication media, was deployed through its unique communication modalities.
I found that the studies of the protests by communication scholars in Korea have
captured a trendy convergence of social movement and information technologies in one
of the world‘s leading Internet-infrastructure nations, Korea. Communication studies,
however, has paid minimal attention to the historical contexts of the Korean protest
movement. Information technology (especially the Internet) surely assumed pivotal roles
in mobilizing people and contributed to the protest‘s development and unique form. I
argue that information technology cannot be the singular element to characterize the
protest.
Leftist commentators locate the 2008 candlelight protest in its historical context—
the neoliberal era—which determines, enables, and constrains the possibilities and effects
of the protest. The commentators pay special attention to the fact that the protest was
ultimately opposed to the idea of using the KorUS FTA as a means to push Korea further
into neoliberalism. Taking the historical context into consideration, the leftist
commentators believe that the protest against the KorUS FTA (particularly U.S. beef

9

In this manuscript, Korean communication scholars and Korean leftist intellectuals refer to those
scholars/intellectuals who have had their works on the 2008 protest published in Korean academic outlets.
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imports) is a local collective resistance against capitalist globalization, accelerated by
neoliberalism.
Although the left-leaning commentators attempt to justify the protest within its
historical context, they do not seem to take into account the full range of heterogeneous
desires in the protest venues. Not all protesters appeared to be able to rationally engage in
the geopolitical calculus of commerce that is likely driven by neoliberal globalization. In
this chapter and in my project, I widen the horizons of discussion on the protest by
articulating the concept of articulation.
The concept of articulation helps to locate a practice or an event in its complextangled historical contexts (within which the practice or the event occurs and on which
the practice or the event has influence). By including the concept of articulation, I attempt
to push the boundaries of communication studies on social movements that are confined
to communication modalities and technologies; simultaneously, I intend to widen the
range of discussion on social movements to cover multi-dimensional forces that drive the
movements. My effort to develop the concept of articulation as the theoretical framework
for my research project, however, does not imply a rejection of the extant perspectives
addressed by Korean communication scholars and leftist commentators; rather, I aim to
de-articulate and re-articulate the existing discussions on the 2008 candlelight protest.
In the rest of this chapter, I first examine the extant discourses on the 2008
candlelight protest in communication studies scholarship in Korea and then move to the
leftist commentaries on the historical contexts of the protest. Then, I elaborate on the
concept of ―articulation.‖ This concept, developed in cultural studies, provides theoretical
and methodological frameworks for understanding the multi-dimensional and multi-
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directional historical contexts of the 2008 candlelight protest in this research project.
Simply put, my aim is to discover the specificity of the political event—the protest—in
cultural spaces. I conclude this chapter with research questions that elucidate the goal of
my research project.
The 2008 Candlelight Protest in Communication Studies
One of the outstanding features of the protest was that various communication
technologies were used, including the Internet, mobile phones, Short Message Service
(SMS) and Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS). Most communication scholars in
Korea turned their attention to new media, which mobilized a large number of
participants and prompted the protest to develop in its unique form. I accessed an online
resource website DBpia (www.dbpia.com), a scholarly, multi-disciplinary database, and
retrieved fourteen essays from the journals in communication disciplines regarding the
2008 candlelight protest. Among the fourteen essays, only two essays discussed how
mass media represent the issue of U.S. beef imports; the rest of the essays were devoted
to exploring what roles new media took on for the protest.
One of the main strands of communication research on the 2008 candlelight
protest is related to how the protesters utilized the Internet as a ―public sphere.‖ Jürgen
Habermas‘ notion of the public sphere is the most popular theory that has been discussed
regarding Internet websites in Korea. In his book The Structural Transformation of the
Public Sphere (1989), Habermas depicts the emergence of a European bourgeois public
sphere spearheading the development of capitalism in the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries. According to Habermas, private individuals publicized and exchanged their
views and knowledge on matters of general interests through newspapers, journals,
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reading clubs, and in Masonic lodges and coffee houses, without being subjected to
coercion. Essentially, the public sphere was a place between private individuals and
government authority, open to all, where people could participate in rational-critical
debates on issues of public interest. Habermas believed that when individuals accessed
the sphere with equal rights and assembled their opinions through rational procedures,
they could reach a consensus that would serve as a counterweight to political authority.
With its possibility of democratic control of state activity, Habermas emphasized the
significance of the ―public sphere.‖ However, with the transition of the liberal bourgeois
society to the modern mass society,10 the promise of the public sphere declined. The
sphere of publicness turned into a site of self-interested contestation for the resources of
the state and commerce; for example, journalism began to take on the role of consumer
services—striving to entertain customers by providing them with tips and features on
fashion, food, travel, etc.
Taking into consideration the Habermasian notion of the public sphere,
communication scholars in Korea focused their attention on the space where private
individuals came together to have discussions and debates regarding the U.S. beef
imports on the Internet. The scholars examined whether the promise of the public sphere
as a counterweight to political authority was invoked. The information and discussions on
the Internet led many Internet community members to become involved in the protest.

10

According to Habermas, a new constellation of philosophical, social, cultural, and political
developments took shape, extending from the late nineteenth century to the early twentieth century. The
philosophical progression against classical liberalism coincided with the exposing of contradictions
inherent in the liberal constitutional social order. The emergence of state interventionism and the welfare
state blurred the demarcation between state and society and subsequently obliterated a clear distinction
between public and private. Major socio-economic transformations based on industrialization resulted in
the rise of mass societies characterized by consumer capitalism. The serial changes derived the decline of
the public sphere.
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Park Tae-soun states that the Internet transformed the structure of communication
in the public sphere (120–40). Mass media, which has traditionally held a pivotal role in
the public sphere, struggles with the gap between producer and consumer, in which social
power groups (politicians, government bureaucrats, media powers, among others) may
intervene. The advanced communication technology, the Internet, however, provides a
space where general citizens can assume the roles of both producer and consumer. Park
refers to this transformation of communication structure as the shift from a representative
system to an expressive system.
Lee Chang-ho and Jung Eui-chul examined Korean adolescents‘ favorite Internet
cafés, Jjugbbang Club (http://cafe.daum.net/ok211) and Bizarrerie or Truth
(http://cafe.daum.net/truepicture), and found out that these cafés, while originally
established for exchanging information about and pictures of celebrities, played a leading
role in the 2008 candlelight protest by urging adolescents to be united (388–424). The
cafés‘ adolescent members and visitors established special sections for the protest on the
websites and promoted public participation by sharing the given times and locations of
their protest assemblies as well as narrating their own experiences about participating in
the protest. Nonetheless, Lee and Jung conclude that although the Internet cafés
demonstrate some features of the public sphere, they fall short of becoming Habermas‘s
notion of the public sphere. While the Habermasian notion underlines ―deliberation‖—
discussion based on rationality and mature procedures—the discussions in the cafés
tended to be based on distorted information and groundless rumors. The adolescents often
hurled insults at government conservatives and exaggerated the horror of mad cow
disease rather than develop any rational-critical perspective on the issue.
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In agreement on the unsuitability of Habermas‘s notion of public sphere to the
Internet discussions, Hong Seong-gu turns his attention to Chantal Mouffe‘s notion of
Republicanism (77–118).11 Mouffe‘s notion begins with the acknowledgement that the
Habermasian concept of the public sphere, which assumes consensus drawn through
rational procedure of consensus (mediating among conflicting interests), suppresses the
reality of power relations. According to Mouffe, ―the political‖ is always antagonistic in
an irreducible dimension of all social relations. Mouffe asserts that democratic theory
needs to acknowledge the ineradicability of antagonism and the impossibility of
achieving a fully inclusive rational consensus (Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic
Pluralism). For Mouffe, it is impossible to reach a consensus; even if individuals reach a
political consensus, it is only temporary. Ultimately, Mouffe maintains that ―the political‖
resides in conflicts and in the ever-shifting relations between various interests, between
changing groupings of ―us‖ and ―them‖ in plural societies. Hong believes that Mouffe‘s
notion is more applicable to the public sphere encompassing the 2008 protest. While
private individuals exchanged their opinions in the non-political Internet cafés such as the
aforementioned Jjugbbang Club, and Bizarrerie or Truth, and in Internet communities
such as Daum Agora, Hong believes that power inequality and bullies could not be
ignored in the real spaces. Essentially, Hong‘s critical agreement is that although
individuals worked toward a political solidarity, the process did not necessarily entail
rational procedure for a ―consensus‖ founded on equal right.
Kim Ye-ran suggests another concept of public sphere, an ―affective public
sphere,‖ as an alternative to the Harbermasian modern notion of the public sphere. With
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her inquiry into the process of how individuals with private interests become social and
participate in a collective activity, Kim conducted interviews with members of the
women‘s Internet communities that came into prominence during the 2008 candlelight
demonstrations, including Soul Dresser, Hwa-jang-bal, Ssang-Ko, Lemon Terrace, Sesang-eul Ba-ggu-neun yeo-ja-deul (an Internet community for political discussions), and
Dae-jang-bu-ung-i (a fan club for Politician Lee Hae-chan) (146–91). Kim states that the
women habitually shared private affects, thoughts, and opinions on the Internet in their
everyday lives and reached affective consensus. When the Korean government approved
U.S. beef imports, the women started to discuss the issue because of the decision‘s direct
impact on their lives, and turned into political actors for the 2008 candlelight protest. In
Kim‘s view, individuals construct social minds, social relations, and social activities by
sharing individuals‘ affects (such as pity, joy, anger, and desire) on the Internet, rather
than sharing rational and critical perspectives. Kim finally conceptualizes such Internet
space as an ―affective public sphere,‖ meaning the social space in which human emotion,
affect, feeling, thought, and opinion are felt, communicated, shared, and activated in
bodily and symbolic interactions.12 Kim identifies the significance of an affective public
sphere in its capacity to transform various affects in ordinary lives into political actions.
Another thread of exploring the 2008 candlelight protest in communication
studies is related to the source of ―intelligence.‖ In particular, according to Park Sun-mi‘s
research, the 2008 candlelight protest showed that ―intelligence,‖ which used to reside in
a small number of intellectuals and professionals, moved to general citizens, all of whom
have incorporated new information technologies into daily life (51–93). In her research,
Park analyzes discourses within the Internet portal service Daum Agora and discovers
12

Bodily interactions indicate interactions of bodily substance such as emotions and affects.
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that the masses searched for professional information regarding the issue (e.g., the
possible danger of U.S. beef), and in doing so, they constructed their own knowledge
through their collective discussions on the Internet. Park states that in the past, the
political parties had taken the crucial role and function of ―organic intellectual‖ forming
counter-hegemonic discourses to the logics of ruling forces; however, the boundaries
between the ―organic intellectual‖ and the masses are no longer clear.
The role of journalists, assumed by general citizens during the 2008 candlelight
protest, has also been a research topic of communication scholars in Korea. During the
protest, the chances to participate in news production procedures increased from the
limited number of mass media workers to general citizens. The extant Internet news
websites, Color TV (www.jinbocolor.tv) and Oh My News (www.ohmynews.com), began
to provide real-time broadcasting services, and No Cut News (www.nocutnews.co.kr) and
Pressian (www.pressian.com) followed them. To understand the shifting role and
function of journalism in connection with the Internet‘s real-time broadcasting, Lee
Chang-ho and Bae Ae-jin conducted interviews with the reporters of the Internet
broadcasting service Broadcasting Jockey (BJ) (44–75). According to Lee and Bae, the
BJs carried laptops equipped with digital or web cameras and Wibro (wireless Internet
technology)13 to report all the happenings in the protest venues without any mediation of
(mainstream) mass media. Lee and Bae then state that the merit of Internet broadcasting
is its capacity to cover a wide range of events that terrestrial national TV channels could
never cover, while also corresponding to the requests of the Internet users and media
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Wibro (Wireless Broadband) is a wireless broadband Internet technology developed by the
Korean telecommunication industry. The two Korean companies, KT and SK telecom launched
commercial service in June 2006 and the number of subscribers was 100,000 in 2008. (qtd. in Lee and Bae
54).
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viewers. Subsequently, Lee and Bae explore a new mode of journalistic performance:
with their digital devices, some protesters recorded the events that unfolded before their
eyes, and uploaded their recordings on User Created Content (UCC) websites. Such an
alternative form of journalism, according to Lee and Bae, has the possibility of
surpassing the function of old mass media, which are limited by the deadlines and the
formulaic styles of news articles.
In his short essay, Jeon Gyu-chan focuses on the new mode of political
communicative engagement during the protest (110–29). Jeon draws on his own
observation of the protest venues as a journalism scholar and as a journalist to argue that
the candlelight protest was a voluntary and autonomous explosion of the masses‘
volitions and desires for democracy. In Jeon‘s eyes, hundreds of thousands of participants
(encompassing women, irregular workers, freelancers, teenagers, seniors, and homeless
people) communicated their emotions (such as anger and fear) and affective feelings
(delight, sadness, and hatred) through diverse media including the Internet, graffiti, fliers,
placards, and T-shirts with slogans. Although the protest was triggered by self-defensive
measures of the subjects who were exposed to the potential danger of mad cow disease,
the protest dynamically developed into collective festivals. According to Jeon, the
protesters maintained independent subjectivities through new modes of communication
with indecent, abusive, coarse and vulgar languages contained in satires, jokes, and
rumors. Jeon concludes that the 2008 candlelight protest was comprised of complexities
of the rational and reasonable and the affective and emotional.
The 2008 protesters were also known to have frequently used personal media such
as cell phones with Short Message Service (SMS) and Multimedia Messaging Service
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(MMS) in organizing the demonstrations.14 Kang Jin-suk, Jang Ji-hyun, and Choi Jongmin conducted in-depth interviews with fifteen participants, and discovered that the
protesters communicated through personal media with their acquaintance-participants and
even with strangers to encourage each other to join the protest (13). The researchers came
to the conclusion that the protest was initiated and sustained by voluntary participants
with the help of personal media, instead of being mobilized by certain organizations or
groups as Korean government conservatives claimed.
In summary, communication scholars in Korea claim that the 2008 candlelight
protest was an explosion of civil power, with digital media playing the leading roles of
developing its unique form. The scholars highlight that the protest was orchestrated by
self-mobilization and voluntary participation of ordinary people who became involved in
networks on the Internet. However, I argue that communication media is not the only
answer to the question of who/what was pulling the strings of the protest. Although
communication media were undeniably significant in mobilizing people and leading them
to continue to participate in the protest, communication technologies cannot be the
(super-) agents, which actualize democratic ideals. Considering that previous social
movements in Korean history, especially the student-led prodemocracy movements
against military dictatorship in the1980s, obtained large public support before the
emergence of the Internet and other new media such as mobile phones and text message
services, information technology is likely insufficient to be touted as the single most
important factor that attracted extensive participation during the 2008 candlelight protest.
In the next section of this chapter, I draw attention to the commentaries by Korean leftist
14
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camera-equipped handsets, and audio and video content.
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intellectuals. These commentaries underline the historical contexts of the 2008
candlelight protest.
The 2008 Candlelight Protest in the Context of Neoliberalism
Besides the discourses emphasizing communication technologies as the important
factors in (re)vitalizing the democratic movements for the 2008 candlelight protest,
various other perspectives have attempted to analyze the protest. In particular, Korean
leftist intellectuals locate the protest within its historical context and examine the
justifiability of the 2008 candlelight protest as a form of civil disobedience. Before
discussing the leftists‘ commentaries, I review some cultural perspectives on the
historical contexts of the 2008 protest in order to contextualize leftists‘ commentaries.
In particular, Cho Ki-suk and Park Hye-yun view the 2008 candlelight protest as a
cultural clash between materialism and post-materialism (243–68). Through the surveys
they conducted with the protest participants, Cho and Park found that, on average, the
protesters were more affluent, individualistic, and highly educated than members of the
public. By exploring protest participants‘ socio-economic backgrounds and other
demographic characteristics, Cho and Park attempt to apply the concept of ―postmaterialism,‖ advanced by political scientist Ronald Inglehart, to understand the protest.
In his book The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western
Publics (1977), Inglehart uses the concept of post-materialism to explain the attitudes of
young, modern-day Europeans and Americans who experienced a long period of
prosperity and security in advanced industrial societies (after World War II). According
to Inglehart, the young generations in the Western countries are fairly interested in postmaterial values (such as quality of life, human rights, and environmental issues) and are
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actively involved in conventional political actions (such as voting) as well as
unconventional political actions (such as protests, rallies, and sit-ins). Based on
Inglehart‘s concept, Park and Cho conclude that the 2008 candlelight protest was a clash
between the protest participants‘ post-materialist values and the Korean government‘s
traditional materialist values (which attempted to achieve economic benefits through the
beef imports).
In a similar sense, Hong Seong-tae sees the 2008 candlelight protest as a case of
―life politics‖: a political action of Korean citizens to protect their health and life as basic
human values (129–37). Based on the concept of ―risk society‖ in Ulrich Beck‘s work,
Hong argues that the citizens live in a society in which they are surrounded by risks
driven by modernity. The beef importation dispute, in this context, served as momentum
for Korean citizens to realize the unpredictable risks and anxieties in their daily lives. To
this extent, Hong concludes that the 2008 candlelight protest was an expression of the
protesters‘ desires and aspirations for rallies to prevent the possible danger of U.S. beef
on their health and life.
In his research paper, Chae Jang-soo specifies the 2008 candlelight protest as a
progressive movement but not a leftist one (133–4). Chae distinguishes the pair of
conservative-progressive oppositions from the pair of right-left oppositions, although
both pairs are often used interchangeably. The conservative-progressive binary indicates
the stances and attitudes toward maintenance of the extant order, while the left-right
binary is related to ―system orientation‖—e.g. socialism (a system) is a leftist term, but it
is not a progressive one. Based on this classification, Chae conceptualizes the protest as a
progressive movement in that it was opposed to government‘s ―authoritarianism,‖ and in
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favor of ―citizens‘ political participation,‖ and ―publicness.‖ In Chae‘s view, the protest
was not an anti-capitalist (or anti-neoliberal) movement with ideological concerns, but
pleaded for civil rights to participate in the decision-making of public policies and for the
freedom of assembly.
Cho Ki-suk also claims that the protest was only opposed to undemocratic trade
negotiation procedures of the Lee administration rather than the capitalist system (125–
48). She supports her claim from surveys of the protest participants‘ ideological
orientations. She says that the participants‘ ideological orientation did not reflect the leftright or class disparity in Western European countries, that there was no evidence to
support the notion that participants were intentionally against globalization, and that the
participants‘ political orientation was found to be progressive.
Leftist intellectual Park Young-gyun, however, argues that these kinds of
discourses—interpreting the protest as a cultural clash between materialism and postmaterialism, a life politics, the disputes over direct democracy and indirect democracy,
collective intelligence, Web 2.0 Generation,15 and so on—can possibly make the mistake
of diminishing the meaning of the 2008 candlelight protest into merely technological and
cultural issues. Park asserts that the scholars and commentators, many of whom ignore
the political and economic aspects of the protest, neglect their duty to locate the event
within its social and historical context. He maintains that the candlelight protest should be
understood within its historical context and social structural transformation in the second
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phase of capitalism (driven by neoliberalism). Korean leftist intellectuals share Park‘s
perspective, which views the protest as an anti-neoliberal movement.
Neoliberalism is a political economic ideology that operates with an emphasis on
the reduction of state intervention and the deregulation and liberalization of markets.16 As
economic system renovation was required with the inflation, unemployment, and a
variety of fiscal crises in the 1970s in Western countries (which included Keynesianism
as the mainstream eco-political logic), the orthodox liberal ideology of free markets in the
global political economy reared its head out in the name of ―neoliberalism‖;
neoliberalism emerged with the rejection of Keynesianism, which had supported state
intervention (in Western countries from the 1930s to the 1970s).17 As orthodox liberalist
Adam Smith postulates about an ―invisible hand‖ to describe the self-regulating nature of
the marketplace in his book Wealth of Nations (1776), neoliberalism assumes that the
market is a complete and progressive order by itself, within which the forces of selfinterest, competition, and supply and demand would provide the best outcome for society
without government interference. To sum up, neoliberalism is about ―the triumph of
markets over governments‖ (Steger 48–9).
Neoliberalism initially appeared as ―Reaganomics‖ and ―Thatcherism‖ in the
United States and in the United Kingdom, respectively. In favor of free market, both
trends of policies emphasized restructuring toward privatization of social and public
services (health care, education, and housing), flexibility of labor market (which
weakened laborers‘ power), reduction of taxes (which resulted in wealth inequality), and
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relaxation and elimination of quantitative restrictions on enterprises and trade protections
(licensing, etc.). Under the logic of neoliberalism, capital was liberated from
governments‘ controls, crossing over national territorial boundaries, integrating the world
economies into a single free-market global economy.18 According to Michael Hardt and
Antonio Negri, in this new phase of capitalism, transnational corporations and the United
Nations‘ bodies, along with multi- and transnational finance and trade agencies––the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), and so forth––have enhanced their powers, pushing countries deeper
into the free market global economy; therefore nation-states no longer have sovereign
power over their economies. It became virtually impossible, Hardt and Negri assert, for
any government to escape involvement and alliances in the world economy.
Although countries have adopted and reflected neoliberal trends in their policies,
they have been unable to overcome their economic depressions.19 Kang Sang-gu explains
that neoliberalism is not a complete theory because it has not been able to integrate
―laborers‖ into its system. The theory has been mobilized by an exclusive segment of
social forces or agencies; thus, under neoliberal policies, benefits are concentrated in the
hands of those in high-income brackets (Harvey 11). The situations in Korea appeared to
demonstrate the incompleteness of neoliberalism. Korea knuckled down to join the global
economy in the early 1990s (Sang-gu Kang 90–119). The country adopted a policy of
open markets, which brought broad-based relaxation of finance sector regulations, such
as permitting companies and banks to attract foreign loans (Sang-gu Kang 90–119).
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Pursuing neoliberalism as a market driven ideology, capitalists tend to raise the rate of profit
through ―flexibility‖ of the labor market, which results in disempowerment of workers (Sang-gu Kang 90–
119).
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However, a chain reaction occurred in an unpredictable way: the sudden influx of
transnational capital led first to an economy and property bubble in Korea, then to rapid
capital flight, and finally to an exchange crisis in 1997.
Subsequently, Korea experienced the peak of neoliberalism through the
intervention of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) during the period of the financialcum-economic crisis.20 Providing loans to Korea, the institution demanded four major
reforms: financial sector restructuring, corporate-sector restructuring, privatization of
public corporations, and an enhancement of flexibility in the labor market (K. Shin).
These economic restructurings resulted in mergers and the acquisition of big companies
in the banking and manufacturing sectors, whose immediate impact was massive layoffs
of laborers. Korea eventually succeeded in paying off the debt to the IMF in 2001.
Park Young-gyun believes that the fatigue, which Koreans had felt while passing
through the injustices and contradictions of the Western political and economic logic,
neoliberalism, materialized into the chorus of voices in the 2008 candlelight protest (106–
8). Guided by the logic of neoliberalism, the Korean government gradually transformed
itself into an institution that could be controlled by corporations in private sectors. Even
regarding the issue of U.S. beef imports, the Korean government failed to act as an
elected representative of its people by relinquishing the right to self-inspection for U.S.
beef. Instead, the Korean government worked toward liberating the economy from its
political control and restrictions, and keeping up with the KorUS Free Trade Agreement,
which was a focal component of neoliberalism.
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A Free Trade Agreement (FTA) is a pact between two or more countries to
establish an exchange of goods and services unhindered by government-imposed
restrictions, including taxes and other legislation such as tariff and non-tariff trade
barriers. FTAs have guaranteed freedom for transnational corporations to operate as they
please (regardless of the human suffering and ecological costs) while creating widespread
social disparities like any other neoliberal institutions (KoA, ―Struggle against
Neoliberalism‖).21 The KorUS FTA was on the verge of presenting a large advantage to
the giant Korean conglomerates, whereas the agreement would possibly spell disaster for
many other sectors of the economy that could not fairly compete with U.S. corporations.
While Korean conglomerates would achieve more opportunities to export automobiles,
cell phones, and other goods to the United States through the KorUS FTA, American beef
imports would starve out Korean beef farmers who could not keep their beef prices lower
than U.S. beef from large-scale farms. In this regard, the 2008 candlelight protest, as Park
argues, is a significant local struggle against neoliberalism.
Kim Se-gyun and others also believe that the public wrath expressed through the
2008 candlelight protest was not only directed toward undemocratic conditions but also
toward the structural forces of neoliberalism that cause hardships among the Korean
public, and the pro-neoliberal government that prioritized expansion of market growth
over publicness (25–6). Son Suk-chun, on the other hand, states that the protest against
U.S. beef imports automatically signifies a resistance against neoliberalism in the sense
that mad cow disease is a product of neoliberalism (52). A case of mad cow disease was
21
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first detected in the United Kingdom, when the UK food security agencies weakened
their regulations on agricultural food production under the regime of Margaret Thatcher
in favor of free markets. Lending weight to this viewpoint, Kim Chul-kyoo argues that
the increasing global food exchanges under neoliberalism have caused food crises, under
the guise of food sovereignty and food safety (123–44).
In summary, Korean leftist commentators believe that the driving force behind the
2008 candlelight protest is the economic fascism of neoliberal globalization. It is true that
the 2008 candlelight protest was a case of slowing down the tempo of capitalist
globalization to the extent that it was opposed to the KorUS FTA. However, does the
concept of neoliberalism explain all aspects of the protest? Although a resistance against
neoliberalism is one of the critical social and political implications of the candlelight
protest, it does not appear to be the singular driving force of the protest. Such an account
cannot explain why other movements against neoliberal policies were unable to elicit
such strong responses from the public; for instance, the 2006 protests against the KorUS
FTA were comprised of a limited number of participants and were mainly led by farmers.
I believe the leftist intellectuals tend to confine the meaning of the protest to resistance
against neoliberalism. This kind of a reductionist perspective is epistemologically
problematic, as it is politically insufficient.
Accordingly, my intention in this research project is to punctuate such a
reductionist perspective through my commitment to understanding the protest within
multi-dimensional social structures and engagements in culturescapes. In order to avoid
the conventional reductionist paradigm, I include the concept of ―articulation‖ as the
foundational theoretical lens for my project. The concept of ―articulation‖ leads me to
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consider the complex, multiple, and non-necessary historical forces that straddle the 2008
protests. I consider the candlelight protest, as a mélange of the contingent connections
between different historical forces surrounding and penetrating the event.
Multi-Dimensional Contextualist Approach to the 2008 Candlelight Protest
The concept of articulation was primarily propounded by Antonio Gramsci, and
has been elaborated in the works of Ernesto Laclau and Stuart Hall. Lawrence Grossberg,
who has endeavored to establish British cultural studies in U.S. communication
disciplines, also developed the concept into a contextualist perspective on an event.
Grossberg‘s rubrics of articulation lead to an understanding of an event not as an object
but as a process ―whose problematic and specificity can only be understood in response
to particular historical contexts‖ (45). In this section, I examine the theoretical notion of
articulation. I first review the works of Ernesto Laclau and Stuart Hall before examining
Grossberg‘s notion of articulation and how his ideation of articulation can be used to
conduct a cultural analysis of the 2008 candlelight protest.
Indeed, there is no complete configuration of ―articulation.‖ According to Jennifer
Darlhy Slack, who has contributed to a genealogical understanding of articulation,
articulation has never been delineated or used as a complete concept, nor has it been
configured as simply one thing (114). Instead, articulation is a complex and unfinished
phenomenon that has emerged and continues to emerge, foregrounding and
backgrounding theoretical, methodological, epistemological, political, and strategic
forces, interests, and issues (Slack 114). In the pejorative line of Geras (who has
mordantly criticized Laclau and Mouffe‘s post-Marxist position), articulation is not
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intelligible, as it is applied sometimes to events and sometimes to discourses about events,
and it is unclear whether its principles are empirical or logical (27).
The double meaning of the word ―articulation‖ may provide a clue for
understanding its theoretical concept: articulation primarily means to utter and to express
or explain ideas, thoughts, or feelings clearly in words, and secondarily it means a joint or
connection that allows movement. The former meaning implies that articulation indicates
discourse (structures accomplished by subjects‘ various practices), and the latter features
the shape or form of the discourse that is similar to a specific linkage, where parts
(ideologies) are connected to one another, but not necessarily. Articulation, thus, is
briefly conceptualized as discourse (structure) that is shaped as a ―unity,‖ but it is, in
actuality, a linkage of ―different‖ elements or ideologies connected to each other (but not
necessarily).
Ernesto Laclau uses this concept to ―break with the necessitation and reductionist
logic which has dogged classical Marxist theories‖ (Hall ―Postmodernism and
Articulation‖ 53). The fundamental tenets of classical and orthodox Marxism are the
ideas (1) that history is inevitably progressing towards the fall of capitalism and
communist revolution; (2) that the working class will necessarily play the primary role in
bringing about such a revolution; and (3) that such historical movement is irreversible.22
Likewise, classical Marxism relies on two related forms of reductionism: economic
reductionism and class reductionism, as Slack notes:
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For more discussions of reductions, Slack recommends Hall, ―Rethinking the ‗base-andsuperstructure‘ metaphor,‖ and ―Race, articulation and societies structured in dominance‖; Williams, ―Base
and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory‖ 3–16.
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Economic reductionism maintains that economic relations, thought of as a
virtually static mode of production (the base) controls and produces (determines)
everything else in society (the superstructure). Class reductionism holds that all
political and ideological practices, contradictions, and so on, in short all that
might be conceived of as other than economic, have a necessary class belonging
which is defined by the mode of production. Consequently, the discourse of a
class and the existence of the corresponding class itself constitute a direct
reflection of, or a necessary moment in the unfolding of the economic (116).
Laclau believes that reductionism (specifically class reductionism) failed both
theoretically and politically, because actual variations exist in the discourse of classes:
not everyone believes what he/she is supposed to believe or act in a way he/she is
supposed to act, regardless of his/her class belonging (Slack 114). Essentially, for Laclau,
there may not be an ―overlap‖ between class positions defined by capitalism and the
political subjectivity (or consciousness) needed for revolution (Ives 458); only contingent
and non-necessary connections exist between different practices, between ideology and
social forces, between different elements within ideology, and between different social
groups comprising a social movement (Laclau 160).23 To bring into focus a nonreductionist view of class and the assertion of non-necessary correspondence among
practices and the elements of ideology, Laclau turns down a simple determination by the
―economic.‖
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Laclau gives an example of the contingent and non-necessary connections as follows: ―the
discourse on nationalism can be linked to a feudal project of maintaining traditional hierarchy and order; or
it can be linked to a communist project accusing capitalist of betraying a nationalist cause; or it can be
linked to a bourgeois project of appealing to unity in order to neutralize class conflict, and so on.‖
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Laclau‘s passage from economistic and essentialist Marxist roots mainly depends
on Gramsci‘s work (Mouffe, ―Hegemony and Ideology‖ 168–204). Gramsci‘s vision of
society is not based on a mechanical model of base and superstructure but involves a
complex interaction of relatively autonomous spheres (public and private; political,
cultural, and economic) within a totality of attitudes and practices (Lears 571). Society is
in constant process, where subjects or agents dynamically deploy struggles to construct
common sense to achieve hegemony even as the creation of counter-hegemonies also
remains a possible option (Gramsci 12). Gramsci states the following about the dynamic
of society in relations to the concept of hegemony: hegemony is ―a process of continuous
creation which, given its massive scale, is bound to be uneven in the degree of legitimacy
it commands and to leave some room for antagonistic cultural expressions to develop‖
(Adamson 174).
Among Gramsci‘s works, Laclau focuses on his concept of the process by which a
dominant class exerts ―hegemony‖ out of an ensemble of interests, beliefs, and practices.
A certain class achieves dominance by articulating non-class contradictions into its own
discourse and thereby absorbing the contents of the discourse of dominated classes (Slack
119). Articulating (expressing) the interests of social groups is coordinating connections
between complex, multiple, and theoretically abstract non-necessary elements. The
articulated (enunciated) discourse has no essential class connotation, and the meanings
within the discourse are always connotatively articulated (linked) to different class
interests, characters, or ideological elements within a discourse at a particular historical
conjuncture. In essence, articulation replaces the idea of ―representation‖; whereas
representation suggests the presentation of class interests defined economically and then
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re-presented on the political or subjective terrain of consciousness, ―articulation‖ is a
process of creating connections between different practices (between ideology and social
forces, between different elements within ideology, and between different social groups
composing a social movement), and the connection is ―contingent and non-necessary‖
(Hall, ―Encoding/Decoding‖ 129). No single moment can fully guarantee the next
moment with which it is articulated (Hall, ―Encoding/Decoding‖ 129). Articulation, in
this sense, points out the problem of determination by underlining that a connection is
forged or made in certain circumstances (Slack 119).
From the non-necessitarian and non-reductionist conceptualization by Laclau,
Stuart Hall advances articulation into a concept indicating the form of discourse that,
under certain conditions, can create a unity out of different elements. For Hall, the form
of discourse is a linkage, which is not necessary, determined, absolute, or essential for all
time; he notes, ―The so-called ‗unity‘ of a discourse is really the articulation of different,
distinct elements which can be rearticulated in different ways because they have no
necessary ‗belongingness‘‖ (Hall, ―Postmodernism and Articulation‖ 53). Hall asserts
that a theory of articulation is a way of understanding how ideological elements come,
under certain historical conditions, to cohere together within a discourse; it is a way of
asking how they do or do not become articulated, at specific conjunctures, to certain
political subjects (Hall, ―Postmodernism and Articulation‖ 53). In other words, a theory
of articulation asks how specific practices articulated around contradictions that do not all
arise in the same way, at the same point, in the same moment, can nevertheless be
thought of together (Hall, ―Postmodernism and Articulation‖ 53).

40
Furthermore, Hall elevates the importance of articulating discourse to other social
forces, but he does so ―without going ‗over the brink‘ of turning everything into
discourse‖ (Slack 121). Hall‘s endeavors begin from a critique of Laclau‘s later work,
which has ―a risk of reductionism upward rather than a reductionism downward as
economism was‖ (Slack 121).24 In Hall‘s eyes, Laclau and Mouffe reduce everything else
to discourse: ―they take a post-Althusserian position positing all practice nothing but
discourses; society itself can be analyzed as a series of competing languages; and all
historical agents are discursively constituted subjectivities‖ (―Postmodernism and
Articulation‖ 53).25
Contesting ―a risk of reductionism upward‖ in Laclau and Mouffe‘s recent works,
Hall highlights the Althusserian recognition that ―no practice exists outside of discourse
without reducing everything else to it [discourse] (my emphasis)‖ (Slack 122). For Hall,
material conditions are, even if not sufficient, the necessary condition of all historical
practice (Slack 122). Hall does not believe that struggle is reduced to struggle in
discourse, where ―there is no reason why anything is or isn‘t potentially articulable with
anything,‖ and society becomes ―a totally open discursive field‖ (Slack 122). Hall ―pulls
articulation back from the extreme, theoretically driven logic of ―necessary noncorrespondence‖ (what he calls the ―excesses‖ of theory) and maintains thinking and
24

Laclau‘s contestation against a priori insertion of classes into Marxist analysis continues to
appear in his later book, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (2001), which he coauthored with Mouffe, and
discloses the nuance of their reduction of everything into discourse. Laclau and Mouffe state the following:
―Our principal conclusion is that behind the concept of ‗hegemony‘ lies something more than a type of
political relations complementary to the basic categories of Marxist theory. In fact, it introduces a logic of
the social which is incompatible with those [Marxist] categories‖ (3).
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In fact, Marxist critic Geras has also denounced Laclau and Mouffe‘s work as relativist, idealist,
and anti-Marxist; Geras summarizes their work as ―being little more than liberal pluralism dressed in fancy
words and postmodern jargon, for being, or just confused‖ (Ives 456). The critics against Laclau and
Mouffe‘s post-Marxism include: Geras, ―Post-Marxism?‖; Palmer, Descent into Discourse (1990); Wood,
The Retreat from Class (1986).
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theorizing practices within which are unities—often relatively stable unities‖ (Slack 122).
For Hall, ―the ‗unity‘ that matters is a linkage between the articulated discourse and the
social forces with which it can, under certain historical conditions, but not necessarily, be
connected‖ (Slack 122). In short, if Laclau and Mouffe highlight the role of the discursive
in the process of articulation, Hall worries over the effect of their logic on the politics.
Lawrence Grossberg, on the other hand, advances the concept of articulation into
a theoretical frame for identifying a practice or event in the field of cultural studies within
the discipline of communication. Grossberg‘s idea develops by repudiating a principle of
interiority or essentialism that locates the identity of any practice in a structure of
necessity. In his book We Gotta Get Out of This Place (1992), Grossberg states that the
identity of an event is not intrinsic but is in relation to its various connections to its
exterior, to that which is other to it. The identity of an event is not where it is or happens,
but at all of those sites where its existence makes a difference in the world. Grossberg
believes that an event is identified by the ―effects‖ of the others; he notes that this
understanding is derived from the works of Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze and Félix
Guattari.
According to Grossberg, Foucault, and Deleuze and Guattari place an event in a
complex network of effects. An event exists with other events‘ effects on it; it also effects
elsewhere on the other events. An event is defined by others‘ effects or, more precisely,
―effectivity‖ (indicating the multidimensionality of effects). The effects are not
guaranteed before they have been enacted, nor are they limited to a single plane or
direction; rather, they are exerted on multidimensional and multidirectional fields. To this
extent, Grossberg claims that Foucault‘s, and Deleuze and Guattari‘s ways of
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understanding the identity of an event is similar to the concept of articulation. In his view,
Foucault, and Deleuze and Guattari have not found a proper word for their logic (54)
For Grossberg, articulation is a process of forging connections between certain
practices and their effects, as well as enabling practices to have different (and sometimes
unpredicted) effects. An event or a practice obtains its identity as a result of ―articulation‖
of different exterior elements to it. Grossberg states, accordingly:
Articulation is the production of identity on top of differences, of unities
out of fragments, of structures across practices. Articulation links that
practice to that effect, this text to that meaning, this meaning to that
reality, this experience to those politics. And these links are themselves
articulated into larger structures, etc. (54).
Articulation, however, not only produces identity on top of differences but also
delinks or disarticulates connections as well as rearticulates connections, as there is no
necessary ―belongingness‖ in connections. Articulation is ―a continuous struggle to
reposition practices within a shifting field of forces, to redefine the possibilities of life by
redefining the field of relations within which a practice is located‖ (54). ―Each practice is
located in a specific place as a set of relations, close to some practices, more distant from
other. Its effects will be determined by those relations and distances‖ (60).
Grossberg suggests that such articulation should be conceived as a linkage of lines
or vectors, projecting their effects across the field. Articulation may have different
vectors, different forces, and different spatial reaches in different contexts, and it may
also have different temporal reaches, cutting across the boundaries of our attempts at
historical periodization. ―Each vector has its own quality (effectivity), quantity, and
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directionality; any practice exists in multiple contexts across the space of a particular
moment, articulated into different, sometimes competing and sometimes contradictory
sets of relations‖ (59). Another point that requires special attention here is Grossberg‘s
regard for ―structure‖ as an important matter; a context is thus ―a structural field, a
configuration of practices‖ (60). Accordingly, Grossberg‘s concepts of lines or vectors
indicate structures.
Consequently, analyzing an event from the perspective of articulation involves
(re)constructing the network of relationships of structures into which and within which
the event is articulated. This strategy of analysis involves drawing lines or connections,
for they are the productive links between points, events, or practices within a
multidimensional and multidirectional field. Articulation leads us to dig out the contexts
of an event in order to grasp its identity; in other words, articulation offers a theory of
structural contexts (4). Therefore, interrogating any articulated practice (or structure)
requires an examination of the contexts—namely, ―the ways in which the ‗relatively
autonomous‘ social, institutional, technical, economic, political forces are organized into
unities that are effective and are relatively empowering or disempowering‖ (60).
Based on this notion, Grossberg devotes the remainder of the book to exploring
the contexts of U.S. culture—especially popular culture, rock music, and youth culture—
where historical vectors and forces project their effects across multidimensional and
multidirectional fields. Finally, Grossberg discovers the unlikely confluence between
popular culture and the deeply ingrained conservatism of U.S. post-World War II society,
which resulted in pessimism over politics and depoliticization. With his deductions,
Grossberg argues that popular culture has played a central role in the reorientation of U.S.
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politics along neo-conservative lines (402).26 Neo-conservatives have managed to usurp
the libidinal and affective qualities of rock culture for their own hegemonic purposes in
the United States.
Gathering up all the aforementioned threads, a theory of articulation, advanced by
Grossberg, provides a way to understand an event or a phenomenon as an inter-play of
correspondences, non-correspondences, and contradictions of structures as fragments, in
the constitution of a unity. Identifying an event thus requires mapping the contexts within
which an event or a phenomenon occurs or which influences the development of the
event. Mapping the context is not situating a phenomenon in a context, nor is the context
something out there within which practices occur or which influence the development of
an event (Slack 125; Grossberg 55). Instead, mapping the context is to investigate the
exterior vectors and forces of structures, which exert their effects on the identity of an
event.
Relying on the notions of articulation, I aim to unravel the identity of the 2008
candlelight protest. This notion does not lead me to see the protest as a coherent unity;
the identity of the protest is not intrinsic or guaranteed, but it is an (unpredicted) effect of
the conjuncture of disparate exterior events and practices with various contradictory
forces, tendencies and positions of social, political, and economic structures. Moving
beyond the general identification of the protest as an online social movement or anticapitalist response, I explore the complex and active vectors and forces that affected the
configuration of the protest. Beyond the protest itself, the historical context of the protest
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Grossberg also notes that ―such conservative politics include the growing acceptance of
economic and political inequalities and structures of local discrimination against various (but not all)
subordinated groups, the attempt to impose minority-held moralities on society, the reduction of freedoms
in the name of social values, and the marginalization of radical oppositional groups and alternatives.‖
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is a play or process in which different and distinctive practices entangle, un-entangle, and
re-entangle. Essentially, the 2008 candlelight protest as an utterance of criticism against
the Korean government‘s decision is understood as a complex, unfinished phenomenon
that has emerged and continues to emerge in my research project. The contextual
structures of the protest that I will present will address the epistemic blank that
communication scholars and leftist/progressive intellectuals‘ discussions have left/created.
As I embark on my inquiry, I first explore the main features of the 2008 candlelight
protest; then, I discuss the historical vectors and forces of the protest; and finally, I let the
historical context reveal the identity of the protest. In short, I propose to address the
following research questions in this dissertation project:
RQ 1: What are the main discursive and material features of the 2008 candlelight
protest as a social movement?
RQ 2: What are the historical structures (the political, the social, and the
economic) that produce the communicative possibilities of the 2008 candlelight
protest?
In the following chapter, I present a map of how I conducted this research project
to engage with these research questions.
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CHAPTER 3:
METHOD

Articulation and Speculative Analysis
In my research project, I aim to interrogate the identity of the 2008 candlelight
protest, relying on the notion of articulation as my theoretical and methodological
framework. The notion of articulation, especially the one advanced by Grossberg that I
discussed in Chapter 2, guides us to recognize that the identity of a practice or an event is
not intrinsic, but emerges at the intersection of the effects of other practices on it and its
effects on others. This approach begins by questioning ―a principle of interiority or
essentialism which locates any practice in a structure of necessity and guarantees its
effects even before it has been enacted‖ (50).27 Under the rubric of the notion of
articulation, a practice or an event is defined by its connections to its exterior, to that
which is other to it (53). The identity of a practice, thus, is not merely where it takes
place; it is present at each of the sites in which its existence is produced by the world and
in which its existence makes a difference in the world. Applying this notion, I attempt to
locate the 2008 protest in its historical context and allow its historical context to articulate
its identity.
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The principle of interiority or essentialism is the view that for any given kind of entity, there are
specific traits, all of which are necessary to its identity and function. This view reduces all things to its
essentially and fundamentally required attributes.

47
While the notion of articulation involves ―(re)constructing [or fabricating] the
network of relationships into which and within which a practice is articulated‖ (54), I
focus more on the historical backgrounds that produced the possibilities of the protest
rather than on the effects of the protest on other practices. As presented by the notion of
articulation, the identity of a practice relies not only on the production of effects of other
practices on it but also on its own effects on others. However, a four-year time frame is
too brief to adequately portray the effects of the protest, whose existence, I believe, can
produce a more substantial impact over a longer latent period. Accordingly, I direct my
efforts toward (re)constructing the historical contexts of the 2008 protest in this research
project.
However, (re)constructing the historical context is ―not a matter of merely
acknowledging its background‖ (55). (Re)constructing the historical context should be
based on the acknowledgement that historical factors crossing the political, social,
economic, and cultural fields are connected to each other, in a different shape and at a
historical juncture to form a specific context for a particular practice. Furthermore,
(re)constructing the historical context should be based on the understanding that the
process, in which a context is produced by historical factors, is not singular, unified, or
uni-dimensional; it is complex, multi-dimensional, and non-necessary. In other words, a
context is a construct by a contingent and non-necessary connection between different
historical forces. To this extent, in my research project, I attempt to (re)construct the
historical contexts of the 2008 protest by revealing how historical factors had exerted
their effects in their trajectories, or the effects emerging from the connections between
the factors onto the protest.
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In order to lay out the complex process of (re)constructing a context, Grossberg
suggests that one examine the context as the field of articulated ―vectors‖ and ―forces.‖
Grossberg states that each vector possesses the quality of its effect and the quantity that
has both size and direction; force has a measured strength as it comes into contact with
other events or practices (60). Analysis for (re)constructing a context, thus, can be
conceived of as producing a map of ―the interrelated vectors, each with its own trajectory
and strength which define its ability to penetrate into and affect reality‖ (61). If this
notion is applied to my research project, I could conceivably produce a map of the
historical vectors—along with their qualities, sizes, and directions—that produced effects
on the possibility of the 2008 candlelight protest. Furthermore, the map would be marked
with the forces illustrating the strengths of these effects.
In order to draw a map of the historical vectors, I use ―speculative analysis,‖
following Grossbeg‘s praxis. I made a decision to choose use this method instead of an
empirical study method such as observation or interview, because of my interest in
―structures‖ that shaped the protesters‘ experiences. As a configuration of practices,
structure in my research project is defined as ―habitus‖ (a concept mainly advanced by
Pierre Bourdieu), which refers to ―lifestyle, the values, the dispositions and expectation
of particular social groups that are acquired through the activities and experiences of
everyday life.‖ Human individuals live and behave in certain ways. While operating as
the principles of daily life, habitus (structure) enhances, constrains, and/or limits the
possibilities of the practices of human individuals. Structure is real. But, individuals may
have neither any control over the rules that guide their lifestyles and behaviors nor any
conscious awareness of the ways in which they experience and are affected by the rules
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(62). In other words, structural forces are not always simply or directly divulged to our
senses. They can be delayed, deferred, detoured and decreased. Accordingly, I believe
that we cannot understand structures through sensory experience or through logical and
mathematical treatment of the data obtained from the sensory experience. Rather,
knowing and understanding structure cannot be isolated from the researcher‘s speculation,
based on his or her insights, political stances, and morals. To this extent, I attempt to
develop speculative analysis as a research method for exploring structures that operate
within deep layers of our daily experiences.
In my research project, ―speculative analysis‖ (which is used for the purpose of
digging out structures in the deep layers of human experiences) is defined as an analysis
strategy to infer configuration of likely reality from a cluster of verifiable elements. I use
―speculative analysis‖ to infer the historical vectors and forces of the 2008 candlelight
protest (configuration of likely reality) from the main features of the protest (the
verifiable elements that I comprehend through my observation of the protest and my
reading of extant relevant literatures). To this extent, my research project is implemented
in two steps: First, I examine the main characteristics of the 2008 candlelight protest,
referring to a personal journal written during my participation in the protest and a reading
of literature on the protest. I present this analysis in Chapter 4. Then, from the principal
features identified in the first step, I infer the historical vectors and forces that possibly
drove the protest and formulated its identity. This analysis, I present in Chapter 5.
The rest of this chapter scrutinizes the processes I adopted in this project: the
methods of data collection and analysis that I employed to understand the main
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characteristics of the 2008 candlelight protest for the first step, and subsequently how I
developed my speculative analysis for the second step.
Understanding the Main Characteristics of the Protest
In an attempt to analyze the scope of the 2008 candlelight protest, I refer to my
personal journal written during and after my participation in the protest. My personal
experience of participation began on May 27, 2008, continued through July 30, 2008,
during my summer vacation spent in Seoul. My journal was a 74-page double-spaced
script. My initial motivation to participate in the protest stemmed from three imperatives:
first, my sense of social responsibility to speak out against the FTA as a citizen and a
student of social science, second, my personal fear of mad cow disease, and third, anger
upon witnessing the violent measures used by the government to quell the protest.
I held a pessimistic view about the KorUS FTA, which could potentially cause
irreparable damages to Korean society, particularly the majority of farmers, workers, and
the public in general. The report compiled by the Korean Alliance against KorUS FTA
(KoA) noted that among the sectors most likely to be impacted by the economic
globalization due to the FTA were the film, broadcasting, pharmaceuticals,
manufacturing, agriculture, steel, and chemical industries.28 The 2008 protest offered me
a pertinent rationale and avenue to express my discontent with economic globalization.
However, my involvement in the protest was not entirely based on such a
geopolitical calculus. It was partly visceral; I was fearful when I learned of the possibility
of mad cow disease in U.S. beef. People around me talked and worried about their diet,
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For more details about the possible results of the KorUS FTA, refer to KoA, ―Road to an
Undesirable Deal.‖ The KoA, comprised of over 300 organizations, including trade unions, farmer‘s groups,
NGOs, and social movement groups, has presented their seven concerns regarding the KorUS FTA in the
report.
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and I encountered an overwhelming amount of information about U.S. beef and mad cow
disease regarding the route of transmission of mad cow disease, potentially infected food,
and other physical risks caused by the disease. Although government conservatives have
argued that the information on the Internet is largely groundless, I felt afraid at that time,
and even tried to trace back to whether I had consumed the tainted beef. I could not
understand why the Korean government had even brought down the quarantine standards
for imported beef previously instated based on the Koreans‘ concern about U.S. beef.29
Further, my experience with and my witnessing of the riot police firing tear gas,
using water cannons, and arresting protesters evoked the moral courage to protest against
the government. My hostility peaked when I heard that an elementary school student had
been arrested by the riot police. The following is an entry from my journal; it provides a
glimpse of my ―participation‖ and helps me locate myself and my intent with respect to
the protest.
At around 6:30 p.m. on May 28, my first day of participation, I arrived at Seoul
Plaza in downtown Seoul. Thousands of people held candles in one hand and
pickets in the other that read ―Cancel the Contract!‖ and ―Myungbak Out!‖
Middle and high school students in uniform and mothers with their babies in
strollers passed me by. A staggering number of flickering candles brought to my
mind the urgency of the issue more than the two previous candlelight protests that
I had joined in 2004—one against the impeachment of the former President Roh
Mu-hyun and the other protest pushing for discontinuation of the Iraq war. On
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(www.antimadcow.org).
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that day, however, I was forced to leave the protest venue early due to fatigue
after a long flight.
On the second day, I met with two friends from my master‘s program on
the campus of our old school, and together we departed for downtown Seoul.
After a roughly 45-minute trip by subway and by foot, we arrived at Seoul Plaza
at around 6:00 p.m., the opening time of the rallies, which had been organized to
accommodate the work schedule of the participants. My friends and I lit the
candles provided by People United against Mad Cow Disease and took a seat on
the ground of the square. We chanted slogans and listened to free speeches by the
protesters; however, our physical distance from the speakers and the density of
the crowd around us prevented us from hearing the speeches clearly.
As enough protesters gathered around 8:00 p.m., we began to march
along Se-jong Avenue.30 Numerous flags representing civil organizations, Internet
communities, and college student councils led the march forward, and we
followed them. Chanting the slogans and singing protest songs, we reached Jong
Avenue on the way to Blue House, the residence of the Korean president. At this
point, however, our movement was halted as dozens of police buses blocked our
path. Consequently, we turned around and marched in the opposite direction from
which we came. As soon as we arrived back on Sejong Avenue, however, I
realized that we protesters were completely besieged by riot police. We stopped in
our tracks, unable to move forward; it was dark. At that moment, a pacification
broadcast shattered the silence through a megaphone to warn the protesters off
the venue. The water cannon beside the speaker was aimed at us.
30

According to Kyunghyang Shinmun, there were twenty thousand protesters on that day.
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Thousands of us hurriedly linked together, arm-in-arm, to protect
ourselves and hold our ground against the police‘s charge. The gentleman whose
arm was linked with mine informed me that the police would attempt to ram
through us to separate our unified group into smaller ones: once the single, large
group of protesters was divided into smaller groups, protesters would grow
fearful and vulnerable in smaller numbers, and therefore they would soon leave
the venues. I was not aware of this development as I had left early on my first day
of participation. We drew out every ounce of energy to resist the cold, steel
shields with which the police tried to drive us away. Tensions mounted but could
not persist for a long time. It was past midnight when some of the protesters
began to untangle their arms and leave the venue; the police made little space to
let them go. As I left the venue with my two friends around 1:00 a.m., I felt sorry
and guilty for not staying behind with those who did so. The next morning, I
discovered that 80 people who had stayed back were arrested and put behind bars.
This troubled my conscience and these three imperatives motivated me to
participate in the 2008 protest for three months.
Throughout the course of my involvement in the protest, I was
accompanied by one or two of my friends. We always met up on our old campus
to travel downtown together, pulling out of the venues around by midnight to
catch the last subway. When we stayed longer, we would take a taxi to return
home. Because I was often famished after the marches, I sometimes packed snacks
for all of us; otherwise, we had kimbab and donuts from peddlers who weaved
through protesters, selling food for 1,000-2,000 won (around U.S. $1–2), or
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noodles for 3,000-5,000 won (around U.S. $3–5) at food carts in the middle of
streets teeming with protesters. Occasionally, we received free food from citizens‘
generous donations. We used common lavatories near subway stations or
bathrooms in a hotel close to the sites.
Upon returning home every night, I compiled and updated a timeline that
illustrated the tensions between protesters and the government in the journal on my
laptop. In the journal I also included my reflections on the daily incidents and episodes,
on protest activities (such as slogans, songs, and jokes), and on the stories that I picked
up from the conversations I shared with my friend-participants at the protest venues.
Further, I connected my laptop to the Internet to use the online services of the two
newspapers Kyunghyang Shinmun and The Hangyore as my main sources in drawing a
big picture of the protest. I believed that these two newspapers were reliable in that they
appeared to represent the citizens‘ voice, which was excluded from the process of the
national-level decision-making. Since I had no concretely preconceived research project
at the time of the participation in the protest, my journal was filled with non-linear and
fragmented narratives and ideas written in Korean (my mother tongue). After I returned
to the United States for the beginning of a new semester following my participation in the
protest, my journal was translated into English.
I extensively utilized the scholarly works of Korean scholars to contextualize the
protest. I accessed an online resource website DBpia (www.dbpia.com) and retrieved 444
essays in different fields (communication studies, political science, sociology, women‘s
studies, etc.) through January 10, 2012, using the key word Chot-bul (candlelight)—as
the protest is referred to in different ways, including candlelight protests, candlelight
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rallies and candlelight demonstrations, among others. These essays demonstrate that the
2008 candlelight protest provoked a wide scope of scholarly interests and has been
examined from different field-related analytical standpoints. Through their observations
of the protest and interviews of the protesters, the scholars of my shortlisted essays
underline the distinctive characteristics and socio-political meanings related to the protest.
However, following a thorough reading and re-reading of the 444 essays, I
removed those that were less relevant to my project and decided to use only 106 of them
for my data analysis. For instance, scholars, such as Lee Han-gu, Kim Sang-bae, Kim Ilyoung, and others, argue that the protest was triggered both by a TV program‘s
unprofessional treatment of information about mad cow disease and by the exaggerated
and groundless rumors about the disease on the Internet. Their essays describe the 2008
candlelight protest as an anti-American, anti-regime, and violent resistance, which caused
a great deal of damage to the Korean democracy and economy. They also emphasize that
any political dispute would deter foreign economic investors and even damage the
shopping districts lined on both sides of the protest venues. I eliminated these scholarly
journal articles, because these perspectives were not consistent with my research interest
and politics.
As I embarked on my inquiry, I found that the texture of the 2008 candlelight
protest was not homogenous or linear; it was too layered and heterogeneous to be readily
organized in my mind. I thus compared the 2008 candlelight protest with the traditional
social movements in the 1980s in Korea, in order to grasp its salient features. I also
focused on four distinct categories: (1) the main issue, (2) the participants, (3) the
modality, and (4) the goal to characterize the protest. According to Jeong Tae-seok, these
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four categories have been used to understand the specificities of the shifts from Old
Social Movement to New Social Movement and from folk movement to civil movement
in European countries (255). I found these four categories useful for my study in that they
help me mark stark historical changes between the conventional social movements in the
1980s and the 2008 protest.
In Chapter 4 of my dissertation, I present a canvas of main features of the 2008
candlelight protest, compared to those evident in the traditional/conventional social
movements in the 1980s. Dividing the features into the four categories, I explained the
main characteristics of the 2008 candlelight protest under four headings: ―Issue: Food
Safety, Health and Life,‖ ―Participants: Heterogeneous Desires,‖ ―Modality: Serious
State and Humorous Protesters,‖ and ―Goal: Leaving Myung-bak Castle.‖ Subsequently,
I conducted a speculative analysis to speculate on the vectors that framed and were
framed by the 2008 protest.
Speculative Analysis for Drawing the Historical Vectors
For the second step of my research project, I examined a compilation of the
historical vectors and forces that created the communicative possibilities of the protest.
The characteristic features of the protest that I identified in Chapter 4 provided the entry
points for a speculative analysis that I conducted to elaborate on the historical vectors.
While reviewing and comparing the main features of 2008 candlelight protest with those
of the conventional protest in the 1980s, I focused on the national and international
contexts of the 1990s and the early 2000s of Korea in order to find a diverse range of
general structural transformations and specificities of Korean society that might have
enhanced, constrained, and/or limited the 2008 candlelight protest. I began to draw a map
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of the driving vectors and forces of the 2008 protest. In order to make the vectors clearer,
I retrieved my fragmented memories of multiple historical events and configurations of
social and cultural practices in Korean history. I also dared to imagine the relations
between historical events and the protest. Once I had identified four salient axes of
historical phenomena that exerted their interrelated influence on the 20008 protest, I drew
a closure on the map.
I finally labeled the four axes as the following themes: ―Political Democratization
and De-politicization,‖ ―Global Food Exchanges and Well-being Yol-pung,‖ ―Market
Liberalization and Job Insecurity,‖ and ―Development of Communication Technology
and the Carnivalesque.‖ These four vectors, I believe, are the elements that formulated
the contours, curves and angles of the 2008 candlelight protest—that is, the answer to the
question, ―Who/what was pulling the strings of the 2008 protest?‖
In Chapter 5, I recounted how the vectors, with their directions and forces,
maximized and at the same time restricted the possibility of the protest. In order to flesh
out my account of the historical vectors of the protest, I used my extant knowledge on
Korean history as well as the ―snowballing technique.‖31 Just as ―a rolling snowball
grows over time,‖ whenever I needed more information than I had, I constantly referred
to extra sources that contained historical facts of Korea. After locating the bibliographical
sources referenced by the aforementioned scholarly articles that I used, I continued to
acquire additional sources in a successive chain of sources.

31

Regarding the notion of snowball techniques, I owe a lot to Dr. Mahuya Pal. In her doctoral
dissertation titled ―Fighting from and for the Margin: Local Activism in the Realm of Global Politics,‖ she
used snowball techniques for recruiting interviewees. Her dissertation information was passed on by the
potential interviewees themselves in the subsequent chain of referrals as they helped her recruit participants.
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Speculations on Speculative Analysis
I do not maintain that my story about the 2008 candlelight protest has the comfort
and security of completion. I completed the map of driving vectors, but was aware that it
was an incomplete completion. The end of my story is the beginning of other stories, just
as the beginning of my story is the end of others. Any story about the context of a
practice can never have a simple beginning and a precise end. The story that I tell about
the protest, therefore, is inherently partial, polysemic, inventive, and experimental. My
account of the 2008 candlelight protest is only part of a larger body of the oftensophisticated ways in which Korean society has accepted and reacted to globalization.
I am also aware that my account of the 2008 candlelight protest is not isolated
from my personal background: an international student from Korea at a university in the
United States, a woman, a member of the lower middle class in both countries, and aged
in the late thirties. My body, already worn down from the demands of schoolwork in a
foreign country, was again directly exposed to the possible danger of food (beef), and this
affected my perspectives on the Korean government‘s approval of U.S. beef imports. My
social class, which does not allow me the ability to afford organic and expensive
agricultural products contributed to my perspective on U.S. beef and the 2008 candlelight
protest. My position, life value, and the theories and knowledge that I had obtained
through my study influenced the points of view, the way of interpretation, the question
raised, and even the sources selected in this research project.
At the same time, I acknowledge that the analysis of the historical context of the
2008 candlelight protest in this project reshaped who I was. I passed through the golden
age of economic development in the 1980s of Korea as an adolescent without a thorough
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understanding of military dictatorship. I was a freshman in college in Korea in the early
1990s, when the pro-democratic movements had already begun to decline. I was a
member of new generation Shin-se-dae that emerged with the precipitately developing
popular cultures at that time, along with an expanding consumer culture.32 In the wake of
my graduation from college, I faced the financial-cum-economic crisis in 1997, which led
me to dedicate myself to earning a living through exhausting part-time jobs. Under the
discipline of a bureaucratic management system, I did not resist any authoritarian rules,
invisibly suppressing my subjectivity and naïvely neglecting social and political issues. In
short, I was an individual raised through the periods of conservatization rapidly spreading
in Korea. My reflections while working on this project, however, persistently led me to
ponder about where I was and where I was heading. The journey of this research project
was a constant practice of (re)placing myself in new contexts that are available for dearticulation and re-articulation regarding the issues of social protest, democracy, and
empowerment of subjects.
Through these interactions between me and my research project, and also in
attempting to challenge the generalized assumptions about the protest and introducing
extraneous matters into understanding of the 2008 candlelight protest, my research
project includes ―too many arguments and interpretations and not enough evidence‖ (as
Grossberg notes regarding his own project). Despite the newly emerging speculativeanalysis trend that celebrates subjective and fragmented stories, empirical and positivist
studies are unquestionably dominant approaches to both research and theory construction
in the contemporary academic worlds of Korea and the United States. The majority of
journal articles in sociology, political science, and communication studies in both
32

More details of Shin-se-dae will be discussed in Chapter 5.
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countries draw on scientific language and the scientific method. In the face of such trends,
―speculation‖ as a research method tends to be renounced.
Korean scholar Lee Kap-yun, for instance, sets the tone for empirical and
positivist studies (9). According to Lee, the extant academic approaches to the 2008
candlelight protest are mostly based on hermeneutic and interpretative frameworks in
favor of the protest, and lack methodological rigor. Lee reinforces that authentic
knowledge is derived from the processes of obtaining data through sensory experience
and treating such data through logical and mathematical methodology. Lee‘s views
demonstrate the perspective of positivism, an epistemological and methodological stance
of science. From the positivistic perspective, a researcher‘s job is to draw a hypothesis
from a theory and prove that hypothesis through the discovery of evidence that is
observable with the human senses. A researcher should describe the world as it exists to
produce verifiable, accurate, consistent, and value-neutral knowledge, regardless of any
politics or morals held by the researcher.
However, I believe that empirical and positivist studies are limited in that they
lack the capacity to prove any abstract ideas, laws, orders, and principles beyond
observable facts and relationships. It may not be possible to discover any general law
from human and social realities through rigorous scientific methods, or to classify them
into systematic categories, because human reality is always dynamic, complex, multilayered, and even tortuous.
Such limitations of empirical and positivist studies can be further discussed in
regards to some research conducted by Korean scholars on the 2008 candlelight protest.
In fact, Lee Kap-yun‘s research explores the social and demographic characteristics and
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the political orientation of the 2008 candlelight protest participants through strict
scientific procedures, uncovering that the protest participants were mostly members of
young generations, from the Honam region, among the supporters of the opposition
(progressive) party, and among individuals with a high interest in democratic issues.
Finally, Lee concludes that the 2008 protest represents the established political cleavages
pertaining to regional origin, generation, and ideological orientation (99).33 Using
rigorous methodological standards on the same subject, other researchers such as Cho Kisuk and Park He-yoon, and Huh Tai-hoi and Jang Woo-young, arrived at different results.
According to these scholars, the protest participants were initially motivated by their
pursuit of post-materialist values, such as quality of life and better lifestyles, rather than
by conventional political issues such as regional, generational, and ideological conflicts
(Cho and Park; Huh and Jang). These scholars therefore reach the conclusion that the
2008 candlelight protest displays the collision between the Korean public‘s postmaterialist value (e.g. quality of life and better lifestyle) and the government‘s materialist
value. On the other hand, scholar Kim Wook argues that the protest was triggered not
only by the established political cleavages (ideological conflicts) but also by postmaterialist values (33–59). These differing research results on the same topic lead me to
question and rethink the possibility of producing authentic knowledge that is verifiable,
accurate, consistent, and value-neutral.
In my opinion, Lee does not appear to have reflected on the basic epistemological
questions that have been raised in post-empirical and post-positivist scholarly spaces:34

33
34

One thing needs to note: regionalism has caused social conflicts in Korean political history.

Post-positivism is an epistemological and methodological stance that critiques, opposes, and
rejects central tenets of positivism. Unlike positivism that asserts that the natural and social worlds can be
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How do we know what we know? Can we think or know outside of the reigning terms of
our cultural experiences, world views, and dominant social order? Can we have simple or
innocent access to the world sphere outside of our positions? We can only know the
ostensibly knowable worlds through our own familial, cultural, and religious frameworks
within which our identity and morality have been built. Our perceptions, bodies, and
hearts are always haunted by what we already have known, no matter how hard we
attempt to leave it behind; the knower and the known can never be separated. A research
analyst is another social actor standing in specific historical and social conditions that
affect the representation of social ideas. The research objects do not exist ―out there,‖ but
are themselves a product of socially and historically mediated human consciousness.
Accordingly, analysts will all tell different stories depending on the positions from which
they survey the scene and the resources that they have available to them. In this sense, a
fixation with empiricism, positivism, and objectivism may be a work of fantasy.
To that extent, I do not intend to present my research project as an outright
account of the 2008 candlelight protest. Instead, I attempt to adopt a reflexive approach in
my research project and take the perspective of critical and cultural studies, which
accentuate what ideas research promotes. Significance of research does not depend solely
on the rigorous procedures of scientific method. In my project, significance of research is
placed on the effects of the work: what a work reveals and conceals, what it renders
imaginable, and where it takes readers.

understood through application of scientific method, post-positivists reject these assumptions and question
just about everything the positivists ―know‖ to be true. Post-positivism assumes that the world is
ambiguous, infinitely complex, variable and open to interpretation (―Post-positivism‖).
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CHAPTER 4:
THE MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 2008 CANDLELIGHT PROTEST

This research project examines the identity of the 2008 candlelight protest against
U.S. beef imports in Korea. One might wonder why the protest unfolded with ―candles‖
just as in Figure 1 below. In Korea, candles became symbolically loaded as citizens‘
social movements since the 2002 candlelight protest against the Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA) between Korea and the United States. This 2002 protest developed
from candlelight vigils to memorialize the deaths of two young girls caused by an
armored vehicle of U.S. forces during a military drill. As it was revealed that the two U.S.
soldiers responsible for the deaths were tried at military tribunals at a U.S. military base
in Korea and acquitted by a jury trial consisted only of U.S. citizens, the candlelight
vigils turned to the candlelight protest urging the U.S. military to hand over the two
soldiers to the Korean authorities (Tsche 322). Subsequently, the protesters demanded a
revision of the SOFA, which specified that the United States held the primary jurisdiction
over crimes committed by soldiers while on duty. Numerous candles, not only those of
activists but also of general citizens, filled the square in downtown Seoul, in order to
resist against U.S. superpower.
Since then on, a stream of candles became a symbol of social movements in
Korea. In 2004, two more large-scale candlelight protests were held. One protest was
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against the impeachment of President Roh Mu-hyun, supported by the conservative party,
while the other was opposed to Korea‘s decision to dispatch troops during the Iraq War
upon the request of the United States.35 In these two protests, the Korean public had
demonstrated their political passion as well as their ability to lead reformative protest
using ―candles,‖ which represent the peaceful atmosphere of protest venues. Like the
previous protests, the 2008 candlelight protest also demonstrated the Korean public‘s
political passions. The first article of the constitution, which the protesters rhythmically
chanted holding candles, summarized its meaning as a progressive method to compensate
the defect of representative political system: ―South Korea is the republic of Korea. All
power resides in the people! All power is derived from the people!‖

Figure 1. The 2008 Candlelight Protest in Down Town Seoul: the 2008
Candlelight protest march on Sejong Avenue on 15 June 2008. Source:
http://blog.naver.com/han_seok?Redirect=Log&logNo=120052974042.

35

The first candlelight protest occurred when President Roh Mu-hyun was impeached, while the
other candlelight protest that occurred that year was for citizens who were against Korea‘s decision to
dispatch troops during the Iraq War upon the request of the United States.
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With its extensive size and duration, however, the 2008 candlelight protest has
merited special attention from journalists, political commentators, and human and social
science scholars, all of whom attempted to identify the protest and its social meanings.
My research project also aims to join the efforts of identifying the protest and finding
socio-political meaning. Rather than finding the identity and social meaning of the protest
in itself, however, my research project, by applying the notion of ―articulation‖ as the
fundamental theoretical background, attempts to locate the 2008 candlelight protest
within its historical context. Subsequently, I attempt to formulate its identity and social
meaning through an understanding of exterior vectors and forces.
As a preparatory stage before uncovering the multidimensional historical contexts
of the 2008 candlelight protest, I examine the main characteristics of the protest in this
chapter. In order to understand the main characteristics of the protest, I refer to my
personal journal written during my participation in the protest in the summer of 2008, and
consult the news articles from the two Korean newspapers, Kyunghyang Shinmun and
The Hangyore, and 106 Korean scholarly articles written about the protest. I study the
main characteristics of the 2008 candlelight protest by comparing the latter with
conventional social movements in Korean history and in terms of four categories: (1)
main issue, (2) participants, (3) modality, and (4) goal, which are organized under the
four headings of`―Food Safety, Health and Life,‖ ―Heterogeneous Desires,‖ ―Serious
State and Humorous Protesters,‖ and ―Leaving Myung-bak Castle.‖
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Issue: Food Safety, Health, and Life
Even after the modern political system was established (following the end of the
Japanese Imperial rule in 1948 and the Korean War in 1953), Korea suffered under the
controls of authoritarian or military dictatorial regimes, which attempted to pass
constitutional amendments to exempt them from presidential term limits until the 1980s.
The regimes made attempts to justify their continuation by using the tragic experience of
the Korean War, the threat of an invasion from the North. When they were confronted
with opposition, they declared martial laws and arrested opposing members of parliament
and anti-government groups after accusing them of being pro-communist and pro-North
Korean forces. Hence, one of the main threads of social movements in Korea rose against
unjust social outcomes and ideology of the authoritarian regimes. Opposing the
authoritarian regimes, pro-democracy movement participants primarily demanded civil
rights for referendum (Jung and Kim 10).
Another thread of the main issues of the social movements was the collectivist
struggle for justifiable wealth redistribution. Despite political and social unrest, the
Korean economy continued to flourish under the authoritarian regimes, which led to a
rapid industrialization and an export-oriented economic plan over the past thirty years. As
the per capita GNP increased, the overall quality of life of the Korean population was
enhanced. However, the economic growth was based on the capitalist exploitation of lowincome laborers, which was maintained for competitive prices of products. During the
country‘s industrialization and urbanization, the social groups of small-business owners,
workers, farmers, and others were also alienated. Justifiable redistribution of wealth was
one of the main themes of conventional social movements in Korea.
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The main issue of the 2008 candlelight protest was different from these two issues.
In fact, the 2008 protest presented a wide range of grievances against President Lee‘s
unpopular leadership style and his new policies. The protesters criticized Lee‘s wealthbased cabinet appointments and pushed President Lee to drop much of his neoliberal
agenda, which included plans to privatize health insurance and public enterprises (water
and electricity), to reform the systems of education and mass media (specifically
terrestrial broadcasting),36 and to build a canal (called the Grand Korean Waterway).37 In
addition, the trade unions attempted to incorporate their issue of the instability of
employment of contract workers into the 2008 candlelight protest. Likewise, the 2008
candlelight took on the character of citizen protest, but it did not articulate the political
agenda throughout the entire time. Rather, the 2008 protest proclaimed the character of
consumer protest, principally revolving around the issue of ―food safety.‖ In this section,
I attempt to convey the idea that the issue of the 2008 candlelight protest was ―food
safety.‖ Let me begin discussion in this section by recounting Korea‘s status of U.S. beef
imports.
Korea, formerly the third largest market for American beef and worth $800
million a year (by 1999), suspended the imports of American beef in 2003 after an
outbreak of BSE (mad cow disease) in the United States as explained in the beginning.
BSE leads to deterioration of the brain and spinal cord as well as a range of other
symptoms affecting the whole body, eventually resulting in death of the infected animal.
36

During the 2008 candlelight protest, the government attempted to control freedom of speech by
appointing their people as the heads of broadcasting stations of KBS and YTN.
37

People argued against President Lee‘s plan to build a canal called the ―Grand Korean Waterway,‖
explaining that it is not proper to build a canal in a geographically small nation that is a peninsula
surrounded by water which already enjoys a highly developed transportation infrastructure.
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Additionally, human consumption of BSE-contaminated beef results in new variant
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD or nvCJD).38 The infected human experiences a rapid
decline of mental functioning and movement before reaching death. After the first case of
BSE was detected in a dairy cow in the state of Washington in the United States in 2003,
sixty-five nations, including Korea, imposed full or partial restrictions on importing
American beef products.39
Korea revisited the issue of U.S. beef imports in 2006 when the negotiations of
the Republic of Korea and the United States Free Trade Agreement were initially
announced. Korea and the United States, under the former regimes of both countries, Roh
Mu-hyun and George W. Bush, desired for the KorUS FTA with the expectation that the
treaty would be of political and economic benefit to both countries. The negotiations for
the agreement, however, were halted as the United States insisted on resuming U.S. beef
imports for the expansive trade agreements, while President Roh hesitated to lift the beef
import ban with the concerns regarding the health of the Korean public.40 Roh‘s decision
was influenced by the fact that two more cases of BSE-infected cattle were reported in
2005 and 2006 in the United States.
Lee Myung-bak, newly elected as Korean president in 2007, however, placed a
premium on the FTA. Taking it into a serious consideration that the United States had

38

The disease was named after the researchers who first identified the classic condition.
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) can be grouped into two types: ―classic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD)‖
and ―new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD).‖ While classic CJD is not related to mad cow disease,
the infection that causes the disease in cows is believed to be the same one that the causes new variant CJD
in humans.
39

Korea, which had heavily depended on imports for beef from the United States, found
Australian beef as an alternative.
40

States.

President Roh with his left-leaning inclination also sought to create autonomy from the United
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been endowed as a ―BSE controlled risk country‖ by the OIE41 in 2007 (ahead of Lee‘s
election), Lee approved the beef deal without disclosing relevant information (the draft of
the agreement and the specific results of each round of negotiations) to the Korean public
(Kim and Cho 15). Lee‘s approval of U.S. beef imports was revealed to the Korean
public after he had signed the unfavorable contract which included a new version of the
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS) for imported beef.
The new quarantine standards for importing U.S. beef were lower than the
standards in other countries such as Taiwan and Japan, both of which had reopened their
markets to U.S. beef ahead of Korea. There were three main problems in the contract
conditions. First, the quarantine standards allowed the import of U.S. beef products from
cattle of all ages: whereas Taiwan and Japan restricted imports of American beef from
cattle older than 20 months, Korea allowed imports of cattle older than 30 months, which
were believed to be at particular risk of mad cow disease. It is generally known that prion,
the agent of the disease, is generated from cattle that are fed with the remains of other
cattle in the form of meat-and-bone meal (MBM) (Pollan, The Omnivore‘s Dilemma 75).
Once the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) learned that the MBM practice
caused BSE in cows, they began to ban the practice (Pollan, The Omnivore‘s Dilemma
75). However, at that point in time, cattle older than 30 months were those that had
grown before the FDA had completely banned MBM. Second, cow parts in which the
mad cow virus typically resides, such as brains, eyes, skulls, spinal cords, all of which
had been defined by the OIE as Specified Risk Material (SRM), were allowed to enter
41

The World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) is the intergovernmental organization
responsible for improving animal health worldwide. This office was created through the International
Agreement signed on January 25, 1924, with the need to fight animal diseases at a global level. This office
was originally created in the name of the Office International des Epizooties (OIE); in May 2003, became
the World Organization for Animal Health, but it keeps its historical French acronym OIE (www.oie.int).
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Korea. Third, Korea did not have the right to ban U.S. beef imports even if a new case of
BSE was found in the United States in the future.
The Korean public plunged into a sense of fear, uncertainty, and mistrust as the
risks of mad cow disease were covered in MBC‘s PD Su-cheop (the Producer‘s Journal, a
Korean television news magazine similar to CBS‘s 60 Minutes). Aired on April 30, 2008,
the episode ―Is American Beef Really Safe from Mad Cow Disease?‖ alleged that
reopening the Korean market to American beef would expose the Korean public to the
threat of mad cow disease. The program reported the details of mad cow disease,
including the fact that Koreans, in particular, are genetically vulnerable to mad cow
disease at rates 2–3 times higher than other ethnic groups42; the human form of mad cow
disease is easily transmittable through blood transfusions and by consuming powdered
soup base in instant noodles, using cosmetic products made with cow derived collagen,
and consuming gelatin capsules in medication. The program also featured video footage
of sick cattle being led to slaughter in the United States and an interview with the mother
of Aretha Vinson, a deceased American woman who might have died from vCJD.43
Riding a wave of fear stirred up by the TV program, people began to search for
relevant information about the U.S. beef deal and mad cow disease and posted their

42

This claim was based on the information that around 200 cases of those who deceased of the
human version of mad cow disease (vCJD) belonged to a genetic group of M M (homozygous)—among the
three types of polymorphism of human prion protein gene (PRNP), V V (homozygous), M M (homozygous)
or M V (heterozygous). Since another study shows that 94.33% of the Korean population has the version of
the MM gene, it was claimed that the Korean population with M M gene are more susceptible to
developing prion disease (mad cow disease) after BSE prion exposure than any other ethnic group.
43

In fact, it was later pointed out by prosecutors who filed a lawsuit for libel against MBC‘s PD
Su-cheop that there were two important mistakes in the program. The cattle in the footage might not have
had any connection to mad cow disease, but they were downer cows, which under similar conditions are
also routinely slaughtered in Korea. Also, video footage contained a translation error: Korean subtitles
stated that Aretha Vinson, a deceased Virginian woman likely died from vCJD (related to mad cow disease),
while in actuality, Vinson‘s mother explained in English that her daughter had died of CJD (not related to
mad cow disease).
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findings on the Internet (Kim and Cho 2). The following list of statements contains
information spread on the Internet about mad cow disease; I collected these statements
mainly from the Internet portal site Agora of Daum, which was most popularly used as
the public sphere by citizens during the protest.


Prion, the transmissible agent of mad cow disease is highly stable: it resists
freezing, drying, and heating at normal cooking temperatures, and even resists
pasteurization and sterilization that normally kill viruses and bacteria.



Once infection occurs, the incubation period lasts four to five years and
ultimately is fatal to cattle within weeks to months of the onset of the disease.



In human cases of new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD or nvCJD),
symptoms such as depression, difficulty walking, and dementia occur and
progress rapidly.



There is no effective treatment for the disease.



All prion diseases are fatal. Animals and humans who develop a prion disease
will certainly die of it (my translations).
Badly misjudging the situation, however, President Lee reacted with the statement,

―We are to eat quality U.S. beef for a low price!‖ Lee‘s statement was based on the
notion that American beef from large-scale feedlots with the aid of heavy government
subsidies was intended to be cheaper than Korean beef from small farms. His remark
only enraged the public; they criticized Lee, saying ―Lee does not even know the
meaning of food safety. The quality of the food we consume and its impact on our health
is referred to as food safety.‖
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More information (listed below) about the gravity of the situation, the route of
transmission of mad cow disease, potentially infected food, and other physical risks
caused by the disease was published on the Internet.


The beef that will come to Korea is different from the beef that is consumed in the
United States.



Mad cow disease could be induced with a 100% fatality rate by consuming 0.01
grams of specified risk material.



Mad cow disease may be transmitted through kissing. It could also be transmitted
through contacted of soiled diapers or sanitary napkins of individual carrying the
virus.



Even vegetarians in the U.S. have died of mad cow disease.



94% of Koreans would contract mad cow disease if they consumed infected beef.



The entire population of Koreans will die (my translations).
Finally, a small group of female middle and high school students with candles

took to Cheonggye Plaza in downtown Seoul on May 2 to urge the government to cancel
the contract. These teenagers related on a TV interview that they had come to protest with
anxiety about their lives. Once the beef arrived in Korea, the teenagers believed, it would
be used by restaurants, especially the companies in charge of providing them with
lunches at school, which were known to use inexpensive ingredients. In free speech
sessions, they presented the horror of their possible death: ―I have only lived for 15 years!‖
The teenagers insisted the government renegotiate with the United States, chanting
―Nullify the Contract! Withdraw the Notification (of the U.S. beef imports) (my
translation)!‖ Further:
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I will be 21 years old in five years. It will be the time for me to enjoy freedom,
crisscrossing a college campus. I have been making strenuous endeavors [to enter
a college], so I don‘t want to die in my time of freedom. I don‘t want to lose the
people who I love (my translation) (qtd. in Y. Choi 201) (Please note that the fiveyear incubation period is not from scientific expertise, but demonstrated through
the Internet discussions).
As the information about mad cow disease spread to Korean pop groups‘ (e.g.
Tong Vang Xien Qi, Super Junior, Shin-hwa) fan-club websites, teenagers also began to
worry about their idols contracting the disease (Y. Choi 201). The fans expressed their
sentiments, crying, ―oppa(s)44 will run into danger‖ (qtd. in Y. Choi 201). One fan said:
I want to see Tong Vang Xien Qi once more. I want to continue to see the people
who I love, and I don‘t want TVXQ to be sick (my translation) (qtd. in Y. Choi
201).
As the protesting public established the fact that the entire population of Koreans
would die, Lee‘s government held a press conference about U.S. beef safety in order to
quell the fears. The Ministry for Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MFAFF) and
the Ministry for Health, Welfare, and Family Affairs (MHWFA) were in charge of
releasing the government‘s statement (May 2, 2008), the gist of which was that the
outcries of the teenage protesters were driven by groundless rumors about mad cow
disease and provoked by the unprofessional and unscientific treatment of information by
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The literal meaning of oppa is ―elder brother‖ from a female perspective in Korean. However, it
is not limited to family in the community-oriented Korean culture, but often extended to males in general.
Females use oppa (elder brother) to address older males close to them (encompassing elder brother, both
boyfriends and just friends). The male celebrities referenced above, who are often older than teenage girls,
are routinely referred to as oppa(s) by teenage girls.
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mass media (particularly MBC‘s PD Su-cheop), Internet users, and political parties with
political intentions.45 The following is an excerpt from the government‘s press conference:
Although our decision to alleviate SPS standards to import U.S. beef was made
based on international standards and scientific proofs [by OIE], it is very
regretful that some are questioning the safety [of U.S. beef] without
foundation. . . . We believe there is some political intention by a certain entity that
is trying to intensify the confusion surrounding the U.S. beef issue. It is certainly
regretful that some media and political parties are trying to magnify the risk of
mad cow disease to terrify the public. (qtd. in Kim and Cho 16–7).
Subsequently, the major national newspapers Chosun Ilbo, Dong-A Ilbo, and
JungAng Ilbo said the protesters were being instigated by anti-American forces. Dong-A
Ilbo stated on April 28, 2008 in its editorial section that ―some of anti-American civil
organizations . . . are inflaming public sentiments. … In every respect, it is just an antiAmerican instigation‖ (my translation). Chosun Ilbo reported on May 2 that ―the
opposition forces to KorUS FTA are reinforcing the danger of mad cow disease in order
to block American beef imports and to incite anti-Americanism,‖ and on May 5 stated
that ―the anti-American forces united to work together, so even the middle and high
school students, lacking in judgment, are running into the streets with candles‖ (my
translations). The conservative major newspapers, then, pointed out particular entities as
the anti-American forces, which had tried to throw the nation into chaos: MBC‘s PD Sucheop, the Hangyore, the Kyunghyang Shinmun, the Internet portal site Agora of Daum,
the opposition party United New Democratic Party, civil organizations such as Korean
45

According to U Seok-gyun, various scientific research results have shown that most of the
rumors on the Internet are true. For example, the majority of people who contracted nvCJD had MM
genetics which are most common to Koreans (219).
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Teachers Educational Worker‘s Union and other left-leaning and progressive groups
(Nam 258).
The conservative newspapers also delivered the advertisements, co-sponsored by
the Ministry for Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MFAFF) and the Ministry for
Health, Welfare, and Family Affairs (MHWFA), promoting the safety of U.S. beef. The
following is an excerpt of an advertisement run in DongA Ilbo on May 5:
The beef that will be imported from the United States is identical to the beef that
is consumed in the United States! There have been 350 million U.S. cows
consumed for the last 10 years worldwide, but there was no mad cow disease! The
beef that is being enjoyed by 300 million Americans, 2.5 million KoreanAmericans, and people in 96 countries worldwide will be imported to Korea! Mad
cow disease will not and cannot enter [Korea]! The government will take the
responsibility and protect our people‘s health! (qtd. in Kim and Cho 17).
The conservative newspapers‘ assertion about the safety of U.S beef, however,
only served to diminish public faith. Earlier, in resistance to the previous administration
of progressive president Roh Mu-hyun who initiated the negotiation of the FTA with the
United States,46 Chosun Ilbo, JungAng Ilbo, and DongA Ilbo had influenced the public to
believe ―American beef is not safe.‖ But their sudden change in claim that ―American
beef is safe!‖ to support conservative Lee‘s administration was not convincing to the
public.47 Although the newspapers emphasized that the United States had been named as
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In fact, Roh was the president who emphasized democratic values (such as ―discussion‖), but at
the same time, he pursued the KorUS FTA despite oppositions from his traditional leftist constituency.
47

Regarding the point, Kim Jong-young maintains that the boundaries between science and
politics were blurred surrounding the issue of mad cow disease. Whether American beef is safe was not
actually a matter of fact but a matter of value for politics—the risk of mad cow disease was judged not by
scientific standard but by rationale (109–52).

76
a ―BSE controlled risk country‖ by the OIE, this organization itself admitted that the
nature of the BSE agent was still a matter of debate (Y. Kang 269–97). The OIE stated on
its website that insufficient information was available to make any precise prediction
about the future number of BSE and vCJD cases (―Prion Diseases‖). It is for this reason
that other countries such as Taiwan and Japan, which had resumed their U.S. beef
markets ahead of Korea, demanded higher quarantine standards. How, then, could the
conservative newspapers confidently assert that ―American beef is safe‖?48
In order to calm the public, the government explained that American beef would
be labeled, not just in food markets but also in restaurants; people would not have to
purchase American beef if they do not want to. Protesters, however, responded, ―Once
we open the market to U.S. beef, we won‘t be able to control its distribution to make sure
of its safety‖ (qtd. in Kim and Cho 17). Government too often exaggerates its ability to
control the risk situation to maintain people‘s confidence, but the protesters were already
aware of the fact that imported agricultural products had often been disguised as locally
produced; it had not been possible for the government to completely trace the routes of
distribution of imported products.
In a bid to push harder, around seventeen hundred civic organizations and Internet
communities, in solidarity, set up Kwang-woo-byeong Dae-chaek we-won-hoe (People
United against Mad Cow Disease: www.antimadcow.org) on May 8. People United
against Mad Cow Disease offered candles, pickets, and emergency medical assistance for
the increasing number of protesters. At the same time, house wives in Gwa-cheon city
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According to Rho Jin-chul, people are more terrified by ―unknown‖ risks. In this sense, the
Korean public‘s response to the risk of mad cow disease, which plunged into fear, is normal and general
(not exceptional or irrational). Rho postulates that such response is not a temporary phenomenon, but a
repetitive social mechanism.
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began a campaign by putting up banners on their apartment balconies, reading ―Against
importing American beef.‖ American food restaurants such as McDonald‘s and Outback
Steak House ran newspaper advertisements declaring that they did not use American beef.
The protesters‘ acts influenced the general public‘s opinion of President Lee.
Although Lee was elected as president not long ago, his approval rating plummeted to
nearly a single digit number (Kim and Cho 2). President Lee sent a delegation to the
United States to seek modifications through additional negotiation (on May 13) to tighten
food safety regulations; and made a public apology (on May 22).
On May 24, protesters moved from Cheonggye Plaza to Seoul Square to stage
overnight rallies. The protesters gathered in the square and took Sejong Avenue to march
toward the Blue House (the Korean president‘s residence), chanting ―Cancel the
Contract!‖ and ―Lee Myung-bak Out!‖ In response, Lee released riot police. Using their
buses, riot police built barricades around Seoul Square and Sejong Avenue for the
purpose of blocking protesters from marching. They used water cannons and tear gas, and
arrested those who remained at overnight rallies. According to detained protesters, during
interrogations, they were asked, ―Who is pulling the strings behind you?‖ The actions by
the government revealed both the government‘s lack of awareness of food safety and the
old-fashioned political belief that there were anti-American instigators behind the
protesters.49
After the government‘s violent quelling, on May 30, hundreds of mothers with
their infants in strollers came out and stood at the frontline of protesters. In a TV
interview, a woman stated that she joined the protest in order to prevent her children and
49

During the military dictatorships in the 1970s and 1980s, this question had been the query used
for purging the opposition‘s struggles for democratization (Yong-taek Jeong 31–3).
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family from eating foods that were possibly unsafe to eat.50 The participation of the
women—domestic primary caregivers, keepers of health, and supporters of their working
husbands and children, who had supposedly focused primarily on their everyday lives
and devoted most of their time and effort to their families rather than to other external
matters in Korean society—signified the urgency of the issue as well as the fact that the
protest was not entirely political as the government conservatives had claimed.
As the number of participants increased day by day, the protest virtually
paralyzed Lee‘s administration. Lee offered another official apology to the public with
his promise to make efforts to secure safety of food. Finally, the delegation sent to the
United States was able to secure a revision of U.S. beef import conditions through an
additional negotiation, and announced the details of the revised conditions on June 21.51
The revised SPS through the additional negotiation forbade import of beef from cattle
aged 30 months and older, and an age certification for all meat shipped to Korea was to
be provided. Imports of cattle parts (including brains, eyes, skulls, and spinal cords) that
were possibly more susceptible to carrying mad cow disease were also forbidden. In
addition, Korea won the right in the accord to inspect a sampling of American
slaughterhouses; beef that had been in frozen storage in Korea for months could now be
inspected before heading to stores.
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The interview with the mother is available at http://www.vop.co.kr/A00000292910.html.
Moreover, in Kim Jinsoo and Cho Moonhee‘s research, Interview Mom G related, The first thing I
concerned is what my husband and daughters eat at work and school for lunch. We don‘t know where the
beef that food companies and restaurants are using is coming from,… I don‘t believe what our government
is doing is right, and it seems that nobody from the government authority is explaining that clearly (qtd. in
Kim and Cho 18).
51

Regarding the supplementary articles approved by the U.S. minister, I referred to the public
issue discussion site in Korea, www.agendanet.co.kr.
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The 2008 candlelight protest ended after three months. In a magazine interview, a
participant in the protest, a member of the Internet community 82 Cook.com, stated how
the government‘s approval of U.S. beef imports got her involved in politics:
Politics had sounded grandiose. Politics had seemed to be far from me and to
have nothing to do with me. I became aware that politics is our life at a time, I
won‘t forget even after Lee‘s regime. Lee did the thing that no one could have
done single-handed. He made us experts [of politics] (my translations) (qtd. in
Mun 21).
Participants: Heterogeneous Desires
In conventional pro-democracy social movements against the authoritarian
regimes, college students assumed a pivotal role. According to Gu Hae-guen, the student
activists joined hands with the alienated social groups, such as workers and farmers (158–
65 qtd. in Jung and Kim 10). As mentioned earlier, during the dictatorial regimes, the
economic growth created inter-regional conflicts as well as wide structural gaps between
the rich and the poor, and the urban and rural regions. Student activists at the time fought
against the inequality of wealth and authoritarian rule (Jung and Kim 2). Essentially, in
the conventional social movements for pro-democracy and justifiable wealth
redistribution, students, labor unions, and farmers along with left-intellectuals and
political opposition parties were the leading actors.
The 2008 candlelight protest, however, went beyond the farm fences, the factory
walls, and the ivory towers to people from all strata of life: teenagers, Internet users,
celebrities, social activists, reservists, college students, women and their infants, laborers,
and religious leaders. Furthermore, even as food safety was a common thread of the
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movement, these different groups appeared to have different intentions behind their
protests for food safety. It seems that participation of numerous people from across the
political spectrum is a common hallmark of the contemporary social protests just as
Occupy Wall Street in which ―[a]nti-capitalism, lack of health care for the uninsured,
tuition hikes at public universities, and many other complaints share the stage‖ (Linsky).
In this section, I attempt to detail the profiles of the 2008 candlelight protest participants,
who/which groups of individuals came to join the protest, and what roles each of the
groups assumed during the protest.
First of all, in the 2008 candlelight protest, middle and high school students were
one of the most salient groups. When U.S. beef imports were approved by Korean
president Lee Myung-bak, it was a high school student under the Internet user name
Andante, who suggested a signature-seeking campaign for the impeachment of President
Lee in Daum Agora, one of the most popular Internet portal sites in Korea
(http://agora.media.daum.net) (on April 6). More than a million people visited the
website and signed the petition in less than a month (Cho and Kang 326). It was also
fifty-one middle and high school students who first took to the streets to voice their
concerns. Holding candles, this group of teenagers, summoning people to the plaza in
downtown Seoul, acquired the nickname Chot-bul-so-nyeo (candle girls). They became
the icon of the 2008 candlelight protest.
Whereas the role of middle and high school students was prominent, college
students in their twenties, who once led pro-democracy movements against military
dictatorship until the 1980s, did not emerge at the front during the 2008 protest.
Commentators began to reprove these individuals for lacking in interest and enthusiasm
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about the political and social issue at hand (Kang, ―[Where Did the College Students]‖;
Sang-jin Jeon; Chan-ho Oh). Commentators believed that, as the prolonged economic
depression had swelled the ranks of the unemployed, individuals in their twenties were
focused on their own personal issues, explained by the term self-management, as a means
of preparing for the job market.52 Neglecting any issue that did not benefit their current
status, these individuals were more concerned with short-term issues such as achieving a
high GPA, English scores, and other accomplishments required for finding a job. As if
confirming this viewpoint, the Internet newspaper Redian (redian.org) carried out an
interview with a college student who stated ―I fear unemployment more than death in 10
or 20 years (the incubation period of mad cow disease).‖
It appears that college students, who had taken the role of society‘s primary
intellectuals, were no longer the site/bodies of knowledge production. During the 2008
candlelight protest, the most influential sources of information were Internet communities
(the general public). With the announcement of the Korean government‘s approval of U.S.
beef, Internet users galvanized forums to define the situation, to clarify the risk of U.S.
beef, and to organize the protest. In particular, Daum Agora served as the starting point
for discussions related to U.S. beef importation issues, and it took on the role of the
essential glue that bound together the many organizations and individuals by providing an
open space for debates (D. Lee 93).53
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According to Kang Sung-ryul, 95% of twenty-somethings were projected to have only
temporary contract positions and only the remaining 5% would have permanent positions (―[Where did the
College Student]‖ 152).
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According to research results by Media Today in regards to Internet discourse about mad cow
disease from May 3 to June 2, Daum Agora was the most popular information source, the homepage of
Democratic Labor Party was the second most popular, the Naver discussion bulletin was third, and DC
Inside was fourth.
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It is noteworthy here that Korean media scholars drew on the concept of
―collective intelligence‖ advanced by Pierre Levy in order to characterize the shift of
knowledge production from college students, power brokers, and social intellectuals to
Internet community members. In his book Collective Intelligence: Mankind‘s Emerging
World in Cyberspace (1997), Levy postulates that the advanced technology that
constructs cyberspace shifts the society of an information economy into the society of a
social economy (an economy based on human interactions). In the society of a new
economy, the unfettered human interactions of ideas and knowledge (irrespective of
physical locations) reach ―collective intelligence‖ through the mutual recognition and
enrichment of individuals. Now, ―intelligence‖ in the society of a social economy turns to
be collective, which is based on the notion of a collective or plural ―cogitamus (we
think),‖ not a Cartesian model of thought highlighting the singular idea of ―cogito (I
think)‖ (Terranova 43). Based on Levy‘s idea, the media scholars perceived constructions
of collective intelligence by Internet users during the 2008 protest. Even the government
conservatives recognized the great influence of the Internet. Although they held negative
views on the protest, they insisted that the 2008 candlelight protest was the result of
―nationwide Internet hype‖ or ―digital populism [surrounding groundless rumors about
mad cow disease].‖
Information regarding the protest spread throughout online community websites
that were not even politically oriented, such as My Club (an Internet community for
exchanging information about women‘s lifestyle), Soul Dresser (fashion), Hwa-jang-bal
(the real painted ladies—makeup tips), 82 Cook.com (cooking tips), Lemon Terrace

83
(home interior decoration),54 Ssang-Ko (plastic surgery), SLR Club (photography), MLK
Park (baseball), DVD Prime (movie), and so on. These websites all functioned as the
main information channels for the protest.
Accordingly, a large number of protesters were comprised of Internet community
members, such that People United against Mad Cow Disease (www.antimadcow.org) was
formed not only by civil organizations but also by Internet communities. Participation of
Internet community members also served as the momentum for the protest to develop
along with cultural events and to draw celebrities. Korean celebrities, such as singers
Kim Jang-hun, Yun Do-hyun, Lee Seung-hwan, and Shin Hae-cheol, and movie actresses
Kim Bu-sun and Mun So-ri, visited the cultural events as part of the protest, and
encouraged the protesters with their speeches and performances. In particular, actress
Kim Min-sun expressed solidarity with protesters by displaying her dislike for U.S. beef
on her Internet mini-homepage. Cultural events continued throughout the protest: on June
21, there was an overnight music concert (held by a civil organization Mun-hwa Yondae), emceed by the famous film director Byeon Young-ju, and featured performances of
musical groups No-rae-leul Chat-nun Sa-ram-deul (Song Hunters: my translation) and
Huckleberry Finn, and singer Son Byeon-hue.
Voices of women operated in the foreground and background of the protest,
oscillating between online and offline. As mentioned above, the middle and high school
students who first took the protest venues were women. Also joining the protest were
various women who were the members of female Internet cafés (that were mentioned
above, including My Club, Soul Dresser, Hwa-jang-bal, 82 Cook.com, Lemon Terrace,
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The Internet café, Lemon Terrace, was launched on February 26, 2008 for exchanging
information of home interior decoration, cooking, and over all lifestyles.
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Ssang-Ko, etc.) On the Internet, the members of these cafés encouraged each other to
cancel their subscriptions to the major national newspapers (Chosun Ilbo, JungAng Ilbo,
and DongA Ilbo), which took the government‘s side on the U.S. beef import issue. They
also boycotted commercial products advertised in those conservative newspapers, shared
the list and phone numbers of the companies that placed advertisements of their products
in the conservative newspapers, and encouraged each other to make protesting calls to the
companies.55 They threatened the companies to never purchase their products if the
companies continued to use the conservative newspapers as their advertising platforms.
In addition, the members of Soul Dresser collected funds to place an advertisement
opposing American beef imports in the progressive newspapers the Hangyore and the
Kyunghyang Shinmun (respectively on May 17 and 19).
Participation of these women also created unusual scenes of social protests. For
example, women with heavy makeup, high-heels, fashionable outfits, and shiny purses
marched in the protest group, under the flags saying Ssang-Ko, indicating an Internet
community for exchanging information about plastic surgery;56 Hwa-jang-bal (the real
painted ladies), an Internet community for exchanging information about makeup tips;
and Soul Dresser, another Internet community for exchanging information about
luxurious products such as clothing and designer accessories. These women, in my mind,
had been those with a great penchant for the care of their own bodies and the key figures
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At that time, many people unsubscribed from the mainstream newspapers. In Kim and Cho‘s
research, one of the interviewees, Mom G noted as follows: First thing I did after I recognized the issue, I
stopped subscribing to some of the conservative pro-government newspapers that were not covering the
issue very well, and started to read some others that cover the issue better because I thought getting and
understanding the information was very important. (Kim and Cho 12).
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Ssang-Ko is the abbreviated compound for cosmetic eyelid surgery and plastic surgery of the
nose, each of which is called respectively Ssang-ga-pul and Ko-su-sul in Korean.
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of excessive consumptions of goods for their personal gratification, but during the protest
they were one of the groups of the leading actors.
On May 27, after the fierce battles between riot police and protesters, a group of
male youth, in military reserve uniform joined the protest. Because it is mandatory for
nearly all Korean males to serve six to eight years in the reserves (after completing the
mandatory two-year national military service), most Korean men own military reserve
force uniforms.57 Claiming that they came to protect Chot-bul-so-nyeo (candle girls)‘s
voices from the government‘s violence, these uniformed youth controlled traffic. They
ran toward the head of marching protesters and formed blockades made from their
extended arms in a row on driveways, so the other protesters could march safely. In doing
so, they obtained the nickname Oppa-bu-dae (a troop of elder brothers).58 While the
troop of oppa(s) was comprised of 40 military reservists at the beginning, 200–300
reservists had joined by May 31 (Han and Heo 62).
However, appraisals about Oppa-bu-dae‘s presence in the protest were
ambivalent. Many protesters welcomed the troop of oppa(s), dubbing them ―body guards‖
and ―stars,‖59 and applauded their support when the troop of oppa(s) controlled traffic.
Commentators also took notice of the fact that most of the oppa(s) were individuals in
their twenties; having previously been criticized for not leading this protest, they were
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They were indeed the members of the Internet café Military Reserve Force Defending the
Republic of Korea (http://cafe.daum.net/korea20080526).
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As older male, the male in military reserve uniforms were referred to oppa(s) by teenage candle

girls.
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The troop of oppa(s) was described as ―star‖ by the Seoul Shinmun on May 31, 2008, and as
―bodyguard‖ by the Korean Economic Daily on June 1, 2008 (Han and Heo 62).
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now rising to show their passion for this political issue.60 On the other hand, some
protesters felt uncomfortable by the mere presence of military uniforms, recalling the
social movements quelled by military forces in Korean history. Moreover, a few
commentators criticized oppa-bu-dae for reproducing and stereotyping unequal
traditional gender roles of women and children as those in need of protection. 61
As the fierce battles between riot police and protesters continued, on May 30,
hundreds of mothers, pushing their children in strollers, joined the street protests. They
said they joined the protest to prevent their children and families from eating foods that
were possibly unsafe for consumption and obtained the nickname Yu-mo-cha-bu-dae (a
troop of strollers).62 Although some people viewed the participating mothers in the
protest as an emerging, new, significant subject of social movement, some feminists felt
that the mothers‘ claim (that they had joined the protest for their husbands‘ and children‘s
health and food safety) anchored their positions at the margins of society by still placing
their husbands and children as the connection between them and the nation-state (Han
and Heo 62). Possibly, the mothers‘ claims negated their own importance while elevating
the unit of the ―family.‖
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The scholars who focused on the appearance of the individuals in their twenties in the protest
venues are as follows: Oh 360; Sung-hwan Kim 21. Kim additionally notes by June, the protest also
included participants who were in their twenties, thirties and forties.
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Han and Heo believe that the candlelight protest did not exist in the public sphere in which
individuals participate with their freedom and equal rights, but it functioned as a social and cultural ritual or
performance that reproduced unequal gender roles (2).
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The interview with the mother is available at http://www.vop.co.kr/A00000292910.html.
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Meanwhile, the scenes of protest were covered in Internet real-time news
broadcast, evoking greater sympathy and drawing more citizens.63 Play-by-play
announcers from the Internet press—such as Radio 21, Color TV (run by New
Progressive Party), Oh My News (www.ohmynews.com), No Cut News
(www.nocutnews.co.kr), Pressian (www.pressian.com) and Popular Opinion—reported
the unrest (Kang, Jang and Choi 13). The recordings at the protest venues were instantly
posted and delivered to those who had not yet joined the protest, evoking their moral
responsibility (Cho and Kang 311–32). Some protesters I had met at the protest testified
that they came to join the protests after reading about or watching videos on the protest
through the Internet.64 Media scholars Lee Chang-ho and Jung Eui-chul state that citizens
reached ―collective excitement,‖ while writing their comments on the postings, the
activity of which is called daet-geul-nol-yi (play with comments) in Korean (457–91).65
In addition to the news reports on the Internet, general citizens performed as
―news reporters‖ by taking photographs, taping videos, conducting interviews, and
providing coverage through their Internet blogs. The User Created Content (UCC)
website, Africa (www.africa.com) was one of the popular video sharing platforms
throughout the protest. Interested in the blurred boundary of journalism ―experts,‖ Lee
Chang-ho and Bae Ae-jin conducted interviews with citizen reporters and disclosed that
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According to Jeong Yong-taek, numerous new flags (including the flag saying ―Agora, a Shrine
for Discussion‖ of Daum Agora and ―Are You An Educated ‗Woman‘?‖ of Soul Dresser) appeared in the
protest venues on the day after a video clip aired, showing the extreme measurements the police used to
quell the protest (10–1).
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Interviewee Mom N, in Kim and Cho‘s research, also stated that she was affected by the live
broadcast of the protest through the Internet as following: ―I watched the live broadcast of the candlelight
vigil protest held in downtown Seoul via blogs and internet forums almost every night. I also became a
member of more than 10 different social network sites to support this movement. Texting to my friends to
another thing I do to encourage their participation whenever there is a new protest scheduled‖ (Kim and
Cho 14).
65

Daet-geul means ―comments‖ in Korean and Nol-yi means ―play‖ or ―game.‖
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the new journalists intended to report all the happenings in the protest venues from their
own viewpoint, without any mediation or exclusion of major mass media (44–75). In this
way, the 2008 candlelight unfolded, encompassing general citizens beyond social
activists, and the number of protesters rapidly escalated and exceeded 10,000 by May
(Yong-take Jeong 11).
During the 72-hour relay rallies from June 5 to June 7, 50,000 protesters gathered
on June 5, 200,000 on June 6; and 150,000 on June 7. Protest attendance peaked to over a
million on the rally held on June 10 in celebration of the 21st anniversary of the 1987
June Movement, which helped end military authoritarian rules at that time: approximately
800,000 candles packed the entire districts surrounding Tae-pyong-ro in Seoul; another
300,000 protesters were present in the outlying cities.
The huge number of protesters continued to push the Lee administration; a
delegation was sent to the United States for additional negotiation and reached a revision
of U.S. beef import condition. However, the revision of the U.S. beef deal did not placate
all protesters; some protesters still remained downtown, demanding a complete
renegotiation (not an additional negotiation of the deal) to win better assurances to
prevent mad cow disease. Disregarding their voice, the government posted the news of
opening of the Korean market to American beef in the official gazette on June 26, and
officially resumed American beef imports (for the KorUS FTA) on July 1.
This time, laborers, one of the traditional social movement subjects, stood out.
Cheol-gang-no-jo (the Korean Metal Workers‘ Union: KMWU, which represents
workers at 240 companies including the country‘s four major automakers) held a twohour work strike, demanding a new beef deal as well as better working conditions. In fact,
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laborers and trade unions, who were the main actors of the conventional social
movements, had participated in this protest from the onset. According to Huh Young-gu,
a leader of Min-ju-no-chong (the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions: KCTU), union
leaders had taken part in all-night sit-in demonstrations in Cheonggye plaza, while also
encouraging union members to join the protest (87). However, Huh continues that it was
difficult to expect an actual commitment of workers‘ time since most had been pressured
to handle demanding work schedules under the conditions of the waning economy. Still,
trade unions had taken a role in the protest. On June 13, the KCTU attempted to block
distribution of U.S. beef by leading the transportation union on a general strike, refusing
to transport U.S. beef that had been imported and stored in frozen storage in Korea for
months and were heading to stores. On June 25, 146,000 members of the KMWU went
on a 5-day general strike against the KorUS FTA (Y. Huh 87).
The trade unions were not the only group that had played an active part during the
2008 candlelight protest from the conventional social movement leaders. In free speech
sessions, I had seen the protester speakers who introduced themselves as farmers.66
Although they were not the main pillars of the protest, they played a part in the
background of the 2008 protest. Beef farmers in Korea initiated the protest against U.S.
beef imports as the previous government of Roh Mu-hyun began negotiations on the
KorUS FTA on February 2, 2006, which hinted at a detrimental effect on Korean farmers.
As the protest dragged on even after the additional negotiation, violence from the
police grew fiercer. Protesters witnessed an increase in the use of police bus barricades,
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Historically, farmers have been one of the leading groups in conventional social movements in
Korea, as they had not been a privileged group in the society during rapid industrialization and urbanization.
Regarding this point, I will have further discussion in Chapter 5.
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water cannons, tear gas and arrests. The growing police brutality incited the involvement
of religious groups. After grand-scale collisions between protesters and police from June
28–29 (particularly after the government announced the reopening of the Korean market
to American beef in the official gazette), Roman Catholic priests from the Catholic
Priests Association for Justice (CPAJ)67 held an outdoor Mass at City Hall Plaza in
Central Seoul, and led a crowd of at least 5,000 on a winding march. Some priests fasted
and prayed. The Mass terminated the violent mood of the protest. The government and
the police had no reason to interrupt the religious event. Meanwhile, the beef imports
were resumed on July 1. On July 3, Christians joined in the protest and on July 4, and a
Buddhist circle joined the protest and calmed the furious protesters. On July 5, the
religious circles led 200,000 participants in a non-violent, peaceful march (K. Lee 96).
Overall, the 2008 candlelight protest proceeded with floods of different groups of
people: a wide range of generations, men and women, families, school students and their
parents, office workers, farmers, unionists, citizens, musicians, celebrities, reservist
soldiers in uniforms, religious people, activist groups of many different political stripes,
and non-political Internet communities. Each group possessed its own desires and
demands. Some people strolled in the manner of flâneurs in the protest venues, while
others marched resolutely towards the Blue House. Secondary school students worried
over their school lunch; some participants were against the government‘s authoritarian
attitudes; mothers joined the protest with concerns about their children‘s school meals;
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The Catholic Priests Association for Justice (CPAJ) has contributed to democratization of
Korean society. Following the model of Liberation Theology established in the Latin American states, the
Korean Catholic church became a haven for those opposing the military dictatorships. The issues of
democratization and evangelism were conflated and some church leaders went so far as to lead protests
against the authoritarian regimes. It was also possible largely due to governmental agencies‘ reluctance to
use military force against the church.
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workers demanded wage increases; Internet users blamed the government for its lack of
communication; activists tried to enlighten people about the notion of neoliberalism.
These protesters spontaneously came together, creating a diverse unitary protesting
American beef imports.
Modality: Serious State and Humorous Protesters
Regarding U.S. conventional social movements, Marty Linsky states ―the great
movements of the 1960s in civil rights, women‘s rights, and opposition to the Vietnam
War narrowly focused, well organized, strategically brilliant, and while attracting large
numbers of people, managed by people who took on authority roles and made essential
decisions, albeit often with significant consultative processes.‖ Just as they were, the
traditional Korean social activists for prodemocracy and balanced wealth distribution
unfolded focused, well organized, and strategic protests. Social activist groups and trade
unions, on the basis of their political theories and lines, played leading roles in mobilizing
protesters; protesters were unified around their leaders; their activities followed a strict
order, displaying organized marches following the flags of their leaders.68 With militant
mind-sets, protesters cried out against military dictatorship, raising wildly radical and
drastic slogans while pumping their clenched fists in the air. As demonstrations escalated
into pitched battles with the police, protesters broke police lines, wielding steel pipes and
throwing fire bombs in retaliation against the violent quelling by police forces, who had
used cold shields, water cannons, extinguishers, and tear gas on the protesters.
The 2008 candlelight protest, however, developed cultural activist practices such
as culture jamming, subverting, rebel clowning which call upon irony, humor and the
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Lee Jong-gu describes that the participants in the previous social movements ―were part of an
organizational pyramid with central persons leading the demonstrations‖ (321–32).
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carnivalesque. The 2008 protest did not point to a single, unifying political issue. Rather,
the protesters degraded the government authorities through their sense of humor and
collective laughter; the government, reacting angrily, violently, and authoritatively,
looked foolish. In this section, I explore the modalities of the protest, which are different
from those of conventional movements. To understand the essential features of the
modalities, it is now important to look back to the time of Lee Myung-bak‘s election as
the 17th president of Korea.
Lee Myung-bak was newly elected as Korean president in February, 2008, with
an oath to revitalize the national economy and to strengthen Korea‘s relations with the
United States (which, he argued, had been weakened by the two previous regimes). Lee
claimed that he would restore better relations with the United States as a means for
economic revitalization: he planned to sign the KorUS FTA, for which negotiations had
been initiated but not finalized by previous President Roh in 2006. Despite the United
States‘ coercive demand to resume beef imports, Roh hesitated to lift the beef imports
ban because of concerns regarding the health of the Korean public. The KorUS FTA
negotiations, thus, did not go smoothly; the relationship with the United States was
weakened, and President Roh was often accused (by Korean conservatives) of being too
nationalistic and anti-American.
Boasting of his confidence about building an amicable relationship between
Korea and the United States, President Lee bragged about the invitation from President
George W. Bush to the U.S. presidential retreat Camp David, Maryland. Lee was the first
Korean leader to be invited to Camp David. Even days before the visit, Lee‘s aides billed
the meeting with President Bush as a momentous event—one that never would have been
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granted to leaders like Roh. Subsequently, a photo of Lee shaking hands with Bush upon
his arrival at Camp David hit the major conservative newspapers, leading the reader to
assume the two men forged close ties. More pictures were released, including one of Lee
driving a golf cart with a big smile on his face, sitting right next to Bush. The pictures
were presumably intended to illustrate Lee‘s capacity to fortify Korea‘s relationship with
the United States.
Lee‘s efforts to display his closeness to President Bush, however, was greeted
with shouts of derision for then Korea leader kowtowing to the U.S. president, as it was
disclosed to the public that Lee reached a settlement in regards to the U.S. beef import
issues. The U.S. beef import deal approved by a new president behind closed doors
angered the public, especially those who value democratic decision-making. Internet
users morphed the photo of Lee at Camp David using Photoshop to create an exponential
number of sarcastic parody images and spread them throughout various Internet websites.
One of the images that I have encountered was a remake of the poster from a Korean film,
originally titled Nae ―Yeo-ja‖ Chin-gu-reul So-gae-ham-ni-da (Let Me Introduce My
―Girl‖ Friend), abbreviated Yeo-chin-so. The female character in the original poster was
replaced by Bush‘s face, and Lee‘s face replaced the face of the male character. The title
on the poster was also altered into Nae ―Mi-kug‖ Chin-gu-reul So-gae-hap-ni-da (Let Me
Introduce My ―American‖ Friend) with the abbreviated title, ―Mi-chin-so‖ which also
means ―mad cow‖ in Korean. The public‘s rage began to unravel through parody images.
The humor spread on the Internet was no different from the atmosphere of the
2008 candlelight protest on streets.69 The 2008 candlelight protest began with middle and
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In fact, this feature might be different from the image of the protest constructed by the South
Korean mainstream press by foreign press (such as CNN and USA Today). They have played up the violent
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high school students holding candles in Cheonggye Plaza, urging the government to
renegotiate with the United States to change the unfavorable conditions of U.S. beef
importation. The slogans that the teenagers chanted, however, were as jaunty and
certainly different from those of civil organizations and groups who joined the protest
following the teenagers. If civil organizations and activists chanted, ―Overthrow the
Regime!‖ ―Impeach Lee Myungbak!‖ ―Traitor Lee Myungbak!‖, teenagers chanted, ―Eat
Mad Cow Yourself [President Lee]!‖, ―Set Back Lee Myung-bak, Hoola Hoola~‖ (E.
Cho 65), ―Send Mad Cows to the Blue House!‖ ―I came here skipping study hall (which
was mandatory for most secondary students),‖ and ―We are a troop of Zombies from
MadCow.net!‖ The Korean teenagers avoided the same canned phrases and favored
lilting, speedy, and short sentences. From the advertising of cosmetics company Skin
Food, ―Not to be taken orally. Please apply on your skin‖ (my translation), the teenagers
made a parody phrase, ―[American beef] Not to be taken orally. Please apply on MB [Lee
Myung-bak]‖ (E. Cho 65).
The protesters wrote cutting, witty and humorous satirical remarks on their
pickets and placards, and wrote and sang comical songs to mock and deride President Lee,
his administration, and the police. One of the songs popular among protesters was the one
that Singer An Chi-hwan made by adding melody to a poem, whose lyric is following:
If I go to the hospital with mad cow disease,
I could not afford treatments due to privatization of health insurance.
I would just die because I do not have money and landed estate.
Please cremate my body and scatter the ashes on the Grand Korean Waterway.
reactions of the protesters against the increasingly tighter police‘s control. Please refer to CNN, ―Scores
hurt in S. Korea beef protests,‖ June 29, 2008, and USA Today, ―Hundreds hurt in S. Korea beef protest,‖
June 29, 2008.
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On Internet websites, protesters called Lee ―tone deaf‖ since he had never opened
his ears to the protesters‘ voices. Lee was also labeled ―2MB‖—the number 2 being
pronounced ―Lee‖ in Korean, and ―MB‖ being the initials of Myung-bak—, as the
protesters were slyly stating that Lee‘s intelligence quotient (IQ) is only 2 mega-bites
(2MB), leading him to unintelligently sanction import U.S beef with lowered quarantine
standards. In order to make fun of Lee, whose physical appearance, the protesters argued,
was comparable to the appearance of mouse or rat, they chanted ―We field mice
apologize [for the stupid decision] on behalf of the rat. Let‘s catch the rat! Zzig Zzig Zzig
(squeaking)!!‖ These tactics were not intended to rationally make sense, but such a
bewildering array of activities broke down the solemnity of President Lee into bits and
pieces (Kenny 4).
The 2008 protesters also intentionally disrupted and disoriented ―consensus
reality‖ through their practices of cultural activism (Routledge 443). As police alerted
protesters about their impending crushing through a megaphone, protesters spurred the
police to sing, chanting ―Live music please!‖ 70 Protesters shouted at the water cannons
aimed for them ―Soap and hot water please!‖, joking that water cannons served as
portable showers during the hot summer season. They also placed flowers in the jackets
of the police officers who stood still with blank looks on their faces to form a human
barricade. When blocked by the police, protesters chanted ―Detour, when you are
blocked!‖ turning around and proceeding in alternate directions to the Blue House. These
practices ―de-programm[ed] normative spatial functions and consensus realities by
articulating new imaginaries and meanings‖ (Routledge 443).
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Police normally announced that they would take stern actions against protesters who did not
scatter but remained to participate in ―illegal‖ acts.
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Protesters dubbed the police bus ―chicken cage‖ because the bus featured a wire
enclosure. When the police attempted to arrest protesters, some voluntarily turned
themselves in so they could ride on the police bus. They took photographs of themselves
on the ―Chicken Cage Tour‖ to upload on the Internet. Fliers spread on the Internet,
advertising a set of tour packages: ―Free Visit to the Chicken Bus and the Police Station.‖
One time, a rumor spread on the Internet that the ―candle sellers‖ were pulling the strings
behind the protest. Women participants from Internet cafés (such as My Club, Soul
Dresser, Hwa-jang-bal, 82 Cook.com, Lemon Terrace, Ssang-Ko, and the like) assigned
each other ―homework‖ to make protest calls to the companies, threatening to boycott the
products of the companies if the companies continued to use the conservative newspapers
as their advertisement platforms. Standing before the line of frightening police forces,
protesters resorted to mordant humor, which relieved the tension. In such a way, the
protesters (temporarily) transformed spaces of intimidation and coercion into ―clown
spaces of play and mockery‖ (Routledge 443).
Meanwhile, we protesters also ―called upon Situationist-inspired tactics of
détournement (Buser and Arthurs 4). During lulls in clashes between protesters and
police, I arranged a time and place to meet my friends, my master‘s thesis advisor,
research advisors, and master‘s program colleagues who I had often encountered in the
protest venues. We sat in circles on the square or in the middle of streets, ―closing roads
to traffic,‖ hanging out with bottles of beer and soft drinks that we had purchased at
corner shops (Buser and Arthurs 4). Other protesters also sat in their own circles as if
they were at a picnic. Musicians played six-holed bamboo flutes, accordions, and Korean
percussions, while a dance troupe romped on a temporary platform to songs blaring from
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loud speakers. It was an impromptu concert of young protesters, dancing and singing for
onlookers; audiences joined in the performances by clapping to the beat, and some
audience members creatively made impromptu drums out of water bottles as musical
instruments. Elaborately costumed dancing figures gracefully sashayed between the
circles of spectators. We protesters were ―taking over streets and turning them into
pulsing, dancing, temporary carnivals‖ (Duncombe 68). These activities in the protest
venues, ―transform[ing] so-called dead motorway into living human space‖ (Buser and
Arthurs 4), fashioned ―sensuous solidarities‖ (Routledge 443).71
At the other extreme of this exhilarating atmosphere of the protest, however, the
government and government conservatives displayed a stern demeanor. At a press
conference on May 13, the police chief Uh Cheong-su stated that the candlelight festival
in Cheonggye Plaza did not simply appear to be a cultural event because people in the
plaza carried pickets and chanted rebellious political messages. He asserted that the event
was an illegal action, citing the Law on Assembly and Demonstrations that bans
assemblage in the square or the streets without prior notification to the appropriate
authorities. He continued that the police would take strong actions against the illegal
protest participants as well as the instigators of the protest. The Democratic Labor Party,
the Confederation of Korean Trade Unions, the Federation of Street Vendors, and Korean
Teachers‘ Union (which had led social movements for democracy and civil rights since
1960) were pegged as the instigators of the protest.
The government added to the prevailing tensions by directing the Seoul Education
Office to send schoolteachers to Cheong-gye Plaza to coax the teenagers to scatter and go
71

According to Routledge, sensuous solidarities are generated through diverse bodily movements
and techniques, and are indicative of both the performative character of activist subjectivities and the
content of activists‘ public (political) performances.
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―back onto the right path‖ (Sung-hwan Kim 19). The national prosecutors declared that
they would criminally prosecute those who were involved in spreading so-called ―mad
cow horror stories‖ on the Internet as well as organizers of candlelight protests against
American beef imports (Kerr).
On May 24, protesters moved from Cheong-gye Plaza to more spacious Seoul
Square to hold overnight rallies. Thousands of protesters gathered in Seoul Square and
took over Sejong Avenue to march toward the Blue House. The government released
10,000 riot police with water cannons. It was on May 31 when the police launched a
vehement attack on the protesters. Since it was the second day of my participation in the
protest, I clearly remember the situation in the venue. The police blocked the protest
march; the protesters were surrounded by police in a flash and pushed by the police, a
slowly tightening circle formed around them. The police directive over a megaphone said
that protesters would be crushed unless they dispersed. Protesters‘ confrontation with the
police continued for a long while. As the night shifted into the next morning, police
forces exercised a series of illegal and drastic measures in the course of cracking down on
demonstrators. According to a video clip taken by a protester and subsequently posted on
internet news sites, on June 1, a police officer in combat boots stomped on the head of a
fallen woman protester while blocking the camera that was recording the scene.72 The
police pushed protesters with their shields, shot water cannons, and arrested and
arbitrarily detained protesters. When the police released the detained protesters, they
issued traffic tickets to protesters for interrupting traffic by marching on the road.
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This video clip is available at
http://media.daum.net/culture/art/view.html?cateid=1021&newsid=20080601181521485&cp=nocut
http://news.naver.com/main/hotissue/read.nhn?mid=hot&sid1=102&sid2=257&cid=117641&iid=59858&o
id=001&aid=0002193927.
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Leaving a number of demonstrators injured, these measures were not only
undemocratic but also violated safety regulations. The police directly shot water cannons
onto a protester within the short distance of 3 meters, although police equipment
management restricts the use of water cannons within 15 degrees and within 20 meters of
a person. One protester, who had been struck in the face by water cannon from only 10
meters away, had his eardrum split. Civil organizations claimed that the riot police and
the government abused human rights.
The protesters devoted themselves to recording and broadcasting the
government‘s violence, which became a newly common tactic across contemporary
movements such as Arab Spring, the Occupy Wall Street, etc. Instead of responding
violently to the government‘s violence as in the past, technologically savvy citizens in the
2008 protest took on the role of ―citizen reporters,‖ taking photographs and taping videos
of the scenes of forcible winding-up of the protest. The protesters also conducted
interviews and published all of their findings on their blogs and Internet community
websites. All of these journalistic activities demonstrated that the police were certainly
violating human dignity, which caused citizens outside the protest to feel indignant and
morally inclined and to eventually join the protest.
Since it was organized by voluntary participants rather than being mobilized by
social activists or civil organizations, the 2008 candlelight also proceeded in a
decentralized and fragmented form without a single center pulling the strings. The
protesters rejected any trail of activists to lead their protests. The Democratic Labor Party,
the New Progressive Party, and a socialist activist group Da-ham-gge all attempted to
guide the protest, but they received only indifferent responses. The protesters arranged
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themselves in autonomous, horizontal relations refusing hierarchical rules used in the
conventional social movements, just as ―nonhierarchical consensus-driven process‖
turned to be a common feature of current social protests (Linsky). The 2008 candlelight
protest appeared to fulfill Fox and Miller‘s theorization of postmodern public
administration as ―a move from centripetal to centrifugal, centralization to fragmentation,
common units towards incommensurability, difference rather than likeliness, universals
to hyper-pluralisms, fragmentation instead of generalized units of analysis, Newtonian to
Heisenberg quantum physics, and causal theory to un predictable analysis of microcosms‖
(Fox and Miller 52–70 qtd. in Boje 431–58).
Due to the lack of leadership, the development of the 2008 protest was footloose
and fancy free: chanting slogans were not synchronized; the protesters‘ flags were even
fashionable as the members of Ssang-Ko, a plastic surgery web community, carried a
shiny pink flag symbolizing their café community; the attire of protesters varied and was
often different from the conventional apparel of protesters—some women were in miniskirts and high heels, which were not typical attire for social movements,73 while some
male youths were in their military reserve force uniforms in a ―laughable‖ sense because
it contradicted the protests of the past in which the military were quelling the protests.74
Another new face to the protest scene was the hundreds of mothers who took to the
frontline of the protests, marching with their infants in strollers. Some protesters paraded
in cat costumes in order to mock President Lee, while others dragged a computer mouse
caught in a mousetrap in the marches.
73
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They were nicknamed ―a troop of mini-skirts‖ and ―a troop of high heels.‖

They were indeed the members of the Internet café named Military Reserve Force Defending
the Republic of Korea (http://cafe.daum.net/korea20080526).
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The two biggest rallies (held on June 5–7 and June10) exemplified the atmosphere
of the protest venues featuring ―carnivalesque protest and the humorless state‖ (Bruner).75
Protesters held 72-hour relay rallies from June 5–7, named ―National Picnic,‖ which
indicated the rallies‘ relaxed ambience, and people casually joined. I attended the rallies
with former colleagues from my master‘s program; the purpose of our attendance was
also socializing. Some protesters built makeshift tents or unfolded paper boxes and
newspapers to use as mats on the lawn of Seoul Square in front of City Hall. Sitting in
circles, respective group members shared snacks and drinks while chatting. Balloons flew
overhead, carrying banners that said ―Judgment day for Lee Myung-bak‖ and
―Renegotiate the beef deal!‖ It appeared that some families participated in the protest as
part of their family outings: one father walked hand in hand with his children, while
another father carried his son on his shoulders, walking around the protest venue as if it
were a park. Here, Peter Dahlgren‘s view of politics resonates with my perception of the
protest: ―Politics becomes not only an instrumental activity for achieving specific goals,
but also an expressive activity, a way of asserting, within the public sphere, group values,
ideals, and belongings‖ (155).
Another large rally was scheduled on June 10, in celebration of the 1987 June
Pro-democracy Movement, which had ended the rule of the former military government
and resulted in democratic presidential elections. As People United against Mad Cow
Disease had unfolded campaigns for gathering a million candles (protesters), police were
on the highest alert. Thousands of police officers were deployed in Central Seoul to build
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Bruner.

―Carnivalesque protest and the humorless state‖ is the title of the journal article written by Lane
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barricades across the main boulevards, especially Sejong Avenue, along which the
protesters had marched.

Figure 2. The Barricades Made of the Shipping Containers: The
government is moving shipping containers to Sejong Avenue to make
barricades to block protest marches. This photo is taken by Jeon Mun-su,
and posted on the website of Min-jung-eui So-ri (www.vop.co.kr).
They brought shipping containers (Refer to Figure 2) and secured them to the ground
with iron nails, filled them with sandbags, and coated them with oil. As if that was not
enough protection for the president, the police then parked police buses in front of the
shipping containers as an additional barrier. While the police constructed the barricades,
citizens bantered about how Lee was building his fortress to shut out his people, and
nicknamed the barricades Myung-bak San-seoung (Myung-bak Castle) as a symbol of
President Lee‘s refusal to communicate with his people.76 The nickname Myung-bak
Castle was originally used by Internet users on Daum Agora but soon generated a number
of derivatives, one of which was Yong-jeop Myung-bak (Welding Myung-bak), a term
76

The word Myung-bak San-seong combines the first name of Lee Myung-bak and a Korean word
that means ―mountain fortress wall,‖ with the latter part referring to the rows of shipping containers. The
term was first used by Internet users almost instantaneously beginning on June 10 (KST).
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that ridiculed his directives for police to weld the containers together to prevent protesters
from squeezing through. Furthermore, police positioned buses to block subway entrances
and alleys leading to the rallying points, and cordoned off plazas and intersections, where
large crowds had gathered since May 24 (Cho, ―Beef Protest Turns‖).
As anticipated, on that day (June 10), numerous protesters gathered in Seoul
Square to begin their march down Sejong Avenue. The protesters were unwavering in
their attempts to break through the barricade to reach the Blue House. A group of
protesters, angered by Lee‘s overreaction to the situation, tied ropes to one of the buses in
an attempt to flip it over (as Figure 3 shows), but they were arrested before they could
complete the task.

Figure 3. The Protesters Resisting against Barricade: A group of
protesters are pulling the ropes tied to one of the buses to flip it over. This
photo is taken by Jeon Mun-su, and posted on the website of Min-jung-eui
So-ri (www.vop.co.kr).
Then, the protesters filled sandbags at a construction site approximately one mile away
from the protest venue. They formed a human conveyer belt of about sixty people to
transport the bags to the protest site. The sandbags were then stacked in front of the
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police buses to construct steps to the top of the barricades. The incline was nicknamed
Kuk-min To-sung (the People‘s Castle). Those who climbed on the bus waved flags
symbolizing the groups that they represented.

Figure 4. Protesters Weaving Flags on the Top of Barricades:
Protesters are waving flags symbolizing the groups that they represented,
on the top of the barricade buses. This photo is taken by Jeon Mun-su, and
posted on the website of Min-jung-eui So-ri (www.vop.co.kr).
However, the police immediately responded by shooting water cannons at the protesters
who were on the top of the buses. While the force of the water initially toppled the
protesters‘ flags, the protesters persevered, frantically raising their flags. However, their
efforts failed. The protesters could not withstand the deluge of the cannons and finally
tumbled to the ground.
However, the protesters did not lose their sense of humor. They began to decorate
the barricades with large Korean national flags, photographing themselves in front of the
flags, and with fliers stating ―This is a new border for our country. From here starts the
United States of Korea.‖ Some protesters unfolded newspapers to make mats and took
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seats in circles to relax and to have chats with other protesters. Meanwhile, some people
weaved through the milling crowds to hand out kim-bab (seaweed rice rolls), bottled
water, and chocolate bars from citizens‘ donations. This protest, in fact, had been
supported by citizens‘ donations. The kim-bab which my group shared was from a
member of the Internet community DC Inside (www.DCinside.com). The member,
whose user name was Dok-shin-nyeo (spinster), maintained a fund raising effort online
and had collected 60,180,000 won (around $ 60,180) to provide the protesters with
snacks (D. Lee 93). Also, individuals at the protest, as well as thousands of others not
present, simultaneously flocked toward the Internet homepage of the Blue House and the
government agencies; these websites ceased to function in a minute when they were
overwhelmed by a rush of hits.77
However, after a revision was made to original version of the FTA with the
United States, the government‘s violence escalated. Police worked harder to block the
protesters with their buses and shields; used water cannons more frequently, fired liquid
gas (which had been used against antigovernment demonstrators during the military
dictatorships of the 1970s and ‗80s and against labor activists of the 1990s), and sprayed
fire extinguishers to disperse the protesters ) (Cho, ―Beef Protest Turns‖). The police
buckled down by arresting more protesters. According to a news reporter of Oh My News
whom I had met in the protest venue, the police shot water cannons containing a
phosphorescent pigment to mark protesters. After getting pelted by water cannons, she
had tried to hide in a subway but was caught by police who were looking for protesters
who had run away.
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The homepages that the protesting netizens visited included those of the ruling Grand National
Party, conservative newspapers such as Chosun Ilbo, JungAng Ilbo, and Dong-A Ilbo, the National Police
Agency and Public Prosecutors‘ Office, and the companies that advertised in the conservative newspapers.
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Figure 5. The police Spraying Tear Gas toward Protesters: The police
are spraying tear gas from the police car toward protesters. This photo is
taken by Jeon Mun-su, and posted on the website of Min-jung-eui So-ri
(www.vop.co.kr).
The protesters‘ plight exacerbated as the rainy season began at the end of June.
Police no longer needed to use water cannons. Protesters, who were already fatigued by
the long journey of the protest, barely shielded their flickering candles from the rain. I
was growing weary from the inclement weather and cumbersome rain-coats. My feet
often grew soggy and swollen; to take rests, I had to sit down on the wet ground. Riot
police constantly pushed and shoved us, even in the rain. It seemed that protesters began
to lose hope that our presence would cause Lee to change his plan. Daily attendance in
the rallies dwindled; the rallies were eventually limited to the weekends.
On August 15, protesters held the100th demonstration, the last rally. In one final
humorous act, protesters carried pickets with the pun, ―It is our 100 day anniversary. Let
us part!‖ and blew out their candles.78 I believe that the political maneuvers of the 2008
78

Many young Korean couples tend to celebrate their 100th day after they become a couple
because the relationships are often short lived. In this situation, the protesters wittingly acknowledged this
monumental anniversary date.
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candlelight protest can be featured by the term, ―the carnivalesque,‖ coined by Bakhtin to
indicate the literary tendency that subverts authority and dominant power not in rational
or systematic ways but through chaos.79 The 2008 protest, rather than drawing on
grandiose narratives, reasonable ideological lines, or other spiritual or intellectual
elements, degraded and disrespected the government‘s authority (encompassing
neoliberal globalization) through irony, parody, and satire. These carnivalesque tactics,
some people might say, are too cynical, divisive, detached or damaging to ―serious‖
discourse, but Amber believes that ―the use of these forms create discursive spaces and
engages‖ (qtd. in Jenkins). The carnivalesque, which generates humor and laughter,
possibly enables passive spectators to participate and engage in certain issues. Even if
spectators did not wire their brains to perceive their meanings, the carnivalesque directly
hit the bodies of the protesters, immediately evoking the spontaneous impulses of the
body, their ―laughter.‖ Terry Eagleton states ―laughter is the very type of expressive
somatic utterance, an enunciation which springs straight from the body‘s libidinal depths‖
(27).
Goal: Leaving Myungbak Castle
It appears that the deepening of the authoritarian regimes‘ repressions in Korean
history gave rise to the deepening of the oppositions‘ ideas. The leading actors of the
social movements in the past collectively struggled for political and economic democracy,
with their military mindset, in a serious manner. Particularly, the largest-scaled
conventional social movements—such as the April 19 Revolution in 1960, the Gwangju
Popular Uprising in 1980, and the June Democratic Uprising in 1987—were as radical as
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The term, the carnivalesque, refers to a literary mode that subverts and liberates the assumptions
of the dominant style or atmosphere through humor and chaos (Bakhtin, Rabelais and his world [1968]).
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they were steered to either overthrow or threaten the erstwhile authoritarian/military
dictatorial regimes (Jong-ryul Choi 227–70; Yong-taek Jeong 10–1). The 2008
candlelight protest, however, grew organically, and fizzled out in the end, which left me
questioning what the goal of the protest was. In this section, I discuss the goal of the 2008
candlelight protest. I begin with a discussion on the ideological direction of Lee‘s
government, which approved U.S. beef imports in 2008.
Lee Myung-bak was a presidential candidate who set up the revival of the Korean
economy as his most important election promise. The centerpiece of Lee‘s economic
revitalization promise was his ―Korea 747 plan,‖ which was named for its goals: to bring
7% annual growth in gross domestic product (GDP), raise Korea‘s per capita income to
$40,000 USD, and make Korea the world‘s seventh largest economy during his term. His
personal image as a former famous business chief executive of Hyundai Engineer &
Construction as well as a self-declared ―C.E.O. of the Korea, Inc.‖ inspired widespread
public confidence in his ability to restore the national economy. Lee won the Korean
presidency on February 25, 2008. Public confidence in Lee‘s ability also led his
conservative Grand National Party (currently called Saenuri Party) to garner the majority
of parliamentary seats (153 out of 299 seats) in the general election on April 9, 2008.
Lee declared that he would save the national economy, which had weakened
during the ―lost decade‖ of two former leftist administrations. Although the two leftist
regimes of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Mu-hyun had adopted neoliberal policies, Lee
believed that these regimes‘ strategy of exercising government regulations on markets
had led to mismanagement of the national economy.80 Accordingly, Lee‘s naming of the
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Regarding the economic policies of the two regimes of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Mu-hyun, I will
have discussions in Chapter 5.
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previous regimes as ―the lost decade‖ marked his intention to pursue a free-market
ideology in earnest.81
Lee presented his market-friendly ideology under the name of Pragmatism. Under
this principle, Lee planned a range of new politics, including privatization of public
enterprises (health care, water, and electricity), competitive education reforms, and probusiness economic reforms. Essentially, ―MB-Nomics,‖ the series of Lee‘s economic
plans that highlighted a reduction of government regulation of the economy, sounded
similar to ―Reaganomics,‖ the ―neoliberal‖ economic policies promoted by U.S.
President Ronald Reagan during the 1980s.
Establishing the rebuilding of Korea‘s economic alliance with the United States as
a means of revitalizing the national economy, Lee planned on finalizing the negotiations
of the KorUS FTA, which had been initiated in 2006 under the previous regimes of Roh
Mu-hyun and George W. Bush. U.S. congressional leaders had warned Roh‘s
administration that they would never ratify the pact for expansive deals unless Korea
fully reopened its markets to American beef (and automobiles). Resumption of the
market to U.S. beef was suggested in the initial stage of the negotiations, but Roh
hesitated due to Korean citizens‘ concerns about the risk of mad cow disease in U.S. beef.
Lee Myung-bak, however, made a decision to remove the biggest barrier to mending ties
with the United States. On April 18, 2008, Lee approved the agreement to resume U.S.
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Free-market ideology refers to the idea that unfettered capital movements are the best and most
natural way for realizing individual liberty and material progress in the world. It is achieved through the
framework of ―small government and big market,‖ accompanied by tax cuts, deregulation, liberalization of
foreign investment, etc. It is also called neoliberalism. For more details on neoliberalism, please refer to
Chapter 2.
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beef imports with alleviated quarantine standards for the beef, acceding to the demand of
George W. Bush.82
Lee attempted to justify his decision to open the market by stating that through the
KorUS trade agreement, Korea would leap into the position of a great economic power
by reaping huge economic benefits: U.S. financial commitment would increase
employment and productivity, which would raise national competitive power in the
global industrial society, and grant Korean conglomerates (such as Samsung and Hyundai)
more opportunities to export automobiles, cellular phones, and other goods to the United
States. Citing the statement of the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, the
government also emphasized that Korean exports to the United States would rise by 12 to
15 percent per year. The government added that the agreement would allow Korea to
retain its memberships in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD)83 and the Group of Twenty (G-20) Finance Ministers and Central Bank
Governors,84 which Korea had tirelessly pursued for a decade. It appeared that Lee
believed that globalization of markets was the only path to an expansion of economy and
prosperity for all.
As the details of the decision to resume U.S. beef imports became known to the
Korean public, Lee (who had the image of the hero of saving the public from the
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The newly revised Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS) has been detailed in the first
section of Chapter 4.
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The OECD is an international economic organization of committed to democracy and the freemarket economy, providing a platform to compare policy experiences, seek answers to common problem,
identify good practices, and co-ordinate domestic and international policies of its members.
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The G-20 is a forum of international economic development that promotes discussion between
industrial and emerging-market countries on key issues related to global economic stability. It was
established in 1999 to systemically bring together industrialized and developing nations to discuss key
issues in the global economy. I refer to the bulletin board of the French G-20 presidency website
(www.g20.org).
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economic downturn) came to be perceived as a devil incarnate threatening Korean
national pride as well as public health (Jong-ryul Choi 227–70). Newspapers such as the
Hangyore and the Kyunghyang Shinmun reported that the Lee regime had agreed to a
―humiliating‖ concession, which had come under American pressure and disregarded the
concerns of citizens. On the Internet, people vilified Lee for forfeiting national dignity,
reflecting the government‘s ―U.S.-friendly ideology.‖85 Since much of the Korean public
started to believe that they would be infected with mad cow disease and would soon die,
Lee‘s plan for revitalizing the national economy no longer made any sense. Lee was only
a fanatic supporter of economic growth.
In Cheonggye Plaza in downtown Seoul, a group of middle and high school
students had gathered, urging the government to cancel the contract. According to Kang
Nae-hui, these teenagers, in fact, were the members of seven youth organizations—
including 21Se-gi Cheong-so-nyeon Gong-dong-che Hee-mang (21st-Century Youth
Community Hope) and Cheong-so-nyeon Da-ham-gge (Youth Altogether) (my
translations) and others—which had already been aware of the irrationality of Lee‘s
economic principles (Nae-hui Kang 55). These students came out to the plaza in protest
when Lee‘s educational reform plans were announced.
The Korean secondary education system, being highly focused on college
entrance exams, had grown overly competitive; most teenagers had been exhausted from
the burdens of grade competition and the hectic school schedule of 7:00 a.m.–11:00 p.m.
Lee‘s market ideology, however, included plans to intensify excessive competition
among them, effectively transforming them into study machines (K. Song 62; Go et al.
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shinmun.

This perspective was reflected in the progressive newspapers the Hangyore and Kyunghyang
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25–6). The Lee government planned to add an hour to the school day (the zero hour
class), to segregate students by skill levels and to increase the number and quality of
magnet schools.86 The teenagers in the plaza had been initially motivated to protest
against such proposed educational reforms. However, when the approval of beef import
was known, they steered their focus toward the U.S. beef import issue because they were
faced with a situation where they could not even eat their school lunch with peace of
mind while knowing that the companies in charge of providing their lunches at school
would use possibly unsafe American beef. With the entangled issues of neoliberal
education plans and U.S. beef imports, the teenagers cried out, ―Let me get some sleep,
Let me get some food!‖ and ―Retreat mad education, Retreat mad cow!‖
The protest that had begun from the fear of mad cow disease snowballed into a
wide range of grievances against Lee‘s unpopular leadership style and new marketfriendly policies overall. Lee‘s wealth-based cabinet appointments were firstly criticized:
most of Lee‘s political appointees were wealthy, so there were concerns and public
hostility against the possibility that Lee‘s appointees would favor policies protecting the
rich while failing to address the needs of the underprivileged.87 Protesters also suggested
a ―1+5 strategy‖ which was named from its purposes: keeping the original purpose of the
protest against U.S. beef imports, they wanted to present five additional oppositions to
Lee‘s neoliberal plans of privatizing health insurance, privatizing public enterprises
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According to Choi Jong-ryul, the teenagers were guided by 2MB Tan-haek Tu-jaeng-Yon-dae
(People United for the Impeachment of Lee Myung-bak; my translation), which had been protesting since
Lee‘s election on December 22, 2007 (256).
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These appointees were mostly chosen from the nation‘s southeast region (Gyeong-sang-buk-do
and Gyeong-sang-nam-do), which is known as a GNP stronghold.
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(water and electricity), reforming education, constructing the Grand Korean Waterway, 88
and controlling mass media.
Furthermore, the trade unions attempted to incorporate their issues, which were
also in the line of neoliberalism, into the 2008 candlelight protest. The trade unions had
carried out strikes against abusive sweatshop conditions at a number of companies,
including Kiryung Electronics, Koscom, E-Land, Home-Ever, and KTX (Sung-hwan
Kim 21). Even before the 2008 protest started, the working conditions at the companies
had exacerbated in concert with neoliberalism: for example, the production line workers
at Kiryung Electronics Factory were to assemble Sirius Satellite Radios to be exported to
the United States. However, around 250 of the workers were hired as so-called temporary
workers, who ―have no rights, earn less than half of what regular permanent workers do
[around $600 per month], and can be arbitrarily fired at the drop of a hat‖ (Korea
National Labor Committee). The pace was so frantic that workers dared not lift their
heads; workers could not even use the bathroom. For women, conditions were even
worse, as married women were limited to only three-month contracts so they could be
fired if they became pregnant. Recognizing that these conditions had been backed by the
eco-political principle of neoliberalism, the workers at the Kiryung Factory had organized
a local union to fight back, and affiliated to Korea‘s largest union, the progressive Korean
Metal Workers Union from 2005. The trade unions attempted to incorporate their issue
into the 2008 protest.

88

An important part of Lee‘s platform was the Grand Korean Waterway project (which he
believed would lead to an economic revival) to construct a 540-kilometer (340 miles) long canal connecting
Seoul and Busan, two of South Korea‘s largest cities. Against President Lee‘s plan, people argued that it
was not proper to build a canal in a geographically small nation that is a peninsula surrounded by water,
and that already had a highly developed transportation infrastructure. Concerns of possible negative
environmental impact were also suggested.
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However, all of these struggles against neoliberal policies during the protest were
defied by the government. Rather than carefully listening to the public opinions, the Lee
government harshly delivered counterblows. The government stigmatized the protesters,
stating that the teenagers, who initiated the protest, were manipulated by antiAmerican/anti-regime forces; mothers with strollers were those who used their babies for
their political ends; the Kyunghyang Shinmun and the Hangyore, MBC‘s PD Su-cheop,
the Democratic Labor Party, the New Progressive Party, and the Internet portal site
Agora Daum were the instigators who stirred up the public to join the illegal actions.
Furthermore, prosecutors opened the doors for the government‘s repression of
freedom of speech by filing a lawsuit for libel against MBC‘s PD Su-cheop. Prosecutors
argued that PD Su-cheop had deliberately distorted facts and/or fabricated information,
emphasizing two allegations: first, while the program featured video footage of sick cattle
being led to slaughter in the United States, the cattle in the footage were not those with
mad cow disease but downer cows which under similar conditions are also routinely
slaughtered in Korea. Second, in the video footage, Aretha Vinson, a deceased Virginian
woman, was described through Korean subtitles as having likely died from new variant
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (nvCJD) (related to mad cow disease), while in English,
Vinson‘s mother said that her daughter had died of CJD (not related to mad cow
disease).89 The Korean Communications Commission (KCC) directed MBC to apologize
on air for its mistranslation.90 Prosecutors, politicians, and conservative newspapers
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Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) can be grouped into two types: classic or new variant disease.
While classic CJD is not related to mad cow disease, the infection that causes the disease in cows is
believed to be the same one that causes new variant CJD in humans (PubMed Health).
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campaign.

At that time, the head of KCC was Choi Si-jung who worked for President Lee‘s election
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pressured MBC to issue a formal apology to admit that it provided the public with pieces
of wrong information.91 Although the conservatives only accentuated the minor mistakes
the program made, I believe that journalists‘ job is to inform people of any possible social
risk.
Lee‘s government further asserted its authority by repressing freedom of speech.
Some Internet commentators, specifically members of Agora Daum (Agorarians) were
imprisoned under the pretext of spreading so-called ―mad cow horror stories‖ on the
Internet (Kerr). Those who led the campaign to stop subscriptions to the conservative
newspapers Chosun Ilbo, Jung-Ang Ilbo, and Dong-A Ilbo and the members of anti-Lee
Myungbak café were threatened by the police for further investigation (Sung-hwan Kim
23). Civil organizations that opposed the KorUS FTA were cut off from their access to
government subsidies. Police also combed the offices of civil organizations including
People‘s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy and Korea Alliance of Progressive
Movements, which had helped in organizing the protests, and prosecuted them for their
infringement of the Assembly and Demonstration Act regulations (Je-wan Kim 125–69).
Not only were the organizations taken to criminal court, they were also taken to civil
court, as owners of stores in the shopping districts along the protest venues filed damage
claim suits against People United against Mad Cow Disease (Je-wan Kim 125–69). Lee‘s
government also attempted to appoint his supporters as presidents of KBS (a terrestrial
broadcaster) and YTN (a cable broadcaster), replacing the existing presidents. The
situation was similar to that of the Cold War governments of Central Europe, well-known
for suppressing political dialogue. Padraic Kenney, who examined the historical details
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Regarding the mistranslation of the interview with Vinson‘s mother, there have been other
interviews and articles from United States media that show that she believed that her daughter Aretha
Vinson might have suffered from vCJD (related to mad cow disease).
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surrounding the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern European countries,
describes the Cold War governments of Central Europe in 1989 as the sites of an
―incessant monologue‖ that was ruptured ―not with persuasive argument, but with a
cacophony of insistent and derisive voices‖ (5).
In order to shut down the protesters‘ voices, the government even released riot
police and directed them to heavily quell the protesters. The police blocked the protesters‘
marches with their buses and shields, and shot extinguishers, water cannons, and tear gas
to scatter protesters. The police violence was fierce enough to receive a negative
assessment from an international human rights organization. Amnesty International
released a report confirming cases of human rights abuse committed by the riot police,
including use of excessive force, arbitrary detention, intentional suppression of protesters,
brutal and non-humanitarian treatment and penalties, and a lack of medical treatment for
detainees. Many protesters were injured and 1,045 protesters in total were arrested.
Government conservatives fervently alarmed the public of the possible damages
on national economic conditions and on private business sales. They tried to stimulate
popular worries about sagging growth and rising inflation with surging prices of oil and
other raw materials. In addition, they highlighted that the 2008 candlelight protest scared
off foreign investors and big business, both of which would be helpful for reviving the
national economy. The Korea Economic Institute, affiliated with the Federation of
Korean Industries (FKI) announced that the direct damage of the candlelight protest on
the Korean economy had reached 668.5 billion South Korean won, and the total amount
of direct and indirect damage would reach 1.9228 trillion Korean won (Chae 139). These
statistics eventually led to small businesses lining up on both sides of the protest venues
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to file damage claim suits against the state and People United against Mad Cow Disease.
Regardless of the democratic value of the protest, the protest was only accused as the
element that inflicted great loss on daily economic activities, disrupted the prospect of the
KorUS FTA, and scuttled the opportunities for Korea to leap into the position of a great
economic power.
Besides these severe damages, however, I do not see any significant achievement
of 2008 candlelight protest. First, the candlelight protest did not fully achieve the right for
food safety. In the previous chapters, it was mentioned that after the additional
renegotiation with the United States to revise the U.S. beef import conditions, the
government bragged of its accomplishments with the statement that its results were
similar to the deals Japan and Taiwan had reached. In fact, however, there were other
stories behind the government‘s swagger. In actuality, the trade negotiators, who were
sent to the United States, confronted the U.S. Congress, which refused to back down
(Kerr). After much wrangling, the negotiators were offered only a temporary voluntary
agreement by U.S. ranchers not to export beef from cattle older than 30 months as well as
to provide an age certificate for all meat shipped to Korea. These conditions, however,
were not even written into the accord but orally promised (Kerr). Although the safety
right regarding Specified Risk Material (SRM)—cattle parts like brains, eyes, skulls, and
spinal cords, in which the mad cow virus mainly resides—was changed, it was not
significantly altered: dangerous parts of cows (such as the backbone and internal organs)
were still permitted to enter Korea. Even in regards to the right to inspect, Korea won the
right in the accord to inspect only a sampling of American slaughterhouses.
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Some protesters including myself still remained in Seoul Plaza to demand a
complete renegotiation to win better assurances to prevent mad cow disease. We believed
that the revised deal was simply the government‘s trick to quell public anger without
solving the real problem. The government, however, responded with even fiercer physical
violence. The police were constantly arrayed in downtown Seoul to block the protesting
marches with their shields and buses. The police even made their presence apparent by
thunderously banging their shields on the roads before collisions with protesters. They
continually used water cannons and liquid tear gas more often than before to disperse the
protesters; and buckled down on arresting the protest leaders and detaining protesters day
after day.92 As a rainy season began, we protesters were growing tired. The daily rallies
slowed down into rallies only on weekends. As a number of protesters suffered physically
and mentally from the violence inflicted upon them, we broke into several groups of
hundreds, engaging in sporadic marches. My group marched to the National Police
Agency, protesting violent measures, and later to broadcasting stations of KBS and YTN
to protect freedom of speech, as the government attempted to appoint their people as the
heads of these stations.
Meanwhile, the government posted the reopening of the Korean market to
American beef in the official gazette on June 26, driving grand-scale collisions between
protesters and police from June 28–29. These collisions subsequently led to the
involvement of religious circles: Roman Catholic priests began to lead a crowd of
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Protesters said that the situation surrounding the 2008 candlelight protest reminded them of the
political situation of public peace and safety in 1989, called Gong-an-jung-guk in Korean. After
consecutive unauthorized visits of South Koreans to North Korea in 1989, the then government strongly
and sternly responded by extending the application of National Security Law and reinforcing investigations
of left-wings. The government established National Security Planning and a special investigation
headquarters made of police and prosecutors to investigate the opposition groups and the members of
student-led movements in the name of eradicating leftist pro-communist forces. The political situation
rapidly became conservative. This tragic history seemed to be repeating during Lee‘s reign.
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protesters on a winding march, while Christians and a Buddhist circle followed to join.
However, the involvement of these religious groups not only calmed down the police‘s
violence but also transformed the furious sentiments of protesters into docile
temperament. While peaceful marches transpired on the protest venues, beef imports
were officially resumed on July 1; the beef products, which had already been imported
and kept in warehouses in Korea, began to circulate on July 2.
People United against Mad Cow Disease ultimately made an announcement of the
citizens‘ victory on July 15. But to me, it sounded ironic to say that it was the citizens‘
victory. The 2008 candlelight protests fizzled out without any serious achievement.
Although the protest was triggered by food safety issue, the protest did not behold the
agenda throughout whole time: soon after the protest ended on August 15, Korea quickly
became the second largest import entry of American beef in the end of August 2008, and
the third biggest by 2010. Although trade unions attempted to incorporate the issue of
contract workers—trade unions and civil organizations distributed printed materials to
educate the protesters about how neoliberalism has affected workers—, many of the
protesters did not appear to take the issue into their serious consideration. Also, civil
organizations attempted to incorporate discussions on Lee‘s neoliberal plans—including
privatizing health insurance, privatizing public enterprise, reforming education, etc.—into
the protest, but the protests did not attempt to topple down the Lee administration. The
2008 candlelight protest did not seriously influence elections or political discourse either,
considering that the person who won the 2012 presidential election for the next term was
from the same conservative party as Lee Myung-bak. All of these tell that the 2008
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candlelight protest did not question or rethink the social terrains and principles of
neoliberalism.
Marty Linsky, who has criticized the Occupy Wall Street movement in terms of
its lack of leadership, would probably have given the same comments regarding the 2008
candlelight protest. The 2008 protest failed to ―tak[e] the next steps and creat[e] real
impact. It may be necessary for those who want to move any social movements forward
to listen to Linsky‘s statement: ―the presence of authority is essential in order to move
this work forward. Someone, or some ones will have to provide some of the functions of
authority—direction, protection and order—so that the movement can begin to make hard
choices, create priorities, allocate human and financial resources, and keep the anarchistic
outliers from undermining the potential outcomes.‖
In the same vein sense, Korean scholar Lee Dong-yon states that the biggest rally
on June 10 synopsizes the watered-down, vague goal and result of the 2008 candlelight
protest. As mentioned earlier, the 2008 protesters held the biggest rally on June 10 in
celebration of the 21st anniversary of the 1987 June Movement. During their march, they
faced Myung-bak San-seoung (Myung-bak Castle) made of shipping containers and
layers of police buses which blocked Sejong Avenue leading to the Blue House.
Protesters attempted to climb over the wall of Myung-bak Castle with their determination
to pass through, but several of their trials failed. Milling around in front of the wall, the
protesters began to decorate the barricades with flags and fliers, photographed themselves,
and even unfold newspapers to make mats to take seat on. Although the rally borrowed
motifs from the 1987 June Movement in 1987, which strongly fought against and
eventually obtained agreements from the military regime, protesters did not persevere to
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overcome the wall. Lee Dong-yon interprets that the protesters had another big imaginary
wall in their minds, blocking them from moving forward. Protesters left Lee behind
safely staying in his Myun-bak Castle; Lee did not need to drop any of his plans or give
up on his market ideology. As Choi Jong-ryul states, ―economic growth‖ was a euphoric
mumbo jumbo outside the scope of questioning or rethinking among the Korean public
(267).
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CHAPTER 5:
A MATRIX OF THE COMPLEX-TANGLED HISTORICAL CONTEXTS

This chapter discusses the vectors and forces that drove the 2008 candlelight
protest. In the previous chapter, I discussed the main characteristics of the 2008
candlelight protest, which were classified into four categories: the main issue,
participants, modality, and goal. In contrast to conventional social movements in Korean
history, the 2008 candlelight protest dealt with the issue of food safety, and featured a
wide range of participants, who engaged in spontaneous, provocative, and carnivalesque
modality of resistance, and pursued a vague goal. What, then, were the historical factors
and practices that shaped the 2008 candlelight protest in Korea? Based on the notion of
articulation, I argue that the characteristics mentioned above were driven by complex and
multiple layers of historical forces. Since I cannot reproduce the entirety of contexts that
preceded the protest, I selectively discuss four conspicuous contextual facets in recent
Korean history, including political democratization and depoliticization, food
industrialization and Well-being Yol-pung (wellbeing fever), Internet politics and
carnivalesque culture, and neoliberal globalization and job insecurity. In this chapter, I
explain how these four facets shaped the event.
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Political Democratization and Depoliticization
I start my discussion by examining how democratization and the end of
ideological politics were pivotal elements that shaped the 2008 candlelight protest.
During the post-liberation period (after Japan‘s surrender to the Allied Powers in World
War II), Korea experienced serious ideological conflicts between the left and the right:
the United States Army Military Government (USAMGIK) temporarily ruled South
Korea, while the Soviet Union occupied the North. The Korean peninsula was a symbolic
place representing Cold War confrontations in East Asia. According to Sa Eun-suk, at
that time, both anticommunist right-wingers (backed by pro-Japanese Koreans) and leftwingers (backed by peasants and workers) intended to build a state in each of their own
ways; finally, the communist Korean People‘s Republic was founded in the North, while
a liberal democratic state (as an anti-communist state) was built by the U.S. Occupation
in the South (Sa 4–7).93 This social setting of unrest eventually led to the tragic
experience of the Korean War (1950–3), which affected every single aspect of Koreans‘
lives, including politics in Korea.
The first Korean President, Rhee Syng-man, assumed power in 1948 and
established a far-right anticommunist state system. Rhee‘s regime was seemingly
democratic at its inception; but, it soon turned to be autocratic as he sought to cement his
control of the government (qtd. in Jung and Kim 3).94 With the second election ahead
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According to Sa, from 1945 to 1950, the left wing and the right wing political parties disputed a
series of issues including: anti- or pro-trusteeship rule, whether to eliminate the pro-Japanese colonial rule
group or not, and the differences between communism and democracy as forms of government. While the
left and right wing political groups were disputing these ideas, a war broke out in 1950 between the South
and North—the Korean War. From 1950, the left was wiped out from the South.
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Jung and Kim explain the establishment of the far-right anticommunist strong state system with
three causes: First, Rhee removed middle-of-the-road nationalists as well as the left-wing forces, and set up
anti-communist organizations controlled by the government in various sectors of society. Second, the
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after his first presidential term, Rhee declared martial law based on his main policy of
anti-communism, arrested opposing members of parliament, demonstrators, and antigovernment groups after slandering them as Communists who pursued a conciliatory
approach towards North Korea. Anti-communist approach worked; Rhee won the
subsequent election in 1952. Rhee thereupon fraudulently pushed through constitutional
amendment to exempt himself from the eight-year term limit, and was once again reelected in 1956.
These practices caused the formation of opposition parties to counterbalance
Rhee‘s authoritarian rule and motivated the Korean public to join the democratization
movements. In particular, college students took massive collective actions, as social
intellectuals, displaying more sensitive responses against Rhee‘s dictatorship and also his
anti-communist ideology than other social groups (Jung and Kim 4). Meanwhile, Rhee
rigged the presidential elections in 1960 in order to prolong his third term, as his lack of
any clear plan or suggestion for economic and social development prevented him from
gaining public support.95 As Rhee‘s disputable practices were revealed to the public,
students, laborers, and citizens resorted to the streets to protest against the result of the
election and to force Rhee to resign from the presidency. Especially after the discovery in
Masan Harbor of the dead body of a student activist killed by a tear-gas shell fired by the
police, the rally developed into a national movement, called the April 19 Revolution,

number of forces skyrocketed to 600,000 due to the Korean War. Third, anticommunism became
internalized in the minds of the people to be a considerable degree through the experience in the Korean
War.
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It has been known that the ballot boxes had been stuffed with votes for the government
candidates even before voting took place.
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against the regime.96 The April 19 Revolution finally brought a democratic transition by
transferring power to a civilian government.
The presidential power, however, was once again seized by the military
government of Park Chung-hee through a coup d‘état in 1960. The Park regime
convinced people that the newly built civilian government failed to implement effective
reforms and only brought about endless social unrest and political turmoil, which would
make the country collapse into communism. The experience of the Korean War left
―Koreans permanently scared and ‗colorblind,‘ unable or unwilling to distinguish
between social democracy and brutal Stalinism‖ (B. Kim 67). Park thus used the public‘s
communism phobia to deflect their attention from his unjustifiable seizure of power.
Furthermore, in order to offset the lack of legitimacy of his seizure of power, Park
aggressively promoted economic development policies. By resorting to extreme coercion
and governmental competence, Park‘s regime fostered economic development; the rapid
economic growth led to comparative political stability as the majority of people credited
President Park Chung-hee for the industrialization and economic development of Korea.
However, after winning two elections respectively in 1963 and ‘67, Park, seeking
a third term, amended the constitution that had limited the presidency to two terms. This
action provoked huge student demonstrations. Students launched a full-scale campaign,
and the opposition party and dissident leaders made joint efforts. In spite of such efforts,
Park was again re-elected in the 1971 presidential election. Against the prolonged one-
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On April 11, 1960, the dead body of Kim Ju-yul (a high school student who had disappeared
during the Masan rioting of March 15) was found in the harbor at Masan by a fisherman. It was disclosed
that Kim‘s skull had been split as a tear gas grenade had penetrated Kim‘s eyes to the back of his head.
This fact indicates that the police had shot the tear gas at an angle less than 45 degrees, which could be fatal.
Rhee‘s regime tried to censor news of this incident, but it could not halt the spread of information in the
end.
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man rule, the protests grew larger and stronger with politicians, intellectuals, religious
leaders, laborers and farmers all joining in the movement for democracy (Jung and Kim
6).
The Yushin Constitution (the Revitalizing Reforms constitution), which Park
adopted under the pretense of national security in 1972, aggravated the situation. The
Yushin Constitution was marked by the enormous powers granted to the president: the
president could be elected through indirect election; the term of presidency was extended
to six years with no restrictions on reappointment; the legislature and judiciary were
controlled by the government; the president had the right to appoint one-third of the
National Assembly and the right to declare ultra-constitutional emergency provisions (H.
Cho 4, 6). Students and activists for democracy continued their demonstrations and
protests for the abolition of the Yushin Constitution. Dissidents organized a movement to
petition for a constitutional amendment, and started a campaign to obtain signatures for
the petition from one million citizens (H. Cho 4, 6). In the face of continuing popular
unrest, Park‘s administration promulgated emergency decrees and arrested hundreds of
dissidents. In the process, however, new radical opponents armed with a radicalized
ideology began to grow and lead the struggle for pro-democracy as well as proreunification (which was opposite to the government‘s anti-communist ideology).97 The
deepening of the authoritarian regime gave rise to the deepening of the opposition‘s ideas
and movements.
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Park‘s military authoritarian government as a ‗hard dictatorship from 1961 to 1979 can be
divided into two phases: the first phase (1961–72) when formal democracy existed, although limited, and
the second phase, the ‗Yushin System‘ (1972–9), when formal democracy was very restricted and the
government armored itself by high level repression and coercion (H. Cho 4, 6).
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When Park was elected for another term by indirect election in 1978,98 he was
met with more demonstrations and protests that occurred nationwide (Jung and Kim 8).
Unexpectedly, however, the demonstrations provoked internal conflicts within the power
bloc concerning what measures to take against the uprisings; this internal schism
ironically led to the assassination of President Park by one of his closest associates in
1979 (H. Cho 4). The 18-year rule of Park‘s military regime came to an end.
Presidential power, however, was once again usurped by Chun Doo-hwan from
neo-military forces through his 1979 coup d‘état. Enraged citizens launched protest
activities, complicating the lack of legitimacy of presidential power; Chun declared
martial law. Then, a huge uprising erupted, largely in the city of Gwangju. Chun
dispatched martial law troops, isolated the city from the rest of the country, and brutally
quelled the protest. His orders resulted in 154 deaths, 74 people went missing, and 3,310
were injured, including individuals who were arrested or detained; the number of victims
totaled 5,063 (qtd. in Jung and Kim 9). Chun constantly removed a large number of
politicians who were critical of his forces, closed universities, and further curtailed the
press. Then, he was elected through an indirect election by an electoral college handpicked by himself. His regime however, faced successive movements throughout his term
(Jung and Kim 10).
Meanwhile, student movements grew in intensity. According to Jung Hae-gu and
Kim Ho-ki, student movements became ―radicalized‖ and ―scientific‖ (Jung and Kim 10).
College students started to form unions and to promote democratization and self-
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Responding the proliferated movements, Park proclaimed Emergency Decree No. 9 in 1975.
Under Emergency Decree No. 9, those who criticized or denied the Yushin Constitution or demanded its
amendment would be arrested without warrant and sentenced to imprisonment. This led the
democratization movement to be at a standstill, which became the base of his winning the election in 1978.
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regulation on campus. They also regarded theories, political lines, strategies, and tactics
as important, and held incessant debates over various theories and tactics within activist
circles. In addition, student activists consolidated their movement with the enlarged labor
movement.99
The development of the labor movement was related to the situations surrounding
the rapid economic growth that Korea had achieved over the past thirty years. Carrying
forward industrialization and urbanization, Park Chung-hee‘s regime singled out big
business conglomerates for preferential treatment,100 and alienated large groups of small
business owners, workers, farmers, and others, which created wide structural gaps. The
urban poor and peasantry began to attempt to express their voices (Jung and Kim 8). The
rapid economic growth during Chun Doo-hwan‘s regime further widened the gap
between the rich and the poor, the urban and rural regions, and escalated inter-regional
conflicts. Moreover, as some conglomerates such as Samsung and Hyundai raised labor
wages, the power of laborers grew and they started to unify through labor unions, giving
rise to labor movements against the inequality of wealth and authoritarian rule (Jung and
Kim 2).101 It was with this enlarged labor movement that the student movement
consolidated.102
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As part of the struggle for student-labor solidarity, thousands of college students left school to
engage in factory work as disguised workers in order to participate in the labor movement themselves or to
support workers (Gu 158–65 qtd. in Jung and Kim 10).
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At that time, the monopoly system of a minor number of big business conglomerates led to an
increase in the per capita GNP.
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Jung and Kim state that ―the profound social changes resulted from the successful compressed
industrialization further increased demand for democratization‖ (2).
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As part of the struggle for student-labor solidarity, thousands of college students left school to
engage in factory work as disguised workers in order to participate in the labor movement themselves or to
support workers (Gu 158–65 qtd. in Jung and Kim 10).
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The consolidation of students and laborers led to a democratic movement that
deployed through the ―largest democratic coalition‖ in 1986 (Jong-ryul Choi 293–6). Not
only the alliance of students and laborers but also the opposition party and dissidents
(including the politicians removed from the political arena by Chun‘s regime) joined the
pro-democracy movement. These alignments proposed a constitutional amendment for
the direct election of a President as the initial platform for democratization. Chun‘s
regime condemned their efforts as a riot committed by communist revolutionaries, and
embarked on a large-scale repressive operation to arrest protesters (Jung and Kim 9). The
government‘s extreme repression against the democratization movement resulted in
serious violations of human rights at that time.
To make matters worse, nearing the end of a seven-year term, Chun announced
his choice of Roh Tae-woo—an accomplice in Chun‘s 1979 coup d‘état—as the
subsequent president. The public designation of Chun‘s successor was seen as a final
affront to the delayed and deferred process to revise the Korean constitution to permit the
direct election of the president. Numerous people ran toward the streets and held a
nation-wide democracy movement, called the 1987 June Democracy Movement, the
biggest movement in Korean history.103 It was based on a coalitional movement led by
multiple groups. College students, labor movement activists, politicians from the
opposition party, dissidents and church people joined the movement and demanded an
array of reforms including an end to martial law, a direct election of a President as part of
democratization, an increase for minimum wage, freedom of press, and even reunification.
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The 1987 June Democracy Movement was especially intensified as a student Lee Han-yeol,
who had attended Yonsei University, was seriously injured and eventually killed as a tear gas grenade
thrown by the police penetrated his skull.
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At the end of many phases of collisions between the protesters and Chun‘s
government, a compromise was finally reached. Chun and his nominee Roh Tae-woo
succumbed to the oppositions‘ demands and announced the Declaration of Political
Reforms called the ―6.29 Declaration.‖ This measure called for direct presidential
elections, but Chun and Roh‘s decision to accede to the demands, indeed, was driven by
their belief that Roh could win the competitive election as well as their unwillingness to
resort to violence before the 1988 Olympic Games, which was to be held in Korea (Jung
and Kim 14).104
Roh was duly elected President through direct elections in 1988,105 and it was big
progress toward democratization. Subsequently, more measures for democratization were
taken: the arbitrary exercise of the president‘s power was reduced in favor of the power
of the National Assembly, and the central role of the military authorities was partially
retreated. A political party system based on popular support was initiated; civil society
regained autonomy and developed (Jung and Kim 15). Then, presidential power was once
again peacefully transferred to a civilian government of Kim Young-sam through another
direct election held in 1993. The emergence of civilian government marked the end of
military rule; in such a way, democracy was gradually settling down in Korean society. 106
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According to Jung and Kim, ―Chun Doo-hwan regime accepted democratization and direct
election of President‖ and could not reverse or repress the June Democratic Uprising in 1987 because
several million citizens across the country were involved (14).
105

There were two main reasons why Chun‘s nominee Roh Tae-woo, a person from the military,
was elected. First, there were divisions of the two candidates, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam, within
the opposition party. Second, the day before the election, Korean Air Flight 858 exploded when it was
flying to Bangkok; and, it was announced that it was caused by a North Korean conspiracy. This accident
created a profitable environment for Roh Tae-woo—military regimes had always used anti-North Korean
ideology.
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According to Cho Hee-yon, the Korean democratic transition was not a complete withdrawal of
the authoritarian force at that time. Although the civilian government of Kim Young-sam substituted for the
military-backed president, it was not full democratization: Kim merged his Peaceful Democratic Party with
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Ironically, however, such democratization of the society reshaped the Korean
public‘s political passion, especially in three senses. First, fierce protest and large-scale
coalitions disappeared in the early 1990s. In tandem with the adoption of referendum (a
direct election) and the advent of a civilian government, people lost the common goal of
social movement; democratization movement was no longer persuasive to the public.
This decline of social movements was also connected with the international situation
surrounding the collapse of the Soviet Union Bloc. The end of the Cold War resonated
with a broad skepticism about the ideology of the Left. It made individuals feel difficult
to enter into any explicit ideological struggle or political resistance (Jung and Kim 14).
The 1990s, likewise, was one of the most politically changing decades in Korean history
(H. Cho 4).
As college students withdrew from social movements, civil society was
transformed (Shin and Chang).107 Civil organizations emerged and began to lead civil
movements beyond the pro-democracy campaigns that featured the 1970–80s‘ social
movements. A variety of civil organizations, including Kyung-sil-ryun (Citizens‘
Coalition for Economic Justice) in 1989,108 Hwan-kyung-woon-dong-yon-hap (Korean

the ruling Democratic Justice Party and formed the Democratic Liberal Party in order to defeat his rival
Kim Dae-jung. This meant that the previous military regime‘s party kept a certain level of authoritarian
power, while the new government exerted only moderate democratic reforms with limitations (H. Cho 4).
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For the details of transformation of Korean social movements from the democracy campaigns
of the 1970–80s‘ to the rise of civil society struggle after 1987, refer to Shin and Chang, South Korean
Social Movements.
108

Citizens‘ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ) was founded in 1989 as a nationwide citizens‘
movement based in Korea, working for economic justice, environmental protection and democratic
development (ccej.or.kr).
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Federation Environmental Movement) in 1993,109 and Cham-yo-yon-dae (People‘s
Solidarity for Participatory Democracy) in 1994, emerged and gradually expanded civil
movements to almost all sectors of society.110 Such transition into civil society struggle of
the 1990s placed social movement in qualitatively different political contexts, which
extensively galvanized new movements such as the women‘s movement, environmental
movement, cultural movement, etc. (Ho-gi Kim 95–104).
Second, the political democratization led not only to the moderation (or end) of
ideological struggle but also to the emergence of a pro-capitalist tendency and
development of popular culture (KoA, ―Struggle against Neoliberalism‖). It may be noted
that the 1990s were a turning point in Korean popular music. In the early 1990s, foreign
popular cultures such as American rap, rock, and techno music flowed into Korea;
Korean pop musicians began to incorporate American popular music styles in their
music.‖ Especially, the trio boy band, Seo Taiji & Boys showed the experimental kind of
music made of a different variety of musical sounds and styles with the American, with
flashy dance moves and modern fashion style. Their sound paved the way for the Korean
popular music and their footsteps followed by a wave of hip hop and R&B artists and socalled idol bands: young boy and girl bands.111 An unending parade of commercialized
popular cultures encroached into the daily rhythms of the Korean youth through
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The Korea Federation for Environmental Movements (KFEM) was founded in 1993 as a nonprofit organization in Korea that focused on environmentalism and pursued activities include raising
awareness of environmental issues.
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Founded in 1994, the People‘s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) is a civil
organization dedicated to promoting justice and human rights in Korean society through the participation of
the people. Established following the demise of the succession of military regimes for over 30 years, and
the election of the first civil government, the PSPD serves as a watchdog against the abuse of power
(www.peoplepower21.org).
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As hip hop and R&B artists, there were Jinusean, Deux, 1TYM and Drunken Tiger, and idol
bands included H.O.T, Sechs Kies, S.E.S., Fin.K.L, NRG, Taesaja, Shinhwa and g.o.d.
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television spectacles, and reshaped the youth‘s passion and sentimentality toward
pursuing their own life styles. In doing so, the Korean youth also rejected the previous
generations‘ values such as ideological dedication as well as social norms such as
collectivism and hierarchy (H. Jeon 262–81).
The term Shin-se-dae (New generation) was coined in the period to indicate the
Korean youth who were constructed and shaped by new social and cultural settings after
the country‘s democratization. Shin-se-dae is also called ―post-386 generation‖ (or ―postCold War generation‖). The so-called 386 generation referred to those who were in their
thirties (3) at the time the term was coined, who had attended university in the 1980s (8),
and who were born in the 1960s (6). This cohort is well educated and politically active;
they toppled the military dictatorship of Chun Doo-hwan and built democracy in Korea
through a series of movements in the 1980s. The 386 generation spent (or even sacrificed)
most of their youth fighting for democracy, leaving a shared generational experience of
shed blood, sweat and tears in one way or another. Shin-se-dae, however, was the
substantial beneficiary of the nation‘s democracy. This new generation had issues, which
were quite different from that of the 386 generation. Members of this generation were
regarded as ―open-minded, practical, confident, individualistic, and strong in selfexpression‖ (Sun-young Park). The 386 generation, however, had a pessimistic
speculation about the political role of Shin-se-dae: from the viewpoint of the 386
generation, Shin-se-dae was placed in a directionless trajectory, after saying farewell to
political struggles and ideological issues (Sun-young Park). Just as Grossberg in his book
We Gotta Get Out of This Place discovers the unlikely confluence between popular
culture and the deeply ingrained conservatism of U.S. post-World War II society leading
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to disillusion with politics and depoliticization, it appeared that development of pop
music in Korea drove the youth away from politics.
Kim Dae-jung‘s presidency, which began in 1997, led to a further depoliticization
by bringing an un-authoritarian atmosphere to society. Kim Dae-jung had long been an
alternative to the authoritarian regimes. As a head of the opposition party, Kim had
received immense support from the public by castigating the authoritarians‘ abuses of
power and the social inequities. Since he had led social movements against the
authoritarian regimes, Kim had also been subjected to frequent political persecution and
stayed in jail for four years. After having been elected, Kim achieved remarkable
progress in human rights improvement and promoted the ―Sunshine Policy‖ (to North
Korea) in the post-Cold War atmosphere.112 As Kim Dae-jung‘s regime was considered
as a substantial democratic transition in Korean politics (as well as an ideological turn), it
was natural that political oppositions were dying down (Jung and Kim 9).
It was not until 2002 that a large-scale social movement re-emerged. In Chapter 4,
I have mentioned that the 2008 protest, the protest with candles, originated from the 2002
candlelight protest, which developed from candle vigils in memory of two middle school
girls killed by an armored vehicle of U.S. forces during a military drill. The 2002
candlelight protest drew much support from the public, manifesting a restoration of
political passion among the Korean public. As mentioned, the 2002 protest set up
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Kim Dae-jung also founded the National Human Rights Commission (Jung and Kim 9).
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―candlelight‖ as the symbol of social protest and gave rise to the series of the public‘s
political engagements in the 2000s in Korea.113
However, the protest had a different quality than that of conventional movements.
Prior to the political democratization in the late 1980s, there had been anti-American
movements. The students and reformists who developed anti-American movements as
part of the democratization movement in the 1980s ―espoused an intense antiAmericanism overlaid with leftwing and sometimes pro-communist rhetoric‖ (Sorrock).
Essentially, the demonstrated anti-American sentiments were entangled with grand
narratives as well as a series of historical incidents including the U.S. intervention in the
Korean War and its role in the persistence of the North and South division. For instance,
as it became known that the United States supported the authoritarian rule of Chun Doohwan over the Gwangju Democratization Movement,114 students and reformists
condemned the U.S. base‘s presence in Korea and reinforced their views by bringing up
the reports of the U.S. military‘s massacres of Korean civilians in the past (Tsche 335).115
In 1985, a group of student activists occupied the U.S. Cultural Center in Seoul, staging a
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In 2004, two more candlelight protests were held: one protest was against the impeachment of
President Roh Mu-hyun, supported by conservative party, while the other was opposed to Korea‘s decision
to dispatch troops during the Iraq War upon the request of the United States.
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It has been known that the United States supported the military dictator, Chun Doo-hwan
whom the Gwangju democratization movement was against, and was also complicit in the brutal
crackdown that followed.
115

Especially, the Nogeunri Massacre, which occurred at the early stage of the Korean War in
1950, was brought up. A that time, South Korean refugees were killed by U.S. Cavalry Regiment at a
railroad bridge near the village of Nogeunri, 100 miles southeast of Seoul. It has been known that the
orders to fire on refugees were given out of fear of enemy North Korea infiltration (Tsche 335).
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sit-in protesting the United States‘ tacit support for Chun‘s neo-military forces (Jung and
Kim 10).116
In contrast to the conventional anti-American movements, the 2002 candlelight
protest did not connect its issue to accumulated grievances over historical incidents or
ideological grand narratives (Shorrock). Rather, the 2002 protesters were inclined to
collectively vent moral responsibility of citizens by blaming the United States for no
hesitation in ignoring the human rights of Koreans regarding the death of the girls.117
Then, the 2002 candlelight protest, while once calling for a revision in the SOFA, ended
with U.S. President George W. Bush‘s apology as a response, without any change to the
agreement. This shows that the 2002 candlelight protest likely represents a new type of
politics without any ideological engagement. Dahlgren‘s observation summarizes the
atmosphere of political engagement during the 2002 protest: ―The ostensible political
apathy and disaffiliation from the established political system for many citizens may not
necessarily signal a disinterest in politics per se‖ (155). Such a new face of politics, I
believe, had been driven by the democratization and the newly emerging un-authoritarian
atmospheres.
I believe that the political democratization, the end of ideological politics, and
depoliticization were manifested in the 2008 candlelight protest against U.S. beef imports.
The main issue of food safety in the 2008 protest is not the same kind of issue of the
ideologically oriented conventional social movement; the issue of everyday life emerged
116

According to Jung and Kim, Chun‘s regime, in response, constantly attempted to lead people to
believe that anti-American activists were radicals or North Korean sympathizers, dangerous elements of
society (Jung and Kim 10).
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In her research on the vernacular discourses of the 2002 protesters, Jiyeon Kang has stated a
different opinion. She believes that during the 2002 protesters as post-Cold War generation collectively
imagined themselves as a collective opponent of perceived Cold War politics (172).
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as the subject of politics. Just as the 2002 protest did not include the traditional antiAmerican historical resentments, the 2008 protest did not develop into an ideological
struggle. While the U.S. beef import was placed in the central line of power inequality in
the global society, the 2008 protest did not seriously problematize the post-colonial
overtones as its main issue. Although the U.S. beef import was an outcome of
neoliberalism, which had rapidly socially and economically polarized the Korean society,
the 2008 protest did not raise any ideological questions about neoliberalism (Sung-hwan
Kim 21).
The 2008 candlelight protest drew to a close without any critical conclusion. In
past social movements, the deepening of the authoritarian regime gave rise to the
deepening of the opposition‘s ideas: the largest-scale conventional social movements—
such as the April 19 Revolution in 1960, the Gwangju Popular Uprising in 1980, and the
June Democratic Uprising in 1987—either threatened or overthrew the dictatorial
regimes. The 2008 candlelight protest, however, did not even develop into an all-out
struggle against the authoritarian Lee Myung-bak regime. Instead, the 2008 protest
fizzled out merely with the modification of beef import conditions through an additional
negotiation. The 2008 candlelight protest did not make a radical statement of political
resistance. Hence, I tend to believe that the democratization and the depoliticization from
the end of the 1980s ground the current political horizon and shaped the society‘s
ideologies in the 2000s as well as the 2008 candlelight protest.
Food Industrialization and Well-being Yol-pung
During the period of rapid economic development in the 1970s and 80s, farmers
lived in near poverty in Korea. Pursuing industrialization- and export-oriented policies,
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the Korean governments neglected agriculture and attempted to control the prices of
agricultural products. The government even imported cheap agricultural products to
secure export markets for major companies. Accordingly, the government‘s attempts to
liberalize trades of agricultural products often resulted in farmers‘ bloody riots (KoA,
―Struggle against Neoliberalism‖). In fact, Korean farmers participated in demonstrations
even when negotiations on the KorUS FTA were initiated (Hudson). And these kinds of
farmers‘ movements were collective struggles for justifiable wealth distribution and right
to life, reflecting the politics of class divisions based on left-right ideology.
Although farmers, once again, would most likely be victims of the domestic
agricultural market opening in their competition with American beef producers, the 2008
candlelight protest did not deal with the political-economic issue around agriculture
markets, as much as it did advocating ―food safety.‖
How, then, did ―food safety,‖ which had been in the domain of everyday life
rather than a political issue in the Korean context, come to be the main issue of the social
protests? Tracing back to how food has been historically located in Korea, I attempt to
show, in this section, how food safety became the main issue of the 2008 candlelight
protest. I begin by examining the predated phenomena of industrialization, food
industrialization in particular, as modern projects after World War II in the United States
and the political and economic situations surrounding the increased global foodexchanges, which cannot be separated from the issue of food safety in the 2008 protest.
By leading the Allies to victory in WWII, the United States achieved global
hegemony in international societies. U.S. global hegemony was largely supported by its
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economic prosperity and principles.118 The United States achieved economic growth
based on its modern industrialization model of Fordism and the eco-political principle of
Keynesianism (summarized as national protectionism).119 Fordism was originally devised
by Ford Motor Company (by adding the moving assembly line to Taylorism,120 featured
by standardization of tools, division of work between workers, and hierarchy between the
management and the labor) to make mass production possible, allowing the company to
provide affordably priced products to average consumers. The grand-scale production
through Fordism worked with the political economic principle of Keynesianism. As many
countries in the world, including Korea, adopted industrialization models followed in the
United States and sustained their national coherence by adopting Keynesianism, it
became possible for the United States to maintain global hegemony. It was also through
the Bretton Woods system that the United States became a leading actor regulating world
trade. The Bretton Woods system indicates the fixed exchange rates anchored by the U.S.
dollar‘s convertibility into gold at a fixed price (Harvey 11). Through all these conditions,
the United States enjoyed the post-war Golden Age of Capitalism (1945-1973).121
The industrialization pattern of Fordism was also applied to the agricultural
production in the United States. Most systems in the United States have been revised to
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It is also known that U.S. hegemony was supported by the gold it collected from all over the
world through weapon sales in WWII.
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Keynesianism–the work of John Maynard Keynes–developed at the onset of the Great
Depression during the 1930s, drew its motif from the rapid industrialization of the Soviet Union, and
reached increased support for government‘s economic control as a means of securing rapid industrialization
(Fischer, Ranta, and Veigh 837–80).
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Taylorism was first suggested by Fredrick Taylor (although he did not call it that) as a
scientific management in his book Principles of Scientific Management (1911), but it is known that the
system had been in use for at least a decade prior to that.
121

Keynesianism came to define the 1950s and 1960s in western countries (Fischer, Ranta, and
Veigh 837–80).
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increase efficiency and productivity for economic growth—as if proving McKibben‘s
statement, ―economic growth became nearly a religion by the early twentieth century in
the United States‖ (6). Thus, farming took a monoculture system. Monoculture farming is
a structured agricultural practice that focuses on a single crop or plant species over largescale farms and for a large number of consecutive years (Pollan, ―Food Issue‖). Whereas
traditional farms required many hands and more time to grow grains and raise livestock,
the monoculture system allowed for large harvests (of grain and grass such as corn,
soybeans, wheat and rice) from farm machinery with minimal labor. And while
traditional farms sometimes could not reap a good harvest due to droughts or floods, the
monoculture system, within which crops grow faster with chemical fertilizer, could
produce greater yields. Such monocultures of grain led to the monoculture of animals.
Animals were removed from polyculture system farms and placed into large-scale
concentrated feedlots in which a single species of a farm animal is raised. For certain, one
of the cheapest ways to raise animals is to gather them all in the same place where one
worker can take care of tens of thousands of animals (McKibben 60).
However, this monoculture system, based on a shift from solar (and human)
energy on the farm to fossil-fuel energy, gave rise to serious troubles. In traditional farms,
sunlight nourished grains and grasses; photosynthesis was used to replenish soil and to
combat pests; every calorie we consumed was from photosynthesis (Pollan, ―Food
Issue‖). Contrarily, in a monoculture system, chemical fertilizer (made from natural gas)
and pesticides (made from petroleum) are used because they are cheaper and easier to use
than sun-based fertility (Pollan, ―Food Issue‖). Distanced from their usual feeds of
grasses and grains, animals rely more on various commercial feeds including antibiotics,
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hormones, pesticides, fertilizers, and protein supplements. The monoculture system is
also detrimental to the environment. Whenever farmers clear land for crops and till the
soil, large quantities of carbon are released into the atmosphere and contribute to
greenhouse gases. In addition, animal waste, which used to be regarded as a precious
source of fertilizer to spread on crop fields, became a toxic threat polluting the land and
the water (Pollan, ―Food Issue‖). Within traditional farms, sunlight nourished grains and
grasses; animals on pastures harvested their own feed; animals then nourished soil. Now,
however, chemical fertilizer nourishes grain and grass; antibiotics, hormones, pesticides,
fertilizers, and protein supplements are served to livestock. What we finally eat are fossil
fuels—that is, oil—and antibiotics and hormones (Pollan, ―Food Issue‖).
I believe that the basic assumption of the canonical economic logic, which
Herman Daly famously problematized, caused food safety threats (―Homo Economicus‖).
According to Daly, the basic assumption of the canonical economics, ―Homo
Economicus,‖ indicates self-centered individuals isolated from community both in the
social sense (of interrelationships), and in the ecological sense (of mutual dependence of
species in the natural world). Such economic thinking operates as the logic of civilization
in industrial society, with the understanding that it will lead to self-efficiency and
productivity. In the process, the society loses moral and ethical responsibility for others,
and food becomes a risk, even as food safety problems hit the headlines of newspapers.122
According to Pollan, however, the monoculture system in the United States was
not just a product of the free market but of a specific set of government policies (―Food
Issue‖). During the reign of the Nixon administration (1969–1974), high food prices
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Tainted spinach, poisonous peanut butter, and the attack of the killer tomatoes have been
problematic in the United States; Korea had been alarmed about cases of swine flu, bird flu, etc. (Krugman).
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presented a serious political peril; federal policies began to support the monoculture
system in order to promote maximum production of commodity crops. The goal of the
government policy for monoculture was to provide cheap and abundant food to
supermarkets. Essentially, such grand-scale food production through industrialization, at
that time, was managed by the government under the political and economic principle of
Keynesianism.
The government also distributed huge quantities of produced food to poor
populations through food aid programs or offered food at cheap prices to paying
consumers across the United States (Pollan, ―Food Issue‖) In other words, mass food
production led to mass consumption. In parallel with the mass production of food, the
number of supermarkets grew, automobile and refrigerator industries developed, so that
urban consumers could purchase food in bulk from supermarkets, carry the huge quantity
using automobiles, and stockpile them in refrigerators to consume the stored food over
the long haul (C. Kim 136). In the process, food producers and consumers drifted farther
and farther apart from each other (C. Kim 136); the long distance required more
processing and packaging of food, which degraded freshness and nutrition.123 Distance
between producers and consumers of food grew even larger as the global exchange of
food increased. Global food exchange first began as part of the American food aid
program as food surplus at the initial stage of industrialization was distributed to third
world countries (C. Kim 136).
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It appears that food safety threats are embedded in every single part of the modern food system.
I would like to share the following little ditty which summarizes the message of Upton Sinclair‘s ―The
Jungle,‖ which is about the condition of meat-packing industry in 1906 in the United States. I have found
this ditty from Paul Krugman, ―Bad Cow Disease,‖ The New York Times, June 13, 2008.
Mary had a little lamb
And when she saw it sicken
She shipped it off to Packingtown
And now it‘s labeled chicken
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Korea was one of the beneficiaries of the program in the 1950s, post-Korean War,
and deepened reliance on U.S. agricultural products, while pursuing industrialization in
the 1970–80s. In the 1970–80s, the overarching goal of Korea was to surrender to an
apparatus of power that would be supportive of the emerging industrial and Fordist
economic order; the government showed little interest in its domestic agricultural sector
and imported cheap American agricultural products such as meat and most grains,
including wheat, corn and soybean, except the staple grain—rice. With the imported
cheap wheat, Korea developed the (unusual) food industry of ra-myun (instant noodle) to
provide food for the sweatshop production workers, who were often banned from
drinking water during the work, which would make them use the bathroom more often,
and from spending much time cooking food.124 As members of working class often
sacrificed their health and quality of food to invest more of their time and energy in
national industrialization, food was considered in terms of its efficiency and convenience
for cooking, storage, and carriage in Korea.
Entering the 1970s, there was a seismic shift in the global economy (especially in
the economies of the western countries), which subsequently led Korea to be more
vulnerable to food safety issues. U.S. global hegemony began to be questioned. In the
face of inflation, unemployment, and a variety of fiscal crises in western countries in the
1970s, the existing eco-political principle of Keynesianism was questioned; attention was
drawn to the reemerged free market ideology in the name of neoliberalism, which places
an emphasis on the reduction of state intervention with the belief that the market is a
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Kim Chul-kyoo insightfully states that American cheap wheat has spread throughout the world
and played a crucial role in forming the working classes.

144
complete and progressive order by itself.125 As free market and free trade are encouraged
under this logic, the Bretton Woods system (which had supported U.S. power) broke
down in 1971: the system‘s ―fixed‖ exchange rates were incompatible with free flows of
capital (Harvey 10). The U.S. industrialization model of Fordism was subsequently
questioned in that it resulted in unskilled, bored, and alienated laborers.126
Despite the fact that U.S. global hegemony turned to be controversial, the United
States emerged as the number one agricultural exporter, depriving other agricultural
export countries, which used to be third world countries, of opportunities (C. Kim 128).
By keeping its mass-producing industrial system, U.S. agricultural products could retain
their low prices. The increased global food exchanges have generated greater threats to
the environment, food sovereignty, and food safety. It is worth noting the harmful effects
related to global warming caused by carbon dioxide that is emitted into the atmosphere in
the process of transportation (Grossman and Krueger). The resulting climate change is
detrimental to all life, water quality and causes soil pollution and ecosystem degradation,
hampering agricultural productivity (Berthelson). As the transnational agricultural
conglomerates also came to govern the food system; local agricultures were destroyed,
and food dependency increased, worldwide, especially in the Southern countries (C. Kim
130). Paradoxically, the third world countries which had developed their economies to be
independent from colonial contexts had grown to be more reliant on U.S. food imports.
Beyond the scope of environmental pollution and the threats to food sovereignty, the
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The details of neoliberalism are discussed in Chapter 2.

Responding to the crisis of Fordism, a post-Fordist model was suggested. Characterized as a
―flexible system of production‖ (FSP), post-Fordism was established by the Japanese automobile company,
Toyota. By including new information technologies, post-Fordism was able to quickly respond to the
whims of the markets, composed of different groups of consumers with their various senses of taste and
fashion, instead of investing on the mass production of a single product (Sang-gu Kang 80–1).
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farm products, freely crossing international borders, have increased the possible spread of
diseases related to farm products. Due to its increasingly complicated nature, global food
circulation has become less transparent (C. Kim 123–46).
In fact, mad cow disease, which triggered the 2008 candlelight protest, perfectly
condenses the contradictions of both food industrialization and globalization. Mad cow
disease is a result of excessive commitments to increasing efficiency in modern industrial
cattle farming where various commercial feeds had been used to fatten cattle.127 The
Korean government‘s approval of U.S. beef without enough right for inspection displays
the vulnerability of the Korean food system. Mad cow disease soon drove the upsurge of
public fear in Korea, since food distribution in such case is not traceable and accountable.
Likewise, as entering into the very heart of significant economic sphere, food has
caused serious problems and called even for political questions (Morelli). There have
been anti-capitalist movements questioning the world agriculture at the WTO conferences
in Seattle in 1999 and in Cancun in 2003, causing the conference meetings to collapse
(Morelli).128 According to Pollan, by 2008, more than 30 nations had experienced food
riots due to American food through the global market, and one government had fallen
(―Food Issue‖).
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In the United Kingdom, most affected by BSE cases, more than 179,000 cattle have been
infected and 4.4 million slaughtered during the eradication program as well as 166 people had been killed
by vCJD by October 2009. Since 1989, when the first case was reported outside the UK, total 13,286 cases
of BSE have been reported in native cattle in Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,
Slovakia, Spain and Switzerland; six cases of vCJD have been reported in France and one each in Canada,
Ireland, Italy and the United States. Starting in 1996, bans prevented the sale of food and food products
containing beef from the UK to other countries and lasted for 10 years before it was lifted on May 1, 2006.
For more details of BSE, refer to the reports on the website of the International Office for Epizootic
Disease (www.oie.int).
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Morelli identifies that there are three types of food problems: the lack of access to sufficient
quantities of food to satisfy minimum human need is referred to as food poverty; the quality of the food we
consume and its impact on our health is referred to as food safety; the control of the world‘s food resources
is known as food security.
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Meanwhile, Korea also opened up more of its agricultural markets to secure
export markets for major companies as well as to become part of the world economy
(KoA, ―Struggle against Neoliberalism‖). The result was that ―by the late 1980s, roughly
half of South Korea‘s agricultural needs of agriculture—mainly wheat and animal feed
corn—were imported‖ (―Agriculture‖). Along with swelling imports of beef, pork,
chicken and dairy products, the Korean publics, who had traditionally mainly consumed
rice and other grains, increased their consumption of meat. Joining in the OECD in 1996,
Korea became one of the major food importers. Korea‘s rate of self-sufficiency is in the
lower ranks among the OECD countries, and currently imports 80 percent of its grain
from the four transnational grain conglomerates (Cargill, Archer Daniel Midland, LDC,
and Bunge), and more than 90 percent of its food from overseas, including almost all of
its wheat and corn (Berthelesen).
As a counter-response to food industrialization and global exchanges, public
concern on food safety heightened in Korea, just as the international attention to food
security and industrialized farming which began in the mid-2000s. The increased public
concern for food safety and a safe ecosystem in Korea from the beginning of the 2000s is
called Well-being Yol-pung (wellbeing fever).129 Well-being Yol-pung began with a
popular television documentary series titled Good Eating, Good Living, aired in 2002,
which catapulted hidden dangers in daily food, caused by industrialization production
processes, into the forefront of the public conscience. By issuing warnings against
environmental and human health risks of industrialized food, the documentary led people
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In his article, Seong-tae Hong states that the Korean public‘s interest in ―wellbeing‖ began
from the middle 1990s (132).
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to be more aware of their daily diet, which was directly connected to their health, body,
life, and reproduction.
The people around me at that time increasingly said that what was important in
food was not its efficiency and convenience but its quality. They diligently abstained
from flesh and meat, and found food with no-trans fat, no-cholesterol, and less-saturated
fat in order to avoid physical conditions such as obesity, diabetes, and high blood
pressure among others. As the Korean ancient principle of Shin-to-bul-i—the belief that
domestic farm products are the best for the body—was reinstated and often talked about,
they also desisted from eating western fast food such as hamburgers, pizza, donuts, fried
chicken, and Coke, which had occupied a large part of the Korean public‘s diet. Urban
people attempted to find food grown closer to where they lived, or even experimented
with alternative forms of farming. In the metropolitan city of Seoul with endless
skyscrapers, people grew vegetables using flowerpots and the rooftops of their dwellings.
As such, the Korean public, who during the industrialization had borne the demanding
work with Hun-g-ry Jeong-shin (hungry spirit), began to feel concerned about the quality
of food.
However, Well-being Yol-pung soon led to enormous business opportunities;
business corporations expanded the markets of wellbeing products. A growing number of
companies released organic food products, health supplements and materials, and opened
body fitness and management clubs and skin care shops. Sports dance and jazz dance
flourished, as did advertising for salutary endeavors to maintain health and good body
shape. Business marketing even reached ―life style‖ by developing various kinds of
―wellbeing projects,‖ convincing customers that they needed to escape from their busy
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daily life and relieve the stresses of a hectic business schedule. From 2003, yoga,
meditation, thermal spa, and aroma therapy boomed for relaxing and unwinding. A welter
of information regarding health care, healthy food recipes, and meditation was shared
through Internet blogs; books for wellbeing management were released and sold like hot
cakes. Fabric and clothing businesses developed new pro-healthy materials. Well-being
Yol-pung, certainly, swept through the country, entering into every facet of life of the
Korean public and placing itself as Well-being Mun-hwa (wellbeing culture)
I believe that wellbeing culture, which had resided in the daily life of the Korean
public since the early 2000s, laid down the building blocks for the 2008 candlelight
protest. As Grossberg states, daily life can be stronger and more powerful than the
rational plan (45). It is for the reason that such a great many people, all of whom sank in
silence when Korean farmers initiated demonstration against the KorUS FTA in 2006,
held candles when President Lee Myung-bak approved the resumption of U.S. beef with
the alleviated SPS (the quarantine standards). When the details of the resumption of the
beef deal were revealed, the Korean public, who became active consumers of wellbeing
products, alertly searched for more information about U.S. beef and mad cow disease,
and posted their findings on the Internet to share with others, just as they had sought and
shared wellbeing information through Internet blogs.
The 2008 candlelight protest grounded on wellbeing culture has shown the
features of consumer protest where power rests in the collective buying power of
consumers and not merely in the media coverage given to political protest. At the
beginning of July during the protest, the Korean Women‘s Association United and four
other civic group coalitions launched a nationwide campaign to boycott U.S. beef and
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vowed to make the country free of mad cow disease, declaring ―We will oust American
beef feared to carry mad cow disease from our dinner tables without fail‖ (Hyung-jin
Kim). Protesters also encouraged each other on the Internet to cancel their subscriptions
to the major national newspapers (Chosun Ilbo, JungAng Ilbo, and DongA Ilbo), which
took the government‘s side on the U.S. beef import issue. They boycotted commercial
products advertised in those conservative newspapers, shared the list and phone numbers
of the companies that placed advertisements of their products in the conservative
newspapers to make protesting calls to the companies.130 The 2008 candlelight protest is
a hybrid of citizen protest and consumer protest.
I also believe that it was because the 2008 candlelight protest was sort of
consumer protest that the protest did not pay much attention to the issue of employment
instability faced by contract workers, which trade unions attempted to incorporate into
the protest.131 Wellbeing culture has not problematized widening gaps between classes. In
fact, as business corporations found enormous opportunities in the cultural phenomena of
wellbeing, they began to launch luxury products targeting the upper class. A new term,
Well-being-jok, was coined to indicate wellbeing enthusiasts—consumers of quality
goods and services, generally members of relatively upscale and well-educated
populations, and residents of Gang-nam, the metropolitan area south of the Han River in

130

At that time, many people unsubscribed from the mainstream newspapers. In Kim and Cho‘s
research, one of the interviewees, Mom G noted as follows: First thing I did after I recognized the issue, I
stopped subscribing to some of the conservative pro-government newspapers that were not covering the
issue very well, and started to read some others that cover the issue better because I thought getting and
understanding the information was very important (Kim and Cho 12).
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The details of the trade unions‘ attempts to incorporate their issue into the 2008 protest are in
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Seoul.132 In major up-market districts for Well-being-jok, so-called ―wellbeing house(s)‖
were built with a noble image and sat at the top of fine views of mountains, rivers, or
parks. Across the cracks of the dense forest of skyscrapers and high-rise apartment
buildings, these wellbeing house(s) reminded of ―green‖ ecological initiatives and often
contained luxury facilities such as indoor golf courses and fitness clubs (Jong-yul Seo).
The full options of wellbeing business were available for Wellbeing-jok, but not for the
average Korean public. Just as wellbeing culture had developed without any
consideration of the widening disparities of life quality and food culture between social
classes, the 2008 protest ignored the abusive sweatshop conditions at a number of
companies, which the trade unions had carried out strikes against.
Interestingly, the fact that the 2008 candlelight protest was grounded on wellbeing,
shows that the protest has a contradictory connection with capitalism. Wellbeing fever
emerged as a counter-action to capitalist projects of food industrialization and
globalization, but was fuelled by the rampant exertions of capitalist marketing desires.
Ironically, again, wellbeing fever took the role of the foundation for the protest fighting
against economic globalization. In other words, wellbeing fever, articulated by capitalism,
was disarticulated from capitalism and rearticulated to the resistance against capitalism.
In doing so, welling fever took the focus of the 2008 candlelight protest away from leftright ideological debate; the protest fell down to a mere element of the processes in which
capitalism constructs and deconstructs itself.
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These wellbeing enthusiasts are similar to Lifestyles of Health and Sustainability (LOHAS) in
the context of the United States, which indicates a particular market segment of population who pursues
sustainable life style.
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The Carnivalesque Oscillating between Online and Offline
In the first section of this chapter, I explored how the democratization of Korean
politics and the end of the Cold War led to depoliticization of the youth during the 1990s.
The depoliticized Korean youth, I believe, began to be repoliticized to hold and
participate in large-scale protests in the 2000s, in tandem with the emergence and
development of communication technology, especially the Internet.133 However, the
format of social movements practiced by the repoliticized youth was different from that
of conventional social movements as the youth developed their political passion in the
new environment which new communication media set up as well as an un-authoritarian
social setting after the end of military dictatorship. In this section, I focus on how the
development of new communication technology under the un-authoritarian social climate
altered the landscape of political engagement of the Korean youth, and how the youth
refined and displayed their sense of humor through collective activities both on and
outside the Internet, finally affecting the 2008 candlelight protest. In order to best
understand the collective sense of humor engaging in politics, I first explore how freedom
of speech has been repressed in Korean history.
―Freedom of speech‖ was a huge target of repression of dictatorial governments in
Korean history. The authoritarian Korean governments repressed press, publication,
assembly, and association (Sa 1). Conservative ideologies, a product of the Cold War era,
were constantly used as the means for repression of speech and freedom. During the Rhee
Syng-man regime (1945–60), in particular during the Korean War period, ―the Korean
press was subject to strict military censorship, and the Korean press consequently lacked
133

I believe that the Internet provides the general citizens the opportunities to deploy their political
opinions. As the citizens who used to be readers/viewer of mass media turned to be writers/producers on
the Internet, they possibly became more politically engaging.
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diversity in its content‖ (Youm 881 qtd. in Sa 8). After the armistice in 1953, Rhee Syngman continued to restrict the media in various ways. He outlawed leftist newspapers
based on his basic ideology of anti-communism, issued press guidelines, arrested
reporters and publishers who contributed to spreading public dissatisfaction and criticism
of the authoritarian regime, and introduced a licensing system for publishing newspapers
(Sa 2–3).
Under the military regimes of Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, more severe
restrictions were exerted on freedom of speech, specifically the press. Based on anticommunist ideologies, the military regimes resorted to martial laws and emergency
decrees as an effective means of preventing the press from criticizing or reporting any
criticism of the government (Youm 887 in Sa 8). The Park Chung-hee administration,
through the National Security Act, established some topics, such as political relations,
military conditions, factions within the military, role of security agencies in politics, and
the activities of dissident organizations, as taboo so that individuals could not freely talk
about them (Savada and Shaw). After Park adopted the Yushin Constitution in 1972, he
used emergency decrees to penalize those who critiqued the government, and he merged
and closed down news agencies and provincial newspapers (U.S. Library of Congress in
Sa 10). Park also led a wholesale dismissal of reporters from two major newspapers,
Dong-A Ilbo and Chosun Ilbo (both of which were leading newspapers at the time), in
order to stop them from reporting on popular opposition to the Park government as well
as to suppress their struggle to protect press freedom (Sa 4).134
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According to Sa, one-hundred thirty-four journalists had to leave the Dong-A Ilbo and thirty
three journalists had to leave the Chosun Ilbo in 1974.
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Having notoriously come to power through the massacre of Gwang-ju citizens in
1980, the subsequent Chun Doo-hwan government established the most thorough control
of the news media in Korea (U.S. Library of Congress in Sa 7). In order to usurp
presidential power through a coup d‘état, Chun declared martial law, closed universities,
banned political activities, and intensified control and surveillance over the mass media
through the comprehensive National Security Act (U.S. Library of Congress qtd. in Sa
10). Chun also restricted the media‘s ability to criticize the government or power group.
To make control easier, he even merged three independent news agencies into a single
state-run agency (currently called Yonhap News Agency), closed numerous provincial
newspapers, forbade central newspapers from stationing correspondents in provincial
cities, merged two independent broadcasting companies into the state-run Korean
Broadcasting System (KBS), and banned and closed highly acclaimed opinion journals
(Sa 8). Chun continuously forbade the Christian Broadcasting System network from
providing news coverage not related to religion (Sa 8). Meanwhile, the major
conservative newspapers, the Chosun Ilbo and the Dong-a Ilbo, etc. (which had once
collaborated with Japanese colonialists in the past) took the role of political favor rather
than siding with civil rights (Youm 881 qtd. in Sa 8).
Freedom of speech was, to some extent, established through a series of protests
for democratization in the 1980s. The 1987 June Prodemocracy Movement in particular
led to a relaxation of restraints in the press. The subsequent President Roh Tae-woo‘s
―6.29 Declaration‖ (of political reform responding to the June Movement) eliminated past
vestiges of authoritarian rule by revising laws and decrees to fit democratic provisions. At
the time, along with the fact that university autonomy was recognized and that
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restrictions on overseas travels were lifted, freedom of press was more expanded. In the
line of democratic attempts to achieve freedom of press and counterbalance the major
conservative newspapers, a daily newspaper called the Hankyoreh was founded in 1988
with its alternative political perspective. Subsequently, the civilian government
established in 1993 ushered in an un-authoritarian atmosphere in society and granted the
press greater freedom, allowing a new generation of journalists to investigate sensitive
subjects—for example, Chun Doo-hwan‘s Gwangju massacre (U.S Library Congress in
Sa 10).
During this change in political climate, the Internet emerged and rapidly
developed in Korea. There were a couple of advantageous conditions that accounted for
the rapid development of new communication technology: the Korean government had
poured billions of dollars into constructing extensive information networks from the late
1990s so that a highly wired social environment became available to average Korean
citizens. The fact that Korea had/has a highly urbanized and dense population was
advantageous for networking (T. Kim). Since the early 1990s, the government also
applied its policy to promote privatization and deregulation in general to the information
technology (IT) sector so that the Internet could rapidly expand for economic purposes.
Many businesses utilize the Internet for services such as social media, shopping, banking,
and especially cultural media (TV drama, movies, songs, games, etc.) and education (T.
Kim). Under such conditions, Koreans became technology-savvy.
Considering that Korea was/is an Internet powerhouse in the world, the Korean
public, particularly liberals, had huge expectations for the new communication media to
realize freedom of speech by providing alternative information that had been excluded by
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the mainstream mass media under the authoritarian regimes. Liberals pinpointed that the
Internet was/is open to those who had political motivations and would open up avenues to
overcoming the historical experience of limited freedom of speech and democracy (T.
Kim).
Ddanzi Ilbo (www.ddanzi.com), founded in 1998 as an alternative political news
website, might have been the starting point of efforts to direct the Internet as the driving
power to upgrade democracy. Ddanzi Ilbo began to counterbalance the high-walled
mainstream political discourses by engaging in political debates with its alternative
political stance. Hijacking public discussion out of hands of authority, Ddanzi Ilbo also
developed an unconventional way of political engagement. Just as its name Ddanzi,
meaning (a) ―carping tongue,‖ the news website presented political opinions and critical
perspectives on social power groups through cheekily ironic stunts, utilizing expletives,
jokes, vulgar vocabulary, and comic cartoons with irony, parody and satire. Although its
indecent and obscene language was sometimes criticized by feminists, Ddanzi Ilbo‘s
daring attacks on the conventional politics through its flashes of wit, which led to
development of communities of loyal fans eager to hear its opinions articulated in its own
languages, who are called Ddanzi pe-in(s) (Danzi addict(s)).135
Another online news website, OhmyNews (www.ohmynews.com) was founded in
2000 with its unique motto: ―Every Citizen is a Reporter.‖ While displaying its intention
to address its alternative political perspectives from general citizens rather than from the
minority social elite groups of professional journalists, OhmyNews deployed an open
source style of news reporting in which amateurs could participate in news production
135

Pe-in(s), rather than signifying the original meaning ―a disabled person or a bum,‖ the term
refers to a person who is hooked on to and almost addicted to the Internet, forming social networks almost
exclusively in cyberspace with people with similar interests.
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and public debate.136 In the same year, another news website, Pressian
(www.pressian.com), was founded with the intention to present alternative political
perspectives through in-depth analysis of events and phenomena. Likewise, throughout
the early 2000s, a diverse range of Internet news websites and political webzines
constantly emerged and contributed to the wider dissemination of alternative political
perspectives and critical opinions.
The blossoming news services on the Internet began to permeate through the
Korean public‘s daily routines, spaces, and times of social and cultural life. Based on
their interests and tastes, the public located or even opened up Internet websites, read
postings, posted their ideas, exchanged information, and socialized with fellow members
on certain websites. Although the Internet could not promise a quick fix for democracy, it
certainly offered viable possibilities for civic interactions, politicizing the public‘s
political passions.
DC Inside (www.DCinside.com) was one of the Internet websites that developed
the politicized Internet users.137 This website was originally established for the
commercial purpose of selling electronic gadgets and goods, such as digital cameras. At
its initial stage, the site attracted relatively small groups of experts and zealous consumers
of electronics. But before long, this site had become a playground for its regular visitors,
who often posted their comments about electronics they had purchased and pictures they
had taken with the gadgets. The regular visitors also uploaded composite photographs,
which they created through Photoshop and other software. In order to attract more
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staff, while most of the articles are written by other freelance contributors who are mostly ordinary citizens.
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Regarding DCinside, I referred to the journal article, Pang, ―Cyberspace and Minority.‖
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viewers to their postings, they used various materials such as well-known cinematic and
popular cultural images, the images of celebrities and politicians, and incorporated their
whimsical sense of humor into their works. Once parody images were found to be
hilarious, they were viral—they were copied, relayed, and disseminated by visitors to
other websites.
The devotees of DC Inside were called DC pe-in(s) (DC Inside addict(s)). This
group of people was politically literate, and rivals to Ddanzi pe-in(s). They galvanized
cyber forums for socially and politically significant situations, and provided their
opinions. However, their way of political engagement was similar to Ddanzi pe-in(s)‘ in
that they mixed politics with cultural imagination by creating parody images and
addressed their political opinions through slangs, phrases in special rhymes that they
created, and non-grammatical combinations of words that challenged conventional
language rules. I believe that this unconventional mode of political practices reflects the
un-authoritarian political climate as well as the characteristics of the Internet.
The Internet provides different circumstances from those of conventional media.
First, the Internet shifted the subjects of political discourse production from the expert to
the general citizen. While newspapers—considered as the standard conduits of political
information—selectively present experts‘ and pundits‘ opinions, the Internet provides
opportunities to members of the general public to voice their opinions. If newspapers and
hand-written posters (principally used by the student bodies who led prodemocracy
movements against military dictatorships) offered ―authority‖ to the small groups of
expert commentators, the Internet breaks the authority into bits and pieces. Moreover, the
Internet is spontaneous. On the Internet, people are generally freed from their everyday
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identities as highly disciplined social roles are exchanged or discarded. The Internet
space thus signifies a breaking away from the ordinary time, hierarchical ranks and
privileges, and all official worlds. This kind of liminal realm of freedom offers people
opportunities to express their nonconformist opinions in rebellious ways.
The new way of political engagement was extended from the Internet to offline
platforms. The 2002 FIFA World Cup (hosted by Korea and Japan in cooperation from
May 31 to June 30) served as a base station for expanding the new-styled political
passion to the public ―square.‖ As the first World Cup held in Asian countries, the 2002
World Cup excited the Korean public from the outset. As the games were in progress, the
Korean public became fervent, watching the stunning consecutive victories of the
national team. As large companies sponsored the setup of large television screens in the
square in downtown Seoul, scores of wildly enthusiastic people came out to watch the
games together. The crowd on the streets collectively cheered for the Korean team,
chanting slogans, singing songs, dancing to the rhythm of the cheering songs, waving
national flags, and clapping red balloon sticks. Some wore face paint and costumes made
of Korean national flags, while most wore red shirts symbolizing the soccer fan club of
Korean team Bul-geun-ang-ma (Red Devils). Automobiles were decorated with two
traffic cones, generating the image of Red Devils. The traffic on Sejong Avenue along the
square was paralyzed by the jubilantly moving and dancing bodies overflowing from the
square, especially during the days and nights of the Korean team‘s matches. The moving
and dancing bodies were not the modern bodies which had been intimidated by political
and social authorities.
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The modern bodies of the Korean public had been disciplined by the martial laws
of military dictators and for modern industrialization.138 The bodies were trained to
internalize social norms and to vitalize them to become those of laborers for the
successful progression of capitalistic systems and economic growth. During the
industrializations, the bodies of the Korean public were made to feel guilty and shamed
when they were off-work, and were supposed to yield roads lined bumper-to-bumper
with vehicles, which never yielded even an inch to human bodies. Contrarily, the dancing
and moving bodies in the middle of drive ways during the World Cup season were the
bodies experiencing liberation from the social rules as if they had been at a carnival.
This collective festival during the World Cup games, for certain, marked a radical
shift away from the authoritarian social atmospheres surrounding the political
assumptions of ―mass rally‖ and ―red color‖ in Korean context. The authoritarian regimes
had generated excessive hatreds toward communism and stigmatized any collective
mobilization as a pro-communist movement (B. Kim 67). The World Cup event, however,
pulled the masses to squares and streets, eliciting their enthusiasm for collective
participation in encouraging sports teams and replacing the chronic syndrome of ―agoraphobia‖ in public mentality with festive imagination. The red-colored uniforms during
the season also appeared as a symbol marking the end of the long-standing communism
phobia called Red Complex (Jung-min Choi). The color red symbolized passion and
dynamism during the season.
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Korea has long been viewed as an outstanding model of economic development. Despite poor
resource endowment and a large population, a colonial legacy, the devastation following the Korean War,
chronic political instability, and the protracted military confrontation with North Korea, South Korea has
made an impressive ascension in the international economic system, becoming the 13 th largest economy
and the 8th largest trading state in the world in a relatively short span. I believe that beneath the economic
miracle lay human capital investment.
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Furthermore, the 2002 World Cup was an awakening for Korean citizens‘ passion
for (re)organizing political power. In the previous section, I mentioned that the
candlelight protest has its origin in the 2002 candlelight vigils driven by an accident in
which two middle school students were killed by an armored vehicle of U.S. forces
during a military drill. The accident occurred during the 2002 World Cup games, and was
discovered by the Korean public after the season. The lack of attention received by the
accident on time led to a collective feeling of guilt among the Korean public: enjoying
the sports event, the public failed to pay attention to the death of the girls. Cheering the
Korean team, the public grew entangled with the nationalistic sentiments, which were
patched up together into the hostility toward the foreign force, as they found about the
incident. At the moment, internet user nicknamed Ang-ma suggested candlelight vigils to
cherish the memory of the two deceased girls. Varied groups of people spontaneously
declared their solidarity on the Internet and rushed back to Seoul Square, but this time
with ―candles.‖ Subsequently, the candlelight vigils evolved into protests to urge a
revision of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the United States and Korea,
as the two U.S. soldiers responsible for the deaths were acquitted in a jury trial.
The atmosphere of the 2002 protest venues had different hues than those of
conventional social protests against U.S. forces. Whereas the anti-American protests in
the past were generally mobilized and disciplined by activists and deployed with
immense fighting spirits, stones, sticks and fire bombs. However, the majority of the
participants in the 2002 candlelight protests were Internet community members; Cyber
pe-in(s) from Ddanzi Ilbo, OhMyNews, Pressian, and DC Inside also joined. As the
Internet community members displayed a real bearing on the mobilizing capacity of the
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movement, the atmosphere of the protest was peaceful, individualistic, and decentralized.
The manner in which the protesters peacefully carried candlelight vigils in night-time
rallies was reminiscent of the cheering rallies held during the World Cup season, albeit
without the clamor and chaos.
Some protesters grew more playful during the 2002 protest. DC pe-in(s) created a
wide variety of parody images and spread them throughout the Internet—one image that I
have seen on the Internet depicted an armored vehicle running over the U.S. president
George W. Bush. DC pe-in(s) along with other Internet users collectively rushed to the
website of the White House to ―hit‖ on the postings and caused the website to be
overwhelmed by a rush of hits. Unlike the conventional anti-American rallies in which
participants carried Korean national flags (Jung and Kim 10), during the 2002 protest,
DC pe-in(s) carried flags bearing images of cute puppies, which had nothing to do with
the theme of the protest.
I believe that the classical notion of the ―public sphere,‖ which had been most
popularly applied by Korean scholars to discussions of political engagement, is rather
poorly equipped and unimaginative to tackle the ungrammatical political passions
mediated through the 2002 candlelight protest. The classical notion of the public sphere,
developed by Jürgen Habermas, indicates the place between private individuals and
government authority, open to all, where private individuals publicize and exchange their
views and knowledge on matters of general interests; they have rational-critical debates
on issues of public interest and reach a consensus (that could serve as a counterweight to
political authority). However, the way of political engagement during the 2002
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candlelight protest did not follow traditional model or pattern of political communication,
nor was it full of rational deliberations as Habermas outlined.
Rather, the concept of the ―carnivalesque‖ advanced by Mikhail Bakhtin appears
to be more applicable to its culturescapes.139 In Bakhtin‘s development of the literature
term of the ―carnivalesque‖ based on ―carnival,‖ a medieval festival, he focused his
attention on the grotesque body as a carnal body with reasoning and piety removed. For
Bakhtin, grotesque elements of humanity in carnivals destroy social hierarchies and
privileges of everyday life, and present political possibility of initial impulses of the body.
Just as the carnivalesque subverts authority and dominant power through chaos (rather
than in rational or systematic ways based on grandiose narratives), the 2002 protesters
exerted their political power through artistic carnivalesque tactics.
I believe that this new style of politics shaped throughout the 2002 protest was put
to practice during the 2008 candlelight protest. Most of the participants in the 2008
candlelight protest were also members of Internet communities. Even the communities
without any political orientation joined the protest; the protest organized by voluntary
participants proceeded in a decentralized and fragmented form without a leader who
pulled the strings. Despite the government‘s violent acts, the 2008 protesters utilized their
sense of humor. Just as in the 2002 protest, the 2008 protesters degraded the
government‘s authority by weaving together parody images, comical songs, satirical
jokes, mockeries, and derision. The collective laughter of the tumultuous crowd was the
most potent weapon of the 2008 protesters to disrespect and humiliate the Korean
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The term, carnivalesque, was originally coined by Bakhtin to refer to a literary mode that
subverts and liberates the assumptions of the dominant style or atmosphere through humor and chaos.
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government, which represented the prevailing economics of neoliberal globalization of
the time.140
According to Amber Day, the carnivalesque tactics such as satire and irony have
been increasingly centralized in contemporary politics (in the United States). In her book
Satire and Dissent: Interventions in Contemporary Political Debate (2011), examining
today‘s parodic news shows—e.g. Jon Stewart‘s humorous but hard-hitting interviews,
Amber states that a renaissance is taking place in political satire in the United States: as
political parody, irony, and satire have surged in popularity in recent years, they have
become complexly intertwined with serious political dialogue. Subsequently, ―fans are
avidly coalescing around these forms, fervently keen to hear the critiques made, and
drawing pleasure form the communal affirmation‖ (Amber). M. Lane Bruner also relates
that the carnivalesque had been popularly used as protesting techniques in surprising and
dramatic fashion during the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, and
were subsequently reemployed at ―anti-corporate globalization protests in locations
ranging from Seattle, Washington, to Davos, Switzerland, by members of groups such as
Carnival against Capitalism, the Ruckus Society, Reclaim the Streets, and Art and
Revolution‖ (139). Buser and Arthurs also state that carnivalesque practices have been
typified in the alter-globalization and anti-capitalism movements including summit
disruption protests, Global Days of Action and the Occupy movement (3).
The carnivalesque tactics reinvigorated in politicis, in a way, evidently opened up
the space for political debate and even popularized the issue of the 2008 protest. But, it
simultaneously made the protest, like a historical carnival, a work of paradox and
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I will rework on this reference later. According to Boje, the ―carnivalesque‖ has been used for
resistance to globalization. The carnivaleques four themes: the tumultuous crowd, the world turned upsidedown, the comic mask and the grotesque body.
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ambiguity. In a historical carnival (from which the carnivalesque is derived by Bakhtin),
hegemonic social roles and usual restrictions on public behavior were officially relaxed
and reversed, but the suspension of social rules was only temporary. The sphere of the
historical carnival was separate from everyday life, so that it did not succeed in ultimately
disturbing social rules.141 It is true that the carnivalesque humiliated and degraded the
government‘s authority during the 2008 candlelight protest, but, as if echoing the
historical carnival, the humiliation and degradation (through the initial impulse of the
body without an ideological struggle) was too light and volatile to make a radical
statement. Participating in the 2008 candlelight protest, enjoying the carnivalesque humor
and laughter, to be honest, I was confused about the direction of the protest. This might
well mean that the link between the carivalesque and its power to act as resistance is at
best an ambivalent one. This may be why people say ―the presence of irony signals a
cynical distrust of politics and a lack of real engagement or sincerity,‖ and ―the blending
of the serious and the satire only serves cheapen the discourse‖ (Amber 15).
Neoliberal Globalization and Job Insecurity
In Chapter 2, I mentioned that Korean leftist commentators believe the driving
power behind the 2008 candlelight protest is the economic fascism of neoliberal
globalization. From their perspective, the 2008 protest against the KorUS FTA was a
resistance against capitalist globalization. However, I expressed my doubt about the idea
that neoliberalism was a singular driving force of the protest. Although I do not agree
with the leftist intellectuals by confining the meaning of the protest to a pure resistance
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To put it delicately, Bakhtin distinguishes carnival from spectacle as following: ―Carnival is
not a spectacle everyone participates because its very idea embraces all the people seen by the people; they
live in it, and. While carnival lasts, there is no other life outside it. During carnival time life is subject only
to its laws, that is, the law of its own freedom.‖ However, to me, this sounds too idealistic.
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against neoliberalism, I believe that the influence of neoliberalism on Korea was one of
the critical social and political implications of the candlelight protest. In this section, I
explore how the current Korean economic conditions, reframed by neoliberalism,
expanded and limited the potentiality of the 2008 candlelight protest.
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Korea (which remained one of the poorest
countries in the world after the Korean War) gained the momentum of economic
development. Park Chung-hee, who had unjustifiably seized presidential power, pushed
ahead with his economic plans to strengthen the political stability of the nation (Kwan-s
Kim 4). The centerpieces of Park‘s economic plans were improvements in industrial
structure and export-orientation (which were well suited for the country‘s poor natural
resource endowment and tiny domestic markets), and the state played a key role in
promoting industrialization and exports. The government first selected a small minority
of businesses to receive its support and then provided them with a loan arranged from
foreign capital (from the United States as well as Japan).142 The chosen businesses
received preferential treatment from the government, became conglomerates, called
Chaebol(s) in Korean, soon came to dominate the domestic market, and led Korea to
constantly achieve rapid growth in industrialization and to become more competitive in
the world economy. Since the United States provided East Asian countries with special
tax preferences under the Cold War system at the time, the Korean economy flourished
until the 1980s.

142

The government‘s concentration was placed on the basic and light industry at the initial five
years of the economic plan. With the labor-intensive manufacturing industry, Korea could develop a
competitive advantage. Its concentration moved to heavy industry in the second five years plan, and then to
heavy-chemical industry for the next five years.
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Under the subsequent regime of Chun Doo-hwan (in 1980s), due to ―three
prosperous conditions‖—the devaluation of the Korean won, low interest rates of foreign
loans and the low price of oil—the Korean economy flourished on a previously unseen
scale (KoA, ―Road to an Undesirable Deal‖). Chaebols such as Hyundai Motors and
Samsung Electronics, which worked in the electronics, semiconductor, and automobile
industries, sprang up, creating a positive cycle of expansion of exports: economic benefits
from exports, the domestic return of profits, investment and domestic growth, and
economic boom (Moon and Mo 25). The fruits of the export boom returned, to some
extent, to workers in the form of rising wages. Increases in workers‘ income improved
their standard of living and expanded their opportunities and aspirations for education.
Those who received higher education were absorbed by the rapidly growing industrial
and commercial sectors.
Meanwhile, under the Chun regime, the Korean economy underwent economic
liberalization and capital market opening (KoA, ―Struggle against Neoliberalism‖). This
marked a radical turn away from the economic model of the Park regime, in which the
state played a key role in promoting industrialization and export-led economic growth
and in protecting the domestic market (KoA, ―Struggle against Neoliberalism‖). Whereas
the Park administration‘s centralized plans had control over capital, credit, interest rates,
finance, and labor in promoting industrialization and export-led economic growth, Chun
emphasized opening the national economy to foreign capital, and free operation of the
market without government control (KoA, ―Struggle against Neoliberalism‖).
From 1989, the economic growth in Korea slowed down as Korea‘s key exports
(such as semiconductors, steel, and ships) became stagnant (owing to rising inflation,
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appreciation of the Korean won, and the recession of the world economy). At the start of
the 1990s, Korea encouraged capital inflows to finance its growing current account
deficits (Moon and Mo 25). There was also international pressure to open its market from
newly emerged international organizations as well as the United States (Woo-Cumings).
It was the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of GATT and the advent of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) (the membership of which Korea had pursued) that brought
demands for Korea to open its financial and capital market to the world economy (KoA,
―Struggle against Neoliberalism‖).143
In 1996, under the Kim Young-sam government, Korea implemented further
financial deregulation and capital market opening as part of the requirements to join the
OECD (Kihwan Kim 3-4). As neoliberalism became the main political economic
principle, the world organizations dismantled national borders in terms of economy.
Korea confronted an irresistible demand to be united under a single logic of rule of
neoliberal globalization, and then adopted a policy of permitting companies and banks to
attract foreign loans. With the market opening, there was a sudden influx of transnational
capital, most of which were short-term foreign currency debts of financial institutions;
this led to an economy and property bubble. However, this ultimately paved the way for
Korea to face thorn-bushes of economic depression and job insecurity, as a chain reaction
occurred in an unpredictable way.
At the time, a financial crisis had begun in Thailand and was spreading through
other Asian countries in mid-1997. The situation engendered a sense of economic
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The Urguay Round was the 8th round of multilateral trade negotiations (MTN) conducted
within the framework of the GATT, spanning from 1986 to 1994 and embracing 123 countries as
―contracting parties.‖ The Round transformed the GATT into the World Trade Organization (WTO). The
Round came into effect in 1995 and has been implemented over the period to 2000 under the administrative
direction of the WTO.
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insecurity. Observing the situation in Asian countries, foreign investors lost confidence in
the Korean financial market and began withdrawing investment funds from domestic
financial institutions (Kwan-s Kim 7). As foreign capital continued to pull out, domestic
stock prices plunged and the exchange rate soared (Kwan-s Kim 7). Concerned about the
continued depreciation of the won, foreign as well as domestic investors panicked and
fled the stock market, creating a vicious cycle of plummeting stock prices pushing the
value of the won down further. The Korean government was unable to preserve the value
of the Korean won. Meanwhile, the banking sector was burdened with non-performing
loans as its large corporations were funding aggressive expansions (Kwan-s Kim 7). The
credit rating of Korea continued to drift down. Several big businesses (Hanbo, Sammi,
Jinro, Kia Motors, Daewoo Motors, etc.) failed to ensure returns and profitability and
asked for emergency loans from the government, but the government could not secure
new funds from international markets, nor could it have maturing loans rolled over
(Kwan-s Kim 16). Finally, Korea plunged into a financial-cum-economic crisis with
insolvencies in a number of financial institutions and widespread bankruptcies in the
corporate sector in 1997.
In November 1997, confronting a big slump in the Korean economy, President,
Kim Dae-jung asked the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for loans. As part of its
agreement with the IMF, the Korean government pledged to take neoliberal reforming
measures (Moon and Mo). Based on the theory of neoliberalism, economists detected that
the main culprit of the economic crisis is the state-centered economic systems,
established from the initial stage of economic development.144 According to this logic,
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According to the report of KoA, in the process of confronting the crisis, the United States
blocked South Korea from obtaining assistance and loans from Japan and forced the intervention of the
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the Park regime‘s selection and promotion of certain sectors of the economy led too many
production units to crowd into only a few sectors of industries, whereas many worthwhile
economic projects failed. The centralized systems also allowed the chaebol(s) to overborrow loans, putting themselves in an unstable debt-equity position and arousing a high
rate of external debt for the national economy.145 The systems caused problems even in
the financial sector: the financial resources allocated by the state to the targeted firms
made bankers grow lax in examining loan applications, particularly from chaebol(s)
(Kwan-s Kim 4).
Identifying the government‘s poor management of the economy as the very
source of the 1997 economic turmoil, Korea took structural reform measures
encompassing the four sectors of banking, corporate, trade, and labor (Kwan-s Kim 17).
The fragilities of the corporate and financial sectors were considered special, serious
issues. The financial sector reform included the elimination of government-initiated loans,
the removal of all governmental restrictions on foreign borrowings by domestic firms,
and the enhancement of transparency in banking transactions (Moon and Mo). In
corporate restructuring, conglomerates were to streamline their business activities
(focusing on their own specialties) and were subjected to stricter disclosure rules and
financial market discipline to make the Korean economic system more transparent and
accountable.
The immediate impact of the economic restructuring was massive layoffs of
laborers (K. Shin). In the corporate restructuring process, many companies were sold off
IMF in order to achieve the rapid restructuring of the South Korean economy, following the neoliberal
logic.
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It is also known that the centralized systems favored the production of assembly-type exports
(Kwan-s Kim 17).
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and carried out structural adjustments (for decrease in production). Furthermore, the labor
law was revised to provide firms with explicit conditions for layoffs of laborers and
flexibility in deciding work hours (Kwan-s Kim 17). An enormous numbers of
individuals were laid off; some of them were reemployed, but on a contract basis as
temporary job workers in deteriorating working conditions (J. Song 37–65). The
percentage of contract workers rose to higher levels than permanent position workers
(Nam 267). The tradition of lifetime employment was shattered, arousing a constant fear
of being laid off. Workers also had to succumb to the pressure of huge pay cuts or freezes,
which resulted in a drop in their real income.146
Meanwhile, the high interest policy, the main part of the IMF bailout package,
forced social polarization. The objective of interest rate elevation was to induce investors
to keep their savings in domestic currency and to additionally attract foreign investment,
in order to stabilize the value of the Korean won (Kwan-s Kim 14). While stabilizing the
currency market, this policy made chaebols that already had a high debt-equity ratio go
bankrupt; smaller firms, which had depended on the chaebols for business, confronted
plummeting sales or bankruptcies as their big business customers cut back on production
and investment (Kwan-s Kim 15–6).147 On the other hand, ironically, the high interest
policy enriched the domestic capitalist class—a few rich who could continue to live off
their bank deposits with higher incomes—in the midst of the economic turmoil (Kwan-s
Kim 15–6).
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The real income of an urban household during the third quarter of 1998 plunged to its lowest
levels in 35 years (National Statistical Office, 27 qtd. in Kwan-s Kim 16).
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It is for this reason that a series of the IMF reforms is called the ―IMF cold wave‖ (Kwan-s
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Passing through all of these measures, Korea eventually succeeded in stabilizing
the currency market and paying off the debt to the IMF in 2001, escaping from its
retrenchment program. However, the neoliberal reforms did not lead to a full-fledged
economic recovery: bankruptcy of small firms was still frequent even after all the reforms.
Continuous corporate restructuring and downsizing gave a further rise in
unemployment.148 Job insecurity and the downfall in labor wages not only constricted
economic activities but also hurt the livelihoods of people and their dependents: families
were broken, there were higher incidences of poverty, property-related crimes soared, and
even suicides increased (Kwan-s Kim 17). While the wealth of the rich increased under
the high interest policy, the income gap between the rich and the rest widened. This
inequality, in turn, widened the discrepancy in job opportunities based on income and
education level, which helped to solidify the gap between rich and poor (KoA, ―Road to
an Undesirable Deal‖). Consequently, the western principle of neoliberalism swept the
country and left the public with social polarization, job insecurity, dwindling labor wages,
devastating work rhythms, and danger of losing public utilities and corporations.
I believe that such an altered landscape of the Korean economy improved and at
the same time, limited the possibility of the 2008 candlelight protest.149 First, the
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In analyzing a census on the economically-active workforce implemented by the Korean
Statistical Office in August 2001, the Korean Labor and Society Institute (www.klsi.org) estimated the
number of irregular workers to be 7.37 million, constituting 55.7%of total workforce. In March of 2008, the
number of irregular workers was 800 million (the labor groups‘ estimation was 8.69 million, and the
government‘s estimation is 5.64 million).
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In the wake of the IMF crisis, in 2002, the Korean government sought to break up the public
Korea Electric Power Corporation, and sell the parts once this break-up was complete. It also announced a
plan to divide the rail industry into a facilities sector and management sector and privatize it, and a plan to
privatize the public Korea Gas Corporation. In response to this, the labor unions of Korea Railroad
Corporation, Korea Electric Power Corporation and Korea Gas Corporation went on strike simultaneously
to stop the privatizations, and carried out a historical struggle in February 2002. If their struggles had not
taken place, almost all public corporations in Korea would not be privatized. KoA, ―Struggle against
Neoliberalism.‖ Indifference from politics was exemplified in the social movement that the Korean
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economic condition influenced the roles of laborers during the 2008 candlelight protest.
Leaders of trade unions first joined the protest, based on their understandings of the
possible negative influence of the KorUS on workers: while opening the doors for
Korean conglomerates to increase their international trades, the FTA would hurt Korean
small scaled businesses, which would not be able to compete with U.S. large businesses.
The small declining corporations would attempt to reduce their productions to survive,
which would lead either to lay-offs of workers or increase of labor market flexibility.
Recognizing this possible scenario, trade unions leaders joined the 2008 candlelight
protest from the onset and encouraged their members to join. However, the union
members could not make a big commitment of time and energy to the protest under the
pressure of demanding work schedules under the depressed economy.
I also believe that the middle and high school students who first took to
Cheonggye Plaza to urge the government to cancel the contract of U.S beef imports were
those who had been affected by the neoliberal situation (Kerr; K. Song 62; Go et al. 25–
6). The severity of unemployment and unsecure economic conditions had concluded in
intensification of competition in school education, since ordinary Koreans believed that
good college ranks would contribute to career opportunities. Gearing toward a
competitive college admissions process, private after-schools and tutoring programs had
rapidly expanded. The after-schools and tutoring programs foisted more burdens on the
school students, who were already exhausted by a study schedule of 7:00AM–11:00PM
in a common day for the average Korean public school student (Kerr).

Confederation of Trade Unions staged against the worsening labor condition at the end of 1996 and the
beginning of 1997. The movements did not rise up en masse.
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According to Chu Joo-hee, students‘ burdens of grade competition and hectic
schedule had directly affected their diets (245–70). Going back and forth between their
public school and private after-schools without enough breaks, middle- and high-school
students could not help but depend on instant and fast food in many cases, which possibly
cause mal-nutrition and unbalanced over-nutrition. Korean secondary school students had
suffered from various types of eating disorders, obesities, and other diseases. Particularly,
the less fortunate teenagers relied on school meals, often called ―trash meal,‖ made of
cheap ingredients as well as transgenic ingredients such as super corn, super beans, etc.
(260). To this extent, Chu Ju-hee states that Korean teenage girls had become ―monsters,‖
who eat ―Frankenstein‖ food, which they could not avoid due to crowded school and
work schedules (Chu 260).
It is for this reason that teenagers ran toward Cheonggye Plaza to cry out against
the government when the Lee regime announced a series of education reform plans
(including proposals to add an hour morning class to the school day, to segregate students
by skill level, and to increase the number of and quality of magnet schools, all of which
would exert more detrimental effects on their life) (Jong-ryul Choi 256).150 These
planned reforms would intensify excessive competition among teenagers and drive them
to be complete studying machines and rely more on ―Frankenstein‖ food.
The Lee government‘s approval of U.S. beef imports increasingly distressed the
students by putting them in a situation in which they could never eat their school lunch
with peace of mind (Chu 245–70). Before the approval of the beef imports, the students
had already relied on bad diets including instant and fast food due to their hectic school
150

According to Choi Jong-ryul, the teenagers were guided by 2MB Tan-haek Tu-jaeng-Yon-dae
(People United for the Impeachment of Lee Myung-bak; my translation), which had been protesting since
Lee‘s election on December 22, 2007.
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schedules, consequently suffering from various types of eating disorders, obesity, and
diseases (Chu 245–70). Teenagers, overwhelmed by all of the government plans, could
do nothing but cry out ―Stop Mad Education, Stop Mad Cow Disease!‖
Moreover, the KorUS FTA would further frustrate students from less fortunate
economic background. The KorUS FTA would be the chance to introduce more private
American-based testing services to the Korean admission processes (Thomas Kim 20).
The American-based test would further entrench or exacerbate the economic inequality
between students because such a test would increase the demand on students to seek
extra-curricular courses from private programs (Thomas Kim 20). Additionally, the Lee
government‘s approval of U.S. beef imports pushed the teenagers into a situation in
which they could never eat their school lunch with a peace of mind (Chu 260). Facing the
woeful predicaments, teenage students could not but run towards the streets to cry out
―Let me get some sleep! Let me get some food!‖ and ―Stop Mad Education! Stop Mad
Cow!‖
However, an event or phenomenon that shapes the thoughts and responses of one
generation or group is not necessarily transmitted to another. The stagnant economic
condition, on the other hand, during the 2008 protest, silenced others, particularly
individuals in their twenties. Traditionally, the younger generation, especially college
students, was considered to be leading actors of social movements with their liberal and
progressive ideas. At historically significant moments of social movements, college
students fought at the forefront of struggles, disclosing evidence of the students‘
understanding of their own power and capability to influence society. Especially as
student unions in colleges steered pro-democracy movements against authoritarian
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governments, individuals in their twenties became a powerful source of influence among
the people of Korea. During the 2008 candlelight protest, however, as mentioned,
individuals in their twenties appeared relatively inactive in comparison to their
predecessors. Just as Korean commentators offered an explanation for the slowing
activity of individuals in their twenties (Kang, ―[Where did the College Students]‖; Sangjin Jeon; Chan-ho Oh). I also believe that lack of participation by individuals in their
twenties was connected to the influence of the ranks of unemployment due to prolonged
economic depression. As there had been a high unemployment of university graduates,
college students in their twenties, with a huge sense of economic instability and job
insecurity, dedicated themselves to rigors of self-management. They prioritized achieving
high GPAs, TOEIC scores, and English scores, accomplishments that fulfill the job
seekers‘ requirements over the political or social issues that did not benefit their current
status (Oh 370).
How, then, could we understand teenagers and individuals in their twenties, who
had experienced the same historical economic structure, took different roles during the
2008 candlelight protest? Oh Chan-ho, here, suggests that difference in their emotions
should be taken into consideration (370). Oh states that the individuals in their twenties
were those who had been born during a time of rapid economic growth and had spent
their childhood in a prosperous environment, but had experienced the 1997 Asian finance
crisis in their teen years (370). They witnessed their fathers being kicked out of jobs and
their families collapsing. Accordingly, while teenagers were motivated to voice their
discontent with the social condition, individuals in their twenties stayed silent because of
their emotional fear. Consequently, the economic dislocations from the early 1990s in
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Korea opened the possibilities of the 2008 candlelight protest formation and at the same
time confined the possibility of its resistance and rebellion.
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Figure 6. The Historical Vectors of the 2008 Candlelight Protest: The
Historical Vectors of the 2008 candlelight protest include ―political
democratization and depoliticization,‖ ―food industrialization and wellbeing
fever,‖ ―market liberalization and job insecurity,‖ and ―advanced communication
technology and carnivalesque culture.‖
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CHAPTER 6:
CONCLUSION

An Articulation of Discontent about Globalization
My research project was in a way aimed at understanding the identity of the 2008
candlelight protest. The 2008 protest began following the Korean government‘s decision
to resume U.S. beef imports in April 2008, which had been suspended its imports in 2003
after an outbreak of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) was detected in the
United States. Korea‘s resumption of U.S. beef imports was problematic especially
because Korea‘s agreement was carried out with fewer restrictions on meat shipments
than the countries that resumed their U.S. beef markets ahead of Korea. With fear of mad
cow disease mounting, a large number of Koreans gathered in a square in downtown
Seoul, urging Lee Myunbak‘s government (which approved the beef imports) to
renegotiate the unfavorable terms of U.S. beef importation. The protest against U.S. beef
imports continued for the three months of summer (from mid-May to mid-August) in
2008, and the candlelight was finally blown out as the beef import conditions were
revised through renegotiations by delegations of the two countries.
The 2008 candlelight protest is now notably recorded as Korea‘s largest social
movement within 20 years; the protest dominated public attention and drew a staggering
response from journalists, political commentators, and human and social science scholars,
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all of whom attempted to analyze the protest through their own perspectives. Mainstream
conservative newspapers declared that the protest was driven by individuals misguided
by anti-American forces. On the contrary, Korean leftists and progressive alliances
asserted that the protest, ignited by the government‘s approval of U.S. beef imports, was
indeed critical of neoliberal globalization. I found that despite the contrasting tones of the
conservative and progressive parties regarding the justifiability, both believed that the
protest was a ―resistance‖ either against the dominant eco-political logic.
The protest against the U.S. beef imports was undeniably a resistance to the
economic fascism of neoliberal globalization in that it was in opposition to the KorUS
FTA: the beef trade deal was arranged for the purpose of expanding trade agreements
with the United States. In my research project, however, I aimed to explain views on the
identity of the protest and explore whether the 2008 candlelight protesters‘ articulated
discourse comprised merely a resistance against neoliberal globalization. The notion of
articulation that I use in this research project as my theoretical lens guides me to suggest
that an articulated (enunciated) discourse has no essential connotation, but has its
meanings on the top of articulated (linked) different elements within the discourse at a
particular historical juncture. Hence, I attempted to retrieve the historical features and
culturescapes that created the communicative possibility of the protest in order to
(re)define the 2008 candlelight protest.
In the following sections, I summarize my speculative analysis in the context of
the theoretical and methodological impulses I adopted in my research. I conclude this
chapter with a discussion on the contribution of my study to the field of communication
studies.
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How to Uncover the Identity of Articulation
Serving as the theoretical and methodological framework, the concept of
―articulation,‖ informs my research project. Grossberg advanced the concept of
articulation into a theoretical frame for identifying a practice or event: articulation is a
process of forging ―contingent and non-necessary‖ connections between certain practices
and their effects, as well as enabling practices to have different (and sometimes
unpredicted) effects (52). This means that the so-called ‗unity‘ of an event or a practice is,
in actuality, the articulation of different, distinct elements, which can be rearticulated in
different ways because they have no necessary belongingness. Based on this notion of
articulation, we can think of an event not as an object but as a process, which ―can only
be understood in response to particular historical contexts‖ (Grossberg 45).
Worth noting here is that Grossberg has suggestions, regarding using the notion of
articulation. First, an articulation can be conceived as a linkage of lines or vectors,
projecting their effects across the field. Articulation may have different vectors, different
forces, and different spatial reaches in different contexts, and it also may have different
temporal reaches, cutting across the boundaries of our attempts at historical periodization.
Second, Grossberg regards ―structure‖ as an important matter for the notion of
articulation (45). Said another way, analyzing an event engages drawing lines or
connections of structures, for they are the productive links between points, events, or
practices within a multidimensional and multidirectional field.
Keeping the rubrics of articulation in mind, I drew specific plans for my research
and included ―speculative analysis‖ as the methodological framework. I applied this
method of speculative analysis for digging out historical contexts comprised of
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―structures‖ (Grossberg 60), which are not uncovered through empirical study methods
such as observations or interviews. While operating as the principles of daily life,
enhancing, constraining, and/or limiting the possibilities of human practices, ―structures‖
do not simply or directly divulge their operations. I used this speculative analysis strategy
to infer the historical vectors and forces of the 2008 candlelight protest (configuration of
likely reality) from the main features of the protest (the verifiable elements that I
comprehend through my observation of the protest and the extant relevant literature).
Main Characteristics of the Articulation
As I embarked on my inquiry, I examined the main (discursive and materialist)
features of the 2008 candlelight protest in Chapter 4. I juxtaposed the 2008 candlelight
protest with the conventional social movements in the 1980s (the period in which social
movements were most vigorous in Korean history) to highlight the salient features of the
2008 protest, and put them into four categories: (1) the main issue, (2) the participants, (3)
the modality, and (4) the goal. I found these four categories useful for my study in that
they helped me mark stark historical changes between the 2008 protest and the
conventional social movements in the 1980s in Korea.
As the features of the 2008 candlelight protest, I first uncovered ―food safety‖ as
the main issue of the protest, an unparalleled feature in comparison to those of
conventional social movements. In the 1980s, demonstrations concentrated on calls for
pro-democracy, human rights, and justifiable wealth redistribution against the
authoritarian regimes. Demonstrations since the mid-1990s were more often centered on
the issues of workers‘ right, globalization and free trade, presence of U.S. forces in Korea,
among other topics. These issues were also suggested during the 2008 candlelight protest,
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but in such a large spectrum of issues, ―food safety‖ was the most prominent theme
running throughout the entire time.151 Participants constantly stated that they had
voluntarily joined the protest with their health concerns and food morals.
Second, the participants of the 2008 candlelight protest encompass the different
political, economic and cultural spectrum. It was sparked by the middle and high school
female students, supported by hundreds of mothers pushing their children in strollers, and
extended to the women who marched with makeup, high-heels, fashionable outfits (such
as mini-skirts), and shiny purses (all of which were not typical attire for conventional
social movements). Celebrities, including singers, a movie star, and a film director
encouraged the protesters with their speeches and performances; a group of male youth in
military reserve uniforms controlled traffic to ensure the safety of the marching protesters;
Internet community members carried protest pickets with hilarious jokes; families
casually joined the protest and made the protest mood peaceful; religious leaders
attempted to protect the protesters from violent measures of suppression. Even farmers
and workers, the subject of conventional social movements, played their roles in the
protest the entire time.
Third, the 2008 candlelight protest utilized festive stances, rhythmical voices, and
humor as its approaches, instead of militant mind sets, stones and fire bombs, fliers,
ideological lines, slogans, and clenched fists. While the government continued to use
violence, to establish its authority during the 2008 candlelight protest, the protesters
showed nonchalant attitudes toward violence. Active participation of Internet
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As mentioned, the 2008 protest evolved into a platform for demonstrating against the current
administration‘s planned neoliberal policies as a whole, including privatization of public enterprises (health
care, water, and electricity), competitive education reforms, and pro-business domestic economic reforms.
Trade unions also tried to incorporate the issue of contract workers, a neoliberal project, into the protest.
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communities and individuals modulated the atmosphere of the 2008 protest toward
peaceful marches, an absence of hierarchy, and constant employment of creative sense of
humor. The protesters‘ chants and marches were not in unison; they avoided the canned
phrases of traditional chanting slogans, instead opting for lilting, concise slogans that
could sound exuberant; the protesting slogans, pickets, placards, and songs were witty
and satirically humorous.
Fourth, in comparison with the conventional social demonstrations, the ultimate
goal of the 2008 candlelight protest appeared ―vague.‖ The large-scale conventional
social movements threatened to overthrow the authoritarian regimes, but the 2008 protest
lost steam in the end without achieving much. The candlelight protest did not even fully
achieve the right for food safety. The candlelight was only blown out when the U.S. beef
import condition was slightly modified through an additional negotiation.152 Soon after
the government officially resumed U.S. beef imports, Korea quickly became the second
largest import entry of American beef in August 2008, and the third biggest by 2010. The
protest did not question the mainstream structures built by the dominant political and
economic paradigm, neoliberalism. The protest did not call for a transformation of
mainstream structures that oppressed the common citizen, although farmers and workers
attempted to inform and awaken the general protesters about the possible impacts of
neoliberal globalization. Moreover, the protest did not ultimately lead Lee to drop his
neoliberal policies (including privatizing health insurance, privatizing public enterprise,
reforming education, etc.) which would limit Koreans‘ everyday life.

152

Although Korea obtained more safety right through the additional negotiation, in actuality it
was not a significant change. Dangerous parts of cows (such as the backbone and internal organs) were still
permitted to enter Korea. Even in regards to the right to inspect, Korea won the right in the accord to
inspect only a sampling of American slaughterhouses.
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Drawing on these characteristics of the protest, I co-opted and reconstituted the
driving vectors and forces of the 2008 candlelight protest through my speculation; I
discussed my findings in Chapter 5 and present a summary of it in the following
paragraphs.
The Driving Vectors and Forces of the Articulation
The goal of Chapter 5 was to explore the historical contexts of the 2008
candlelight protest. Since the main characteristics of the protest were understood in
comparison with conventional social movements of the 1980s, I examined the national
and international contexts of the 1990s and the early 2000s, the time period between the
two different types of the social movements. By comparing and analyzing the main
features of the 2008 candlelight protest and those of the conventional protest in the 1980s,
I attempted to find historical vectors and forces which created the possibility of the 2008
protest. Focusing on the configurations of practices between the 1990s and the early
2000s in Korea, I found four salient axes as the driving vectors: ―political
democratization and depoliticization,‖ ―food industrialization and wellbeing fever,‖
―market liberalization and job insecurity,‖ and ―advanced communication technology and
carnivalesque culture.‖
Political Democratization and Depoliticization
First, I considered ―political democratization and depoliticization‖ which began in
the early 1990s as one of the elements that shaped the protest. After gaining
independence from the Japanese annexation in 1948, Korea had been led by authoritarian
regimes (who unjustifiably usurped power and attempted to exempt themselves from
presidential term limits). Through the blood and sweat of constant pro-democracy
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movements, the Korean public eventually ended the long history of oppression by
military dictatorships and obtained civil rights especially for presidential referendum in
the late 1980s. The biggest nation-wide democracy movement, the 1987 June Democracy
Movement, was the moment in which the Korean public gained power to push for
democratization. This event evidently opened up avenues to ground the current society‘s
sense of political democracy.
One of the notable features within such a democratized and un-authoritarian
social setting, however, was rapid development of popular culture. During the 1990s, new
styles of Korean pop music emerged, incorporating American pop music styles like rap,
rock and techno, grabbing Korean youth‘s attention, encroaching into their daily life, and
reorganizing their passion and sentimentality toward their own life styles (H. Jeon 262–
81). The term Shin-se-dae (new generation) was coined to indicate Korean youth who
were shaped by the un-authoritarian political climate after democratization and the
blossoming popular culture. The emergence of Shin-se-dae created a widening generation
gap by rejecting the previous generations‘ values and norms, such as ideological
dedication, collectivism, and hierarchy, and by being open-minded, practical, confident,
individualistic, and strong in self-expression (Sun-young Park). The generation‘s
optimism and vividness, I believe, shaped the modes of the 2008 candlelight protest in
terms of its lack of hierarchy and the use of a sense of humor.
The un-authoritarian political climate after democratization, on the other hand,
constrained the force of the 2008 candlelight protest. Ironically or naturally, in tandem
with democratization, Korea went through depoliticization. The frequency and size of
political movements decreased, as people lost the common goal of former social
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movements—―pro-democracy.‖ Even outside the country, the collapse of the Soviet
Union Bloc affected the domestic political passions, generating broad skepticism about
theoretical backgrounds and ideological struggles of leftist political lines, which students
had drawn on to lead pro-democracy movements. The advent of the civilian government
in the early 1990s further diminished the persuasiveness of the democratization
movement of the public and drove Korean youth far from politics. The Korean youth,
from the perspective of the old generations (who were politically passionate to topple the
military dictatorship through a series of movements in the1980s), said farewell to
political struggles and ideological issues. Not surprisingly, the 2008 candlelight protest
fizzled out without making any radical statement of political resistance. Whereas the
conventional social movements tended to develop into large-scale resistance trying to
overthrow the dictatorial regimes, the 2008 candlelight protest did not fully develop into
an all-out struggle against the authoritarian Lee Myung-bak government, which made the
decision to import U.S. beef to secure export markets for big Korean corporations.
Global food Exchanges and Wellbeing Fever
I speculated that ―global food exchanges and wellbeing fever‖ was another canvas
to portray the protest. Well-being Yol-pung (wellbeing fever), which indicates the
increased public concern for food safety and a safe ecosystem, initially emerged as a
counter-action to food industrialization and global exchange. Food had become a
commodity for mass production and mass consumption, as the industrialization patterns
of Taylorism and Fordism had been applied to agricultural production in the United
States. Subsequently, food began to be globally exchanged as countries were
incorporated into global open free markets. As Korea had opened up its agricultural
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markets to the world‘s farm products, the possible spread of diseases related to farm
products and their security became a hot issue in Korea, as in other countries.
In the process, the Korean public became increasingly aware of hidden dangers in
daily food from the early 2000s. The ancient principle of Shin-to-bul-i—the belief that
domestic farm products are the best for the body—was reinstated and often talked about.
Regarding wellbeing management, a staggering amount of issues and information
including healthy food recipes and meditation was shared through books and Internet
blogs; the Korean public began to invest their time and energy, which had once been
dedicated to industrialization and modernization, to creating new life styles in their daily
routines. This cultural trend truly swept through the country, entering into large facets of
quotidian life of the Korean public.
Manifesting such a cultural trend, the participants in the 2008 candlelight protest
expressed their health concerns regarding the U.S. beef deal. As mentioned, when the U.S.
beef deal was approved, the Korean public actively expressed their concerns on food
safety, health and life. Those who were in the protest, through TV and newspaper
interviews, emphasized their health concerns, relating fears and worries about possible
mad cow disease.
This cultural zeal for quality of life, on one hand, contributed to broadening the
range of the subjects of social movement but beyond the fences of farms, but at the same
time, wellbeing fever made the protest politically ambivalent. In a way, the candlelight
protest is politically progressive, especially in the sense that it was against the postcolonial overtones of the United States acting a hegemonic vector in global food
distribution, but at the same time, it embedded conservative streaks in the protest. Just as
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wellbeing fever had opened up possibilities to the business sector and enlarged various
wellbeing product markets comprised of exorbitant prices targeted at the upper (or uppermiddle) class, and just as wellbeing culture was heated by the rampant exertions of
capitalist marketing desires, neglecting possible class conflicts, the 2008 candlelight
protest (driven by wellbeing fever) skimped over the issues of widening class gap and
justifiable wealth distribution, which unions attempted to incorporate into the protest. The
unlikely confluence of wellbeing culture (turned to be subordinated to capitalism) and a
social resistance (against capitalism) led such issues not to be taken seriously during the
protests.
Information Technology and the Carnivalesque
The ambivalence of the 2008 candlelight protest is further fuelled by the
information technology and the carnivalesque culture developed between the late 1990s
and the early 2000s. The Korean government poured billions of dollars into constructing
extensive information networks from the late 1990s, and eventually built a highly wired
social environment available to general Korean citizens. The government also applied the
policy of promoting privatization and deregulation even to the information technology
(IT) sector so that the Internet could rapidly expand for economic purposes. Under such
conditions, Koreans became technology-savvy. Such situation opened up opportunities
for the Korean public to achieve freedom of speech to counterbalance the views of the
mainstream mass media. The public began to express nonconformist and even rebellious
views on the Internet, which granted them openness and anonymity to some extent.
One interesting fact here was the emergence of carnivalesque culture on the
Internet, re-politicizing the depoliticized Korean youth as well as reshaping political
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patterns. Specifically, an alternative political news website, Ddanzi Ilbo was founded in
1998 and began to engage politics by galvanizing forums and publishing political
comments. However, its method of political engagement was unconventional; unlike
serious comments and criticisms in conventional politics, Ddanzi Ilbo presented its
political opinions and critical perspectives through expletives, jokes, coined vulgar
vocabularies, and comic cartoons. DC Inside (www.DCinside.com), which was originally
founded as a commercial website to sell electronic gadgets and goods such as digital
cameras in the early 2000s, also turned to creating political comments through
techonologified parody images, comic songs, and satirical phrases as well.
I believe that the carnivalesque culture developed on the Internet fed into the 2008
candlelight protest. The participants demonstrated their ability to lead the reformative
project by organizing the protest through the Internet, without any mediation of civil
organizations. The new style of political engagement was also evident in the mode of the
2008 candlelight protest. Instead of rational arguments based on grandiose narratives, the
2008 candlelight protesters artfully used ―carnivalesque‖ tactics. Protesters relentlessly
joked that water cannons served as portable showers during the hot summer season,
dubbed the police bus (which had a wire enclosure) ―chicken cage,‖ and even voluntarily
turned themselves into ride on the chicken cage.
In a way, such carnivalesque culture popularized the issue of the protest,
simultaneously making the protest a work of paradox and ambiguity, just as a historical
carnival. In a historical carnival, hegemonic social roles and usual restrictions on public
behavior were officially relaxed and reversed, but the suspension of social rules was only
temporary. The sphere of the historical carnival was separate from everyday life, so that it
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did not succeed in ultimately disturbing social rules. As if echoing the historical carnival,
the 2008 protest‘s humiliation and degradation through the initial impulse of the body
were too light and volatile to evolve into radical struggles. This makes me speculate that
the link between the carnivalesque and resistant power is not fixed, straight, unbroken, or
continuous.
Economic Depression and Job Insecurity
The economic depression in the late 1990s and the subsequently adopted
neoliberal policies were also structural pre-conditions that ironically both expanded and
constrained the possibility of the protest. As mentioned above, the political
democratization in 1987 was followed by economic liberalization and the adoption of
neoliberal policies from the early 1990s in Korea. In particular, the first civil government
of Kim Young-sam made the decision to join in the OECD in 1996; in order to maintain
its membership of OECD, the government adopted a policy of an open market, which
brought broad-based relaxation of finance sector regulations such as permitting
companies and banks to attract foreign loans. However, a chain reaction occurred in an
unpredictable way: a sudden influx of transnational capital led first to an economy and
property bubble, then to rapid capital flight, and finally to a financial-cum-economic
crisis in 1997.
Confronting a big slump in the Korean economy, the subsequent government
established economic reform and a restructuring recommended by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), which provided loans to Korea. The economic restructuring
resulted in mergers and the acquisition of big companies in the banking and
manufacturing sectors, whose immediate impacts were massive layoffs of laborers,
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increase of ―flexibility‖ of the labor market, and plummeting working conditions. As the
percentage of temporary job workers became higher than that of permanent job workers,
the idea of a lifelong workplace gradually disappeared (Son, ―Journalism in the
Neoliberal Era‖ 49–76).
The unsecure economic conditions, I believe, also served as the entryway to the
2008 candlelight protest. The severity of unemployment and economic conditions had
escalated into an intensification of competition in school education (which would lead to
better chances of finding jobs). The small group of middle and high school students, who
first took to the streets for the protest, was comprised of the victims of the cut-throat
competition in the education system. With burdens of grade competition, the students had
moved back and forth between their public regular schools and private after-schools and
tutoring programs, which had rapidly expanded in an effort to prepare students for the
competitive college admission process. The Lee government‘s approval of U.S. beef
imports increasingly, further, distressed the students by putting them in a situation in
which they could never eat their school lunch with peace of mind (Chu 245–70).
Teenagers, overwhelmed by all of the government plans, could do nothing but cry out
―Stop Mad Education, Stop Mad Cow Disease!‖
The stagnant economic condition, on the other hand, silenced many people during
the protest, particularly individuals in their twenties. Traditionally, the younger
generation, especially college students, had led social movements with their liberal and
progressive ideas. During the 2008 candlelight protest, however, individuals in their
twenties appeared relatively inactive in comparison to their predecessors. Lack of
participation by individuals in their twenties was connected to the influence of the
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depressed economic conditions. Having faced social polarization, job insecurity,
dwindling labor wages, devastating work rhythms, and danger of losing public utilities
and corporations in the swirl of neoliberal globalization, the individuals became more
concerned about their own economic wellbeing and less concerned about social and
political issues. Unlike teenagers, individuals in their twenties, who had witnessed
massive lay-offs and family breakdowns during the economic downturns in 1997,
appeared to be in constant fear of unemployment even during the 2008 candlelight protest.
Summary
In my dissertation project, guided by the rubrics of ―articulation,‖ I investigated a
matrix of complex-tangled historical vectors as the canvas on which the contour of the
2008 candlelight protest was drawn. I found the 2008 protest situated at the node of the
four salient vectors of historical events and phenomena between the 1990s and the early
2000s, including ―political democratization and depoliticization,‖ ―global food exchange
and wellbeing fever,‖ ―developments of communication technology and carnivalesque
culture,‖ and ―market liberalization and job insecurity.‖ These vectors show that the
identity of the 2008 candlelight protest is not simply a discursive unity but a contingent
linkage of different vectors and forces of social structures. It is constituted ―on the top of
differences, of unities out of fragments, of structures across practices‖ (Grossberg 52).
The fragmented historical vectors in the political, economic, and sociocultural arenas
converged into the regular pattern of mundane life of the Korean public from the early
1990s; the ordinary life and culture, through which the Korean public had traipsed,
framed the contour and texture of the 2008 candlelight protest.
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The paradoxical qualities of the historical vectors additionally shaped the 2008
candlelight protest into an event of contradiction and ambiguity. The vectors have
paradoxical qualities: they cater to the mainstream social paradigm in some sense, but
also they are articulated into different, sometimes competing and sometimes
contradictory sets of relations with the mainstream logic. The 2008 candlelight protest,
which reflected such paradoxical qualities, exists at the cusp between subordination to
and resistance against neoliberal globalization, providing large support for Grossberg‘s
insight about historical struggles as ―neither pure resistance nor pure domination but
rather, as caught between containment and possibility‖ (52). This contradictory and
ambiguous identity of the protest ultimately debunks the dichotomy of resistance and
subordination, on which the conventional, ideology-oriented perspectives habitually rely.
Contribution
Communication studies have engaged with social movements in the sense that
social resistance has concomitant with the formation of counter-hegemonic discourses, as
well as the enactment of human agency against structure. Korean communication
scholars have engaged the 2008 candlelight protest as a social resistance and discussed
how the Korean public formulated counter-hegemonic discourse, set up the entry point of
solidarity, and developed the movement with its unique communicative modalities, based
on new communication technologies. These scholars have generally conceptualized the
2008 candlelight protest as an explosion of civil power grounded in digital media in a
highly technology-developed country.
Although the extant communication studies grasped the trendy convergence of
social protest and new communication technologies, I believe that communication media
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cannot be the only answer to the question of who/what was pulling the strings of the
protest, nor can it be the only (super-) agents to actualize the democratic ideals.
Information technology (especially the Internet) surely assumed pivotal roles in
mobilizing people and contributed to the protest‘s development and unique form, but
considering the previous social movements in Korean history which obtained large public
support before the emergence of the Internet and other, information technology is likely
insufficient to be touted as the single most important factor that attracted extensive
participation during the 2008 candlelight protest.
To this extent, I designed my research project to centralize historical contexts in
identifying the 2008 candlelight protest and moved my attention to the discussions of
Korean left intellectuals, who have situated the 2008 protest within its historical context.
The leftist intellectuals have located the 2008 protest within its historical context of
neoliberal globalization, and conceptualized it as a revolutionary action against the
contemporary eco-political principle. This kind of conceptualization, however, reflects
economic reductionism and does not reach an adequate explanation of the heterogeneous
texture of the protest.
The recognition of the limitations of the extant discussions on the protest led me
to include the notion of ―articulation,‖ which provides a contextualist perspective with
consideration of multi-dimensional forces (Grossberg 45) in my research project. In this
research, guided by the notion of articulation, the 2008 candlelight protest is identified by
the interwoven complexities of political, social, economic, and cultural factors. My
research findings, which show that the 2008 protest is not merely a resistance against
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neoliberal globalization but an event driven by the stream, formulates the paradoxical
quality of the protest between progressive and conservative lines.
My research findings that conceptualizes the 2008 protest, in a way, as a
progressive resistance against neoliberalism globalization, and at the same time as a
conservative mark provide better explanations about the situations surrounding the 2008
candlelight protest. Not many of the protesters took the issue of contract workers into
their serious consideration, nor attempting to topple down the Lee administration, which
planned on neoliberal policies such as privatizing health insurance, privatizing public
enterprise, reforming education, etc. Even considering how the tide has been turning after
the protest, my research findings help us draw a better picture of our location and
direction. Soon after the protest ended on August 15, Korea quickly became the second
largest import entry of American beef in the end of August 2008, and the third biggest by
2010; in the 2012 presidential election in Korea, a person from the same conservative
party as Lee Myung-bak won for the next term. If the 2008 candlelight protest was
merely an explosion of civil power against neoliberalism through digital media, how all
the situations could come as these cases? The 2008 candlelight protest is not a pure
resistance that entirely questions or rethinks the social terrains and principles of
neoliberalism.
My research findings about the 2008 protest also represent the trendy features of
contemporary social movements. Unlike the conventional social movements, narrowly
focused, well organized, strategically serious (Linsky), like the 2008 candlelight protest,
the contemporary social protests including Arab Spring in 2010 and Occupy Wall Street
have utilized new ways of political engagement mixed with cultural imaginativity (such
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as irony, satire, and parody) and developed anti-hierarchical and anti-authoritarian
consensus-based politics. My research findings attract attentions to such new approaches
to protest and activism, which circumvent the standard conduits of political information,
fostering and constraining political conversations among the youth.
In doing so, my findings emphasize the importance of exploring historical
contexts of social movements in communication studies for dynamically articulating, dearticulating and re-articulating an event and practice. Moreover, my research findings
contribute to developments of the theoretical notion of articulation and speculative
analysis as a methodological frame in social science. The notion of articulation has
created confusion among scholars, as Slack states that there is no complete configuration
of ―articulation,‖ and Geras has made pejorative comments on the unclear usage of it. My
research findings locate the notion of articulation as a theoretical framework with respect
to understanding the identity of an event and a practice as an unfinished phenomenon that
emerges and continues to emerge within complex historical contexts. The findings of my
study also confirm applicability and practical vitality of speculative analysis as a
methodological term in critical and cultural studies scholarship, for examining historical
vectors and forces as structural forces that operate within deep layers of our daily
experiences.
I hope that all of my research findings are useful for those who have the intention
to map out their plans for more radical social movements. Chantal Mouffe‘s rumination
on democratic struggles, in her journal article, captures my research intention: ―What will
help us to better envisage the main challenge facing democratic politics today: how to
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create democratic forms of identifications that will contribute to mobilize passions
towards democratic designs‖ (26).
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